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Different parts of the African continent have been subject to conflict. Over the years, both state 
and non-state actors to provide lasting solutions to peace have embarked on various 
peacebuilding initiatives. Despite different programs, projects, and peace agreements that have 
been signed and established. It however, remains a challenge in most post-conflict countries to 
secure lasting peace. In most cases, there has been relapse of conflict within a period of 5 years 
after the peace accord, or within a decade of peace programs. This research approaches the 
African conflict problem from a theoretical standpoint, to challenge the dominance of liberal 
concepts of peace that remain an impasse in grounding necessary structures that may be of 
significant help to build sustainable peace. Vertical integration peacebuilding is engaged as a 
hybrid peace theory in analyzing the various peacebuilding procedures that have been applied 
over the years by international organizations, state actors and regional actors in the continent. 
DRC, Somalia and South Sudan are the relevant case studies. The main argument is not to 
dismiss the progress achieved so far. Rather it seeks to engage on a corrective analysis of the 
strategic impasses that have been sabotaging the transformation processes that can be of much 
significance in dealing with the conflict problems. There have been repetitive liberal/top-
down/paternalistic peacebuilding approaches in the past two or more decades in Africa’s conflict 
countries with little or no significant changes in the transformation of peace. Therefore, vertical 
integration as a peacebuilding approach is engaged to expose the weaknesses of the dominant 
liberal peace mechanisms that guides various institutions of peace in Africa. The researcher 
outlines the importance of developing more local peace ownership programs and establishing a 
legitimate support for peacebuilding programs from below as an effective and alternative way of 
ushering in sustainable peacebuilding programs. Henceforth, sector security reform, and 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, which are particular to peacebuilding, 
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CHAPTER 1: Orientation of the Research theme 
Background and outline of research 
 Since the 1970s, peacebuilding in most African countries was characterized by top-down 
approaches. These approaches mostly focused on strengthening and stabilizing state institutions 
around the principles of addressing past wrongs so as to promote nation building and unity 
(Ncube, 2014). In the post-Cold war era, there has been prominence in the efforts of building 
peace in most conflict-ridden countries. There has been a renewed emphasis on peacebuilding by 
the international community, which has received more attention since Agenda for Peace1 in 
1992. Considering the development of these new propitious trends in promoting the building of 
peace in the early 1990s much hope was assured as peacebuilding activities expanded, 
institutions focusing on peacebuilding projects proliferated and support in the peacebuilding 
scholarship increased (Curtis, 2012). Whilst peacebuilding seemed to have amassed considerable 
experience, acquired much funding, and support over the years, conflict trends in Africa are still 
far from being stable with new conflicts taking shape in countries such as Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) etc.  
Tracing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa 
Tim Murithi in Adebajo and Scanlon (2006: 244) clarifies that conflict crisis in Africa requires, 
“effective post-conflict reconstruction processes and the institutions to back them up.” This 
prognosis follows a trend of past challenges engaged in post-conflict peacebuilding. This 
research seeks to add value to the post-conflict peacebuilding literature and clarify some 
theoretical guidelines that can assist in creating effective institutions. The emergence of African 
Union’s defined peace frameworks between the years 2002-2006 and its clear support for the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to improve the African countries support 
and promotion for peace proved their desire to consolidate post-conflict reconstruction. On the 
other hand, in September 2005 the United Nations (UN) established the Peacebuilding 
Commission with a clear mandate of assisting countries in consolidating peacebuilding processes 
in post-conflict countries. Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008) advocated for a strong relationship 
between these two fronts of peacebuilding if effective outcomes where to be reached in the 
                                                          
1 An Agenda for Peace on Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General (Buotros-
Buotros Ghali) pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 
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process. However, Murithi (2007; 2008) warns that in as much as the relationship between the 
two entities is important, the AU should remain vigilant in declaring total ownership of their 
processes in representing local values to peace or else they may end up in a “hybrid 
paternalism”2 instead of “hybrid partnership”3.  However, the terms of the relationships between 
UN Peacebuilding Commission and AU Peace and Security Council remain limited. The 
foundation, laid by the Consultative Meeting between the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the 
African Union Peace and Security Council in 2010, stipulates several key factors that are 
important in peacebuilding today. It outlines that member States emphasized the “importance of 
a strengthened partnership”, “establishment of joint mechanisms”, “the promotion of coherence 
of action between national actors and international partners in support of peacebuilding” and 
“affirmed the principle of national ownership of the peacebuilding process”. However, the 
question is how far have these factors been put in place? Alternatively, they remain a mystery 
and farfetched in the peacebuilding processes that are taking place.  
 
Whilst there is, celebration that there is an increase in the practice of building peace in Africa 
there is still need for much work to achieve sustainability in the process. In the twenty-first 
century, Africa has witnessed the fruition of the African Union’s (AU) [unlike its predecessor 
OAU]4 active role, participation and contribution towards peacebuilding through various forms 
of intervention with the support of United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and other 
significant International donors. Since the anchoring of the Peace Support Architecture in 2004 
by the AU, various divisions have been put in place to bring forth solutions to the conflict 
challenges at hand (Vorrath 2012). These divisions of peace where forged under the AU’s Peace 
Support Department (PSD) and they include: Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division, 
Conflict Management and Post Conflict Reconstruction Division, Peace Support Operations 
Division (PSOD), Peace and Security Council Secretariat, and Defence and Security Division 
(DSD) (AU Commission). In 2006, the AU created Post Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development (PCRD) framework that was fashioned in the same manner with the UN 
                                                          
2 Hybrid Paternalism refers to the dominance of one institution’s ideas and practices over the other, in this case the dominance or 
imposition of the UN policies and structures over the AU (Murithi 2008). 
3 Hybrid Partnership refers to equal representation and contribution of either involved parties or institutions without imposing 
each other’s ways. (Murithi 2008) 
4 Organisation of African Unity since 1963 to 2002. 
 
 12 
Peacebuilding architecture aimed to support and “help countries consolidate peace and prevent a 
relapse into conflict” (de Carvalho, 2014). However, considering this dedication and 
commitment to better the outcomes in African conflict cases, the continuity of conflict following 
peace agreements tellingly expose the huge gap in the strategies used to address the conflict 
problems.. Vorrath (2012) takes a stand to clarify that despite all these structures put in place; 
African states have shown little commitment in supporting the peace fund making only 2 per 
cent, contribution from 2008 to 2011 period whilst international donors contributed 98 per cent. 
Thus, she extensively argues that if lasting peace is to be achievable on the continent, various 
strategic plans that are inclusive and considerate of various approaches have to be put in place. 
This backdrop provides a clear platform to figure out the various loopholes in understanding why 
sustainable peace has been failing to materialise in African conflict cases and may remain as 
such if proper mechanisms are not put in place.  
Conflict problems   
In understanding the contemporary shortcomings in conflict transformation in which 
“intractable” and “protracted social conflicts” have become dominant, it has become much more 
difficult for peace organizations, governments and communities to work on sustainable peace 
independently of one another. The practice of building peace has been dominated by (imposed) 
liberal frameworks, which have attracted more top-down (institutional) approaches in the process 
(Hoffman 2009; Lederach 1997; Ramsbotham et al 2011). There does exist, a range of grassroots 
(bottom-up) approaches that include people-to-people approaches to peacebuilding, which have 
also been the dominant practice in Sudan, Mindinao and Israeli-Palestine processes of peace 
(Akwanda & Harris 2009; Ramsbotham et al 2011). The field remains divided between these 
approaches with the former practice being labelled as ‘paternalistic’ and ‘standardized’ in nature 
hence neglecting local participation which is vital in peacebuilding (Eriksen, 2009; Hoffman, 
2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). The latter, has received much attention from the critics of the 
former, but Ramsbotham et al (2011) in agreement with Hoffman (2009) clearly warns that the 
bottom-up approaches which embraces local participation need to be engaged without 
romanticising the processes.  
In most peacebuilding interventions and participation, international institutions and organisations 
have focused more on ensuring liberal structures through their peacebuilding practices. Most 
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African conflict countries have received peace support from various organisations guided by 
liberal approaches and mechanisms. The neglecting of local and grassroots peacebuilding 
initiatives in the practice of peacebuilding has weakened various frameworks of diplomacy and 
negotiation in the building of sustainable peace in African states (Hoffman 2006). Therefore, the 
reality of sustainable peace has remained a challenge in most African countries with lists of 
failed peace agreements and some conflicts going on for more than two decades. Conflict 
transformation engages conflict problems on a more inclusive platform which advocates for a 
deeper inquiry and endeavours to enrich peace research through “creating constructive change 
processes that reduce violence” (Lederach 2003). It provides avenues of addressing deep-rooted 
conflicts; through identifying every possible means which ensures the bridging of barriers in 
communication and clash of ideas (between international/governmental institutions/actors, civil 
societies and local actors) to address the forces that continuously generate the conflict (Garwerc 
2006). Thus, it contests the idea of imposing strategies of both liberal peacebuilding and 
grassroots peacebuilding (such as peace agreements and people-to-people initiatives) which have 
dominated most peace initiatives all over the world. 
Purpose of the Study 
Tellingly, research on effective peace mechanisms for African conflict cases are a sine qua non, 
if prevention of armed conflict and the establishment of sustainable peace it to be achieved. This 
research explores aspects of peacebuilding, both as a concept and as an effective tool, for conflict 
transformation that will provide a foundation for long term/sustainable peace mechanisms in 
addressing Africa’s conflict problem. The researcher posits that there has been more of negative 
peace5 than positive peace6 following many peace agreements in African conflict countries such 
as the Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Somalia. Therefore, 
the research focuses on promoting effective outcomes in peacebuilding practices by institutions, 
governments and (both international and local) organisations before, during and after conflict to 
ensure the building of sustainable peace. The research also seeks to outline the factors hindering 
the building of sustainable peace after the signing of peace agreements. Scholars agree that, there 
                                                          
5 The absence of direct conflict usually based on signed or verbal agreements driven by institutional stakeholders. 
6 Positive peace implies more than the absence of direct violence or conflict. It also considers tackling all forms of structural 
violence and systems, which perpetuate inequality in all economic, social and political spheres. Therefore, it is characterized by 
the “presence of social justice through equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and 
impartial enforcement of law” (Galtung, 1967: 22).  
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has been resurgence of latent violence (into manifest violence)7, asymmetric conflict and relapse 
of civil wars within a period of five years or less of peace after the signing of peace agreements 
(Belloni 2007: 99; Ramsbotham et al 2011). 
 
Understandably, peacebuilding strives to ‘transform societal relationships’ (Haider, 2014). The 
purpose of this research is to portray the weaknesses exposed in political, social and economic 
relations in building sustainable peace in African conflict zones and post-conflict reconstruction 
environments. Therefore, this research aims to outline the limitations in political governance and 
policy approaches [especially the drafting of peace agreements] concerning the resolution and 
transformation of conflicts in Africa and how that gap can be bridged. Despite some of the 
conflicts, having been resolved through peace agreements in Africa, cases of conflict resurgence 
are continuously high (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). In recent history, the Northern Ireland peace 
processes, the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the end of apartheid South Africa, 
influenced the emergency of new diverse tools and institutions of managing and intervening in 
conflicts. Henceforth, these various platforms have dominated the new face of building peace by 
ushering in multi-dimensional approaches to peacekeeping, witnessed the formation of the 
United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC), and the increase of state and non-state 
actors’ operations in complex security environments (Carayannis et al, 2014:2). Today, there is 
much better information, resources and lessons learnt from past peacebuilding interventions on 
their successes and failures to better both the theoretical framework of the subject and practices 
in transforming conflict situations effectively.  
 
Many scholars have come to agree that to build effective peace one should consider cultivating 
the local cultural and traditional values of a given society that can be of great significance in 
establishing governing, negotiating and cooperative capabilities, which can sustain peacebuilding 
measures in the long-run (Orjuela, 2003; Pugh et al, 2008; Liden et al, 2009). Hoffman (2009) 
clearly articulates that, “a peace that is built on the ground needs to reflect the interests, needs 
and aspirations of local populations rather than those of the international peacebuilding 
                                                          
7 “Manifest violence is that which is observable whether or not it is recognized as is the case for some forms of structural 
violence. Latent violence “is something which is not there, yet might easily come about”. Latent violence is the underlying 
potential for violence which may lead to manifest violence”. http://allmyneighbors.org/2013/12/09/johan-galtungs-six-
dimensions-of-violence/ accessed 11 Aug. 15 
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community”. There are various loopholes and challenges of peace mechanisms which have been 
transplanted from one society to another which can be identified in tracing the history of UN 
peace missions in Africa, AU peace operations and international organizations that provide 
support and intervention programs. Henceforth, there is much need in Africa peace support 
missions to desist from a system of “monocropping” liberal peace approaches that were used 
successfully in other conflict contexts in Europe, without considering the different and varied 
contexts in many African states (Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011).  
 
This research takes a hybrid peace8 approach in unpacking ‘vertical integration peacebuilding’ 
as a relevant theory to use in addressing African conflict problems. The main argument pushed 
forward is that the blending of both institutional and grassroots approaches is a relevant tool in 
the practice of building peace in Africa [some scholars refers to it as hybrid peacebuilding9]. 
Considering that each conflict setting is unique, the concept of vertical integration acknowledges 
the differences of various societal conditions and demands of each conflict community before 
engaging any peace initiative (Burt & Donias, 2014). Therefore, the researcher posits that 
peacebuilding actors and practitioners need to find an expanse of complementing both grassroots 
and institutional approaches to harness and create effective mechanisms of addressing the 
conflict problems at hand. The process of peacebuilding demands ‘friction’ between global and 
local encounters for the emergency of refined peace approaches (Bjorkal and Hoglund, 2013). 
The use of the term ‘friction’, refers to localization (vernacularisation10 and hybridization), in 
which foreign ideas are constructively engaged by local actors (through discourse, grafting, 
cultural selection and framing) to develop and identify congruent trends with local practices and 
beliefs that can benefit in constructing effective peace mechanisms which are localised. 
 
Scholars agree that contemporary theories of peacebuilding approaches have become dominantly 
guided by the rubric of ‘hybrid peace’ (Belloni, 2012; Boege et al, 2009; Chandler, 2013; 
Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2011; Murithi 2006, 2007,2008; Raeymaekers, 2013; Ramsbotham 
et al, 2011; Richmond & Mitchell, 2012; Tadjbakhsh, 2011; Yamashita, 2014). This interplay of 
                                                          
8 “Hybridity in peacebuilding is used to capture the intertwined relationship between the global and the local, the formal and the 
liberal and the illiberal”. (Bjorkdahl and Hoglund, 2013: 293) 
9 Ramsbotham et al, 2011 
10 “A process of appropriation [(set aside by formal action) global ideas being deliberated for/] and local adoption”( Bjorkdahl 
and Hoglund, 2013: 293)  
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various approaches from both global and local seeks to address intractable and protracted 
conflicts through the most relevant holistic ideas. It is within this framework that this thesis 
examines three of Africa’s longest contemporary conflicts in the DRC, South Sudan and 
Somalia.    
Delineating the Research Problems and Arguments 
This study seeks to “strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” 
(Agenda for Peace, 1992)11 in most African conflict countries. Despite there being much 
research on peacebuilding in Africa, most of the literature on conflict and peace studies has 
limited information that articulates viable strategies and mechanisms for building peace in 
intractable and protracted conflicts. Unfortunately, most conflict challenges in Africa have a 
history of long and complex conflicts, which are, yet to be resolved. However, the research 
maintains a strong position that intractable conflicts in Africa can be transformed into peace if 
proper coherent mechanisms are translated into practice. Intractability in most African conflict 
countries is maintained through the reproduction of positions of power by those in leadership at 
all levels12 thus they tend to revert to strategies that ensure the sustenance of their positions. 
Henceforth, the research explores the various local and global practices that have potential in 
harnessing a striking balance to ensure the process of social transformation that can yield 
sustainable peace. 
 
 DRC, South Sudan and Somalia are amongst the most complex conflicts that have received 
much attention from the international community and regional organizations. There is much 
challenge in comprehending the historical facts of all these conflicts. Therefore, this research 
will limit itself to understanding the factors surrounding the failure of peace agreements and 
reconciliation processes in the case. Curtis (2012:18) comments how “peace agreements 
themselves are replete with tensions”. Which means peace agreements can be viewed differently 
by international (outside) actors and by local political actors (competitors). Whilst the former 
may view them, as binding the latter may view them as instruments and contextual tools to 
enhance their own agendas [of legitimizing some illegitimate systems and actions] (see Chapter 
                                                          
11 A/47/277 – S/24111, para. 21  
12 See Lederach’s Leadership Pyramid in Chapter 3 of the research 
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4). DRC, Somalia and South Sudan share a common crisis of peace agreements and 
reconciliation conferences, which have been taking place with an increasing number of factions 
participating and have yet failed to deliver peace so far. The Fragile States Index indicates that 
for the past four years these countries have been in the top five countries tagged with the highest 
alert. Even though, Sierra Leone is one of the few celebrated successes of peacebuilding in 
Africa it goes unnoticed that prior to the final successful agreement in 2002, three consecutive 
peace agreements had failed dismally since 1991. Scholars agree that the conflict in Sierra Leone 
was highly intractable and required the proper peace mechanisms to ensure some successful 
peace agreement outcomes.  
 
Many African cases of building peace in conflict zones and post-conflict zones are faced with 
various setbacks leading back to conflict. More so, most peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict 
recovery strategies run as ad hoc programs. Therefore, most peacebuilding practitioners agree 
that whatever form of peacebuilding should never be an ad hoc but a permanent process, 
incorporated in state-building governance and institutional missions and projects (Donias, 2014).  
 
Research Problems 
The main problems, identified are that of ineffective peace approaches that have resulted in more 
complex conflict situations in Africa. Profound scholars such as Mark Hoffman (2006; 2009), 
Devon Curtis (2012), Ramsbotham et al (2011) have argued that the fatal failure of most African 
peacebuilding inventions are due to the ‘mono-cropping’ of western liberal peacebuilding 
strategies. Therefore, the researcher critically engages the concept of liberal peacebuilding in an 
effort to address the challenge and to forge in alternative salient frameworks that are more 
flexible. The research zeros in on “vertical integration peacebuilding” as a strategic conflict 
transformation theory, which suggest that peace-building is not just an issue of international 
actors addressing conflict issues but also a case for the government, and the communities 
affected by the conflict to get involved (Donias & Burt, 2014). Hitherto, Lederach’s analysis of 
peacebuilding envisioned as a model which is suitable for the building of sustainable peace thus,  
constructing a peace process in deeply divided societies and situations of internal armed conflict requires an 
operative frame of reference that takes into consideration the legitimacy, uniqueness, and interdependency of 
the needs and resources of the grassroots, middle range, and top level (1997: 60) 
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Lederach’s argument provides a platform for defining new operative frameworks, which are 
adaptive to African environments. This remains a challenging fact to address in this research, but 
as identified in the researcher’s main arguments the consideration of inclusive and 
transdisciplinary approaches allows a more flexible platform for critically engaging the 
discourses in peacebuilding and bridging the parameters of intractability and peace failure. 
 
One of the problems considered in this research is the challenge of stakeholder participation in 
the process of building peace. Stakeholders in conflict includes civilians, civil societies, conflict 
actors (rebels, militias and government or state military), third parties (NGOs, international 
organisations and institutions, foreign governments consultants). In light of this, the OECD 
(2010: 7) report stipulated that peace building together with state building require sustainable 
efforts from all stakeholders; the G7+13 proposed that this aims “to improve governance, 
strengthen economic and social development, and promote peace and security”. This is a cause 
which requires both the recognition of the central state-society relations which includes the 
vulnerable and excluded groups (women, children and youths [civilians/stakeholder 
communities]); and the consideration of international actors or organizational actors which 
focuses on strengthening national capacities for conflict management and laying down 
foundations for sustainable peace and development (un.org -ECOSOC). In outlining such issues, 
there is need for a breaking ground for feasible mechanisms that enact development and support 
capable, accountable and responsive functional states.  This demands international actors, the 
government and the affected communities to work together without any hindrances. Thus, this 
research advances the need of hybrid peacebuilding initiatives and transdisciplinary support 
systems in bringing forth the desired sustainable peace in Africa. 
 
Research Arguments 
This research presents two main arguments:  
                                                          
13 “There are currently 20 member countries of the g7+. Members span across the globe from different regions, cultures, 
traditions and historical contexts in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Pacific; they are amongst the world’s most mineral rich, yet 
least developed and low-income economies. Despite coming from diverse backgrounds, member countries identified significant 
commonalities in their dealings with international actors, and in the impediments restricting the process of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding.” (Retrieved at: http://www.g7plus.org/en/who-were-are/member-countries Accessed on 08/06/2016)  
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Argument 1: by employing flexible [inclusive and constructive] and transdisciplinary14 
approaches in the building of peace [in order to approach each community as unique and 
embrace the local pragmatic systems through holistic measures as a way of ushering in 
participation and effective engagement from all actors at all levels to contribute to the ending of 
the conflict], effective peace mechanisms can emerge in solving complex conflict situations and 
building sustainable peace.  
Argument 2: the instituting of permanent peacebuilding processes before, during and after the 
conflict as opposed to ad hoc peacebuilding projects can assist in eliminating conflict 
resurgences. The approach of each African conflict relating to its experiences can assist in 
acquiring more peacebuilding skills that are useful in drafting peace agreements, promoting 
state-building governance as well as establishing strong institutional frameworks and conduct, 
which promotes legitimate, coherent, reliable and sustainable outcomes. 
Unpacking the Broader issues to be investigated in Research 
In understanding the facts of the Global Peace Index (GPI) as of 2015, six (6) of the eleven (11) 
least peaceful countries belonged to Africa. These countries include Nigeria, DRC, Sudan, South 
Sudan, Somalia, and Central African Republic (CAR). In tracing the trend of GPI, back to 2008 
there is always an average of 17 African countries in the 32 least peaceful countries15. The main 
aspect promoted in this study is to identify various channels to deliberate on in broadening 
mechanisms to peace practice in Africa. In the twenty-first century NEPAD, the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and AU have adopted similar peacebuilding approaches to their 
international counterparts to put in place mechanisms and structures of building peace in conflict 
countries (Khadiagala, 2012). These approaches are guided by liberal governance packages, and 
have so far failed to produce the best of results. Henceforth, the study interacts and comment on 
the limitations of liberal peacebuilding in addressing African conflict problems but does not 
dismiss the concept as ineffective. Rather it clarifies that the concept need reviewing in relation 
to African countries, which have unique societal structures and values. 
                                                          
14 Transdisciplinary approaches may refer to “research efforts conducted by investigators from different disciplines working 
jointly to create new conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and translational innovations that integrate and move beyond 
discipline-specific approaches to address a common problem”. http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/trec/about-us/definitions/ accessed 
19/11/ 2015. 
15 See website: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/2015 accessed August 12, 2015  
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Institutional Paternalism Vs Institutional Partnership: The barrier to sustainability 
The UN has always been at the forefront in guiding and leading the route of building peace. In 
1992, the Agenda for Peace published and three notable changes began to take effect in 
peacebuilding and these include “an expansion of peacebuilding activities, a proliferation of 
institutions tasked with peacebuilding and an increase in peacebuilding scholarship” (Curtis, 
2012: 5). In fact, since the early 1990s, most UN peacekeeping operations were dominant in 
Africa and most of the initial stages of peacebuilding practices trailed on the continent. 
Peacebuilding has attracted much support from international institutions and donors and various 
governmental and intergovernmental bodies have become very active in the process. Barnett et al 
(2007), argues that these bodies have no common approaches they agree on in building peace but 
their organizational mandates and interests control them.  
 
In addition, Curtis (2012: 15) posits, “peacebuilding programming is often driven by external 
ideas and by the disciplining power of external norms rather than by the meanings and values 
from within African countries and locales”. From this background, one of the biggest issues the 
research investigates is how UN has become a paternalistic source of peacebuilding knowledge 
to AU and other international organizations involved in African peace. As good as it may sound, 
Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008) clearly posits that what the AU or any other peace organization 
involved in Africa need is a partnership with the UN not a paternalist or father-figure who acts as 
all knowing and imposes strategies. With the latter being the norm of the peacebuilding world, 
local ownership of peacebuilding can remain a mantra without any power. This suggests that 
new ideas of peace in local conflict zones need enough support from actors and stakeholders to 
achieve a pragmatic outcome (Tshirgi, 2004). This indicates how organizational misdiagnosis of 
issues at hand propagate conflict problems, as they try to forge their agenda to a different 
situation [for instance forcing the signing of peace agreements in which the primary actors are 
not ready to comprehend with]. These factors result in failure of peace agreements, continuity of 
conflict and breeds complexity.  
A shift for effective peace 
The 2003 national report on German policies argued that there was much need for the support of 
peacebuilding explores that goes beyond the diplomatic level (Kievelitz, Kruk and Frieters, 
2003). Their emphasis was on encouraging a shift in the approaches towards the building of 
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peace in conflict and war ridden zones. The paper clearly articulated how the UN, World Bank 
and other bilateral organisations began to rethink their approaches for crisis prevention, conflict 
transformation and peacebuilding as a way of promoting the emergence of effective and 
sustainable peace solutions. In the 2004 UN High-Level Panel report A More Secure World, 
highlighted some key important aspects, which needed consideration to ensure effective 
peacebuilding. It emphasised the respect of individual rights and state sovereignty. Curtis 
(2012:5) comments that from that instance an expansion took place in peacebuilding and its 
borders stretched “to include not only the cessation of hostilities and the rebuilding of 
infrastructure, but also the protection of human rights, the reconstitution of individual identities 
and the reforging of individual and community relationships”. Thus, approaches in peacebuilding 
have been evolving in order to come up with effective mechanisms and structures of rebuilding 
communities affected by war over the years.  
 
Literature on peacebuilding shows that emphasis in the process of building peace has been 
placed more on liberal peacebuilding approaches (Curtis, 2012; Hoffman, 2006; Ramsbotham et 
al, 2011; Richmond et al, 2012). Consequently, various peace approaches have received limited 
attention by organisations, practitioners and academics in engaging viable options that may be 
effective in some unique platforms of conflict. This has resulted in the failure of proposed 
initiatives of peace agreements, reconciliation and negotiations in various African conflict zones 
such as South Sudan, Somalia and DRC. For instance, the unwillingness of the UN to implement 
and support the TRC in DRC robbed the process a platform that could have been effective in 
promoting reconciliation and preventing further violence (Tunamsifu, 2015). The international 
community in neglecting some effective strategies that could lead to successful peace 
engagements has often repeated same mistakes over the years.  
 
The various alternative routes to peace 
There are various alternatives to explore in addressing African conflict problems. Effective 
mechanisms in building sustainable peace should be able to promote the building of trust, 
rehabilitating conflict ridden society, promoting reconciliation and social justice, promoting 
dialogue, and the interaction of all stakeholders involved in conflict (Gawerc, 2006; 
Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Richmond et al, 2012). Hence the mechanisms should be a package of 
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inclusive negotiation, peace education, people-to-people initiatives, ideas and practices, that are 
constructively engaged through the interaction between “local communities and international, 
national, and regional actors” (Curtis, 2012; Gawerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). The 
research promotes the idea that there should be adequate consideration of all stakeholders 
(religious groups, ethnic groups, militia groups, civil societies, government etc.) involved in 
conflict to have representation on the negotiation platform to ensure a balanced representation 
towards peace.  
The ‘Spoiler’ Problem 
Some key issues that have hindered much progress in the peacebuilding process are spoilers and 
the lack of capacity by the authorities to execute their agreements and promises. Most African 
peacebuilding processes have always faced a crisis of spoilers resulting in various setbacks. In 
most cases, spoilers are encouraged by the exclusion of various stakeholders in the participation 
towards peace, the fear of peace consequences by perpetrators of war crimes, and the assumed 
unjust outcomes the peace processes. For instance, the exclusion of the Sudan’s People 
Liberation Army (SPLA) a major rebel group in the conflict in the Khartoum Peace agreement in 
1997 failed to bring the war to an end but rather incited more violence from the SPLA. Scholars 
agree that there is need to approach each conflict problem with much care to reduce the level of 
spoilers at all cost. Hence, though bringing all conflicting parties together may be effective in 
eliminating spoilers in some cases, in some it may not work.  
 
Ensuring legitimacy and competence 
Furthermore, the process of peacebuilding requires the passing of legitimate and sound decisions 
that are binding to avoid macro-institutional dictates of peace decisions that are poorly 
implemented or never implemented at all. For instance, the failure to implement the mission of 
disarmament proposed in the region of Abyei following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) in 2008 by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the Sudanese government. 
This research, therefore, propounds that each peacebuilding intervention strategy should ensure a 
coherent interaction at all societal levels and institutions, to ensure coordination in the chain of 
relationships that link international, state and local actors in peacebuilding efforts (Donias & 
Burt, 2014). This research’s investigations aim to emphasise the need for competence and 
coherence in structural approaches to peace in addressing African conflicts. 
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The researcher acknowledges that peacebuilding demands some wide considerations of 
approaches and perspectives. However, the focus of the research is to harness simple frameworks 
that can be utilised in yielding effective results in working towards peaceful societies and state 
building. It seeks to provide alternative thinking that can assist in creating practical platforms of 
building sustainable peace which has been a failed reality following most of the peace 
agreements (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Henceforth, the foundations of this research study draws 
from conceptions that are inclusive in their approach and should be emphasised more in yielding 
better results in peacebuilding processes. It draws on Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s 
(1992) definition of peacebuilding in his Agenda for Peace, as an “action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict”. In the understanding of this background, the study of DRC, South Sudan and Somalia 
shows that there has been much lack of ‘order and coherence’ in institutional policy initiatives, 
and limitation in understanding and consideration of local values in the peace process. These 
have resulted in the implementation of peacebuilding strategies with very few changes and 
constant resurgence of conflict. 
Contextualising Research Case Study 
Considerably, the research investigates complex conflict situations in an African setting. In 
witnessing the contemporary trend in some ‘post-conflict’ countries such as Angola and 
Ethiopia, there has been remarkable proof of high growth rates and have become ‘much-vaunted’ 
sites, which attract huge influx of global investments. However, other African countries such as 
the DRC, South Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Chad, Libya, Central African Republic and recently 
Burundi continue to show signs of uncertain future with high insecurity and a series of serious 
violence taking place in different communities (Curtis, 2013: 80). The case studies in this 
research serve to provide a wide understanding of the limitations in African post-conflict 
peacebuilding. The research seeks to offer various alternative approaches discerned from 
literature in analysing some popular approaches, which have resulted in more failures than 
successes in Africa. Therefore, three of Africa’s most famous conflicts, which have been 
persistent for more than two decades, were selected as a point of departure to learn from and 
highlight possible solutions that can be applicable in the continent at large. 
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Somalia, DRC and South Sudan are testament of both elements of intractability and protracted 
social conflicts. The conflicts in these states that are Africa’s longest conflicts are characterised 
by high levels of hostility and intense sporadic violence. Somalia has a consistent trend of 
warlord clashes [territorial and ethnic], conflicts and acts of terrorism. The DRC has trends of 
episodic violence by rebels, crimes against humanity and resource related conflicts. South Sudan 
has a history of continuous territorial and religious conflicts which are episodic [genocides and 
tribal wars] in nature. Peace agreements signed over the years in all these countries with very 
little effect. Despite very well meaning intentions and plans from various organizations, the 
evidence from these cases questions their utility in these conflicts, as peace remains elusive.   
 
This research will not reiterate the entire history of the given case studies but will only refer to 
specific processes of peace interventions and agreements (their outcomes, the involved 
stakeholders and the geographical territories in question). This research does not regard the 
involvement of the international community as obsolete and unnecessary and neither will it 
romanticize local approaches. This study, intends to pinpoint various pragmatic, enterprising 
opportunities that brings understanding through multi-disciplinary perspectives in the social 
sciences, which include peace-psychology and development (etc.). The aim is to draw on the 
strongest values of communities and societies that may identify in traditions, culture, leadership 
and communication. This meant to empower the involvement of multi-disciplinary entry-points 
for building effective peace mechanism that are relevant to African conflict settings. This 
research considers a new approach in peacebuilding (vertical-integration peacebuilding) as a 
strategic and effective way to yield the sustainable effects of lasting peace in “deep-rooted 
conflicts”, “intractable conflicts” and “protracted social conflicts” (Kaldor, 1999). 
 
The Main Objective of Research 
Wherefore, this study purposes to help create phases of interaction, learning and correction of 
different procedures and approaches that may be detrimental to future peace prospects in African 
conflict countries/zones. Paul Collier (2004:6) in explaining the short comings of various 
peacebuilding strategies that has been engaged in most African countries vehemently argues that, 
none of the different types of intervention has shown any systematic effect in shortening 
conflicts. He further argues that, “this does not imply that particular interventions have not been 
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effective, but rather that no type of intervention has proved to be systematically effective”. 
Zooming into the world of peacebuilding there is one main aspect that is rarely focused on as a 
limitation that is ‘ad hoc peacebuilding projects’ which is mainly advanced by liberal peace 
reforms (Vorrath 2012). These short-term projects inhibit a full cycle of transformation to take 
place, as they are too rapid for conflict / post-conflict societies to manage (Paffenholz & Spurk 
2006; Hoffman, 2006). Therefore, the processes of reconciliation, rehabilitation, communication, 
reformation and cohesion of societies, which are vital in the building peace, are cut short. It 
should be noted that short-term missions in peacebuilding are sometimes enemies of 
sustainability. Giving a timeframe to peacebuilding process is reducing a social issue to a mere 
technical problem hence it is bound to suffer consequences in the end. 
 
In the process of ending conflicts, priority is placed on rushed peace agreements with little or no 
feasible sustainable strategies this limits the effectiveness of most peacebuilding engagements 
resulting in conflict resurgence. Peace agreements have been treated as the “modus operandi” of 
ending conflicts under Track 1 Diplomacy. Track 1 Diplomacy refers to official governmental 
diplomacy, conducted by official representatives of a state or state-like authority and involves 
interaction with other state or state-like authorities: heads of state, state department or ministry of 
foreign affairs officials, and other governmental departments and ministries16. Whilst Track II 
diplomacy, seeks to promote effective communication and dialogue amongst all stakeholders 
involved and affected in the conflict to eliminate spoilers and ensure effectiveness in the process 
of building sustainable peace. The primary goal is to make sure that all procedures and initiatives 
from all angles including smaller community initiatives towards the building of peace have been 
recognised. 
 
In their effort to end conflicts immediately, various issues of legal virtue have been neglected in 
peace agreements (consideration of some territorial aspects, crimes against humanity and issues 
of displacement) hence justice and coherence have been less considered in most peacebuilding 
processes resulting in the short circuiting of the progress per se. The effort here is to ensure the 
building of sustainable peace in Africa’s intractable and protracted social conflicts. Therefore, 
the research focuses on providing a transformative perspective of how complex conflict 
                                                          
16 Nan (2003) http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track1-diplomacy 
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situations can be engaged to ensure the building of sustainable peace. With the main objective to 
provide a transformative channel of identifying opportunities to address unique conflict 
environments. 
Key questions to be answered: 
 What comprises intractable and protracted conflicts and how can peace mechanisms 
serve as a solution to such conflicts? 
 How does vertical integration peacebuilding serve as an effective framework in grafting 
peace mechanisms suitable to African conflict problems? 
 How can barriers between top-down and bottom-up approaches in peacebuilding be 
bridged? 
 In what ways are the conflicts in the DRC, South Sudan and Somalia intractable and 
protracted conflicts? What effective measures should be taken to enable sustainable 
peacebuilding in these countries? 
 What action can be taken in African conflict situations for sustainable peacebuilding to 
take place? 
Understanding Conflict and the components of Intractable and Protracted 
conflicts 
Defining conflict 
Conflict can be defined as, an active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or 
principles. Conflict differs in many ways, as it is an inevitable aspect of human life. There are 
different kinds of conflicts, which include family conflicts, company/cooperate conflicts, labour-
management conflicts and inter/intra-state conflicts just to mention a few. According to Lederach 
in Maiese (2009: 7), “in common everyday settings we experience social conflict as a time when 
a disruption occurs in the “natural” discourse of our relationships”. This leads one to perceive 
and understand conflict through various angles. Peter Wallensteen (2002: 16) concludes that 
conflict consists of three components, which guides one to understand, and these are “action, 
incompatibility and actors”. Therefore, he goes on to define it, “as a social situation in which a 
minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of 
scarce resources” (Wallensteen, 2002:16).  
In political studies and international relations, conflicts are often distanced from just being 
personal but as deep societal and community challenges that are driven by political, economic 
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and social consequences, which can be either local, national or internationally catastrophic if not 
addressed in time (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2014). Therefore, conflicts can be either inter-
state (between states) or internal/intra state (within states [e.g. civil war]. Scholars have turn to 
perceive and define conflict through these lenses as a way of understanding the factors behind 
the concept. Armed (intrastate) conflicts are the primary subject of concern in this case. 
Understanding perceptions of conflict helps in defining the complex nature of some scenarios, 
referred to be protracted and intractable. 
Tellingly, in Africa, conflict studies have gained much popularity with often-polarised 
characteristics in which conflict is described interchangeably as civil war, political instability, 
war, hostility, civil strife and violent conflict. Abdalla Bujra in his paper on development policy 
to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in 2002 defines conflict as a “violent 
and armed confrontation and struggle between groups, between the state and one or more groups, 
and between two or more states. In such confrontation and struggle, some of those involved are 
injured and killed. Such a conflict can last anything from six months to over twenty years” 
(2002: 3). Curtis (2012) simply defines conflict as “a generative force that alters social norms 
and institutions” in any part of the world and in this case Africa. Thus, this understanding 
provides a clear platform for understanding the defining of intractable and protracted conflicts. 
Understanding Intractability in Conflicts 
There are various challenges in the disciplines of conflict transformation, conflict resolution and 
conflict management when it comes to defining intractable conflict. Henceforth, it is important to 
understand the concept of intractability in conflict situations. To comprehend the meaning of 
intractability, one can start by interpreting protracted social conflicts, which are just a specific 
way of either explaining deep communal group conflicts, which may be ethnic, religious, racial, 
or culturally driven (Azar, 1990; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). This explains the essence of 
intractability in various societal levels in which it influences situations of a zero-sum nature.  
Kriesberg (2005) argued that there was still very limited theory and research on intractable 
conflicts, and over the years, the studies on various social conflicts have helped in contributing to 
the understanding and development of the concepts, which have filled in some of the missing 
knowledge spaces. Kriesberg (2005, cited in Gray, Coleman & Putman, 2007) argues that 
intractable conflicts are those that are persistent and destructive despite much repeated efforts for 
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resolution. Therefore, understanding intractability as protracted social conflicts tellingly brings 
out the aspect of prolonged interlocked conflict situations, which might have been going on for 
decades.  
Coleman et al, (2007: 3) attests that “most protracted conflicts do not begin as intractable, but 
they become so as escalation, hostile interactions, sentiment, and time change the quality of the 
conflict”. In retracing, the history of intractability, various scholars label it differently. John 
Burton (1987) labelled it as ‘deeply rooted conflicts’, whilst Goertz & Diehl (1993) termed it 
‘enduring rivalries’, and Pearce & Littlejohn (1997) labelled it as ‘moral conflict’. All these 
aimed to explain the difficult nature of some conflict situations, which seem insolvable. Edward 
Azar (1990) provides an elaborate analysis as he explains intractability through his protracted 
social conflict (theory). Thus, protracted social conflicts (PSCs) became a dominant term in the 
contemporary study of International relations, conflict and peace studies.  
Various scholars have put forward several definitions for intractable conflicts. This study values 
and adopts the definition given by Gidron et al, who posit that intractable conflicts, “include 
being protracted, continual, violent, perceived as irreconcilable, zero-sum, central to the lives of 
the identity groups involved, and total in that it is about the needs and values essential for the 
conflicting groups’ survival” (cited in Gawerc, 2006: 437). Azar (1978 in D’Estree 2009:150) 
furthers the aspect of intractability and defines PSCs as a “mixture of socio-ethnic and interstate 
elements that defy traditional settlement methods, and generate escalating perceptions and 
behaviours”. Therefore, it is the constant effort of the conflicting groups to maintain their 
perceptions of the status qou, which has become the driving force of continuous clashes and 
unsolved conflicts.  
Intractability Debate 
From a realist perspective, intractable cases are situations of zero-sum nature as an outcome of 
threatening causes to individual or group interests; they often attract the need for the individual 
or the group to protect their respective identities (Crocker, Hampson and All, 2014; Northrup, 
1989). In trying to channel a clear understanding of what intractability is Ramsbotham et al, 
(2011:374), argues that, “intractable conflicts are those in which attempts at settlement and 
transformation have so far failed”. This argument does not dismiss intractability as insolvable, 
but rather emphasises how difficult it is to solve such cases. These conflicts require mechanisms 
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that are different from some general peace approaches, they need multi-faceted (hence the 
adaptation of transdisciplinary approaches see Chapter 2) and prolonged approaches to building 
peace [not ad hoc peace mechanisms] (Burgess and Burgess, 2003).  
Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2014: 11) posits that “a substantial portion of the most intractable 
cases derive from the circumstances and decisions made when things fell apart”. This means the 
challenge lies within the decisions that are made by conflicting parties, on whether they are 
willing to reach consented efforts or not. Once they have come to a point of behavioural actions, 
whereby they do not yield to negotiated efforts there is always a guarantee even is situations of 
less violence there is always a potential for violence resurgence.  
In addition, there are various deformed social functions, which perpetuate intractable conflicts in 
most African communities. African intra-conflict cases are influenced by multiple factors which 
include colonial legacies [varied forms of divide and rule policies], border disputes, entrenched 
social and political privileges and the creation of racial hierarchies, ethnicity, citizenship, 
religious differences, uneven development and, neoliberal and identity construction (Uzodike 
and Moolakkattu, 2013). In a general analysis of issues causing civil conflicts in many African 
countries, one might find five or more of these factors as contributing factors in any one case. It 
is the concentrated combination of these various factors in one territory or state, which has made 
conflict territories in Africa complex to deal with in building peace. These factors are very much 
evident as the main attractors of conflict intractability in DRC, South Sudan and Somalia, which 
are Africa’s contemporary examples of conflicts, which have resisted with tenacity efforts of 
building sustainable peace for more than a decade. As case studies, they outline fervent features 
of intractability, labelled as deadly, deep-rooted and protracted conflicts by both peacebuilding 
organizations and scholars alike. Thus, they present horrors of both complexities, which have 
preoccupied conflict resolution specialists for decades (Kriesberg et al, 1989).  
Accordingly, Coleman (2006:534) argues that the biggest challenges leading to intractability in 
most African countries lies in the power dynamics whereby the powerful parties within a 
state/community oppresses, exploits and abuses the less powerful. Thus the quest of conflict is 
always driven by the mission of addressing the imbalance of political, economic and social 
power existing. He further clarifies that, in such cases ‘power holders’ often uses the various 
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intergroup distinctions such as ethnicity, race, gender and class to endorse and ensure their 
positions of power.  
Conflict transformation scholars have justified that intractable conflicts and protracted social 
conflicts are not, insolvable, but just different from other conflicts that are tractable (Burgess and 
Burgess, 2003). The researcher clearly tries to analyse grounding factors of intractable conflicts 
and protracted social conflicts to aid the development of new constructive peace processes in 
African conflict settings. 
The methodology and meta-theories of the Research 
Qualitative Methodological Paradigm 
This is a qualitative research study. It is a social science research, which studies people, groups 
and institutions in the environment of conflict and in post-conflict situations, hence the 
“laboratory of community life” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 56). A qualitative research style is 
more suitable to this study since it provides an inclusive approach for the research to understand 
and interpret particular patterns and experiences of human behaviour (Schurink, 1998). 
Therefore, it provides the researcher with various alternatives of interpreting the phenomenon 
under investigation, and allows various considerations of facts in reaching the best possible 
conclusion (Babbie & Mouton, 2001).Qualitative research methodology has various 
investigative/research traditions or meta-theories, which helps guide the design of any study. The 
meta-theories that are key in qualitative research include constructivism, phenomenology or 
interpretivist, and critical theory (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). As a social science, qualitative 
research that seeks to advance the discovery, learning and provide solutions to challenges of 
conflict and peacebuilding this study adopts phenomenology and critical theory as the guiding 
tradition. 
Phenomenology or Interpretivist Tradition. 
This study adopts phenomenology or the interpretivist tradition as a meta-theory to interpret the 
meanings of social realities in peacebuilding. This allows an exploration of various ontological 
and epistemological analysis of events in understanding the way in which ‘negotiated 
perspectives that continually redefine reality’ are built up in the social worlds (Mouton, 1988:7). 
Peacebuilding as a subject is broad, and calls for more discoveries and learning. Thus, 
phenomenological approaches in every study enable exploration and discovery of patterns that 
 31 
defines particular outcomes in society (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). This research seeks to consider 
useful approaches in addressing conflict situations in Africa. Therefore, this explains the 
adherence to phenomenological perspective with a critical outlook of how to implement 
peacebuilding in an African setting.  In adopting an interpretivist approach, this research can 
establish an understandable background of the relationships that exists in the theoretical worlds 
of conflict and peacebuilding. It also allows for an analysis of the relationship between the 
metaphysical conceptions of theory into coherent description and exploration of the societies in 
question. 
Critical theory as a meta-theory 
This study uses critical theory tradition to inform certain changes in the peacebuilding 
approaches in an African context and especially in preventive peacebuilding. Critical theory as a 
met-theory adheres to participatory research, and in this context, it emphasizes the importance 
and necessity of involving the people in communities affected by conflict in peacebuilding 
processes since they are the main beneficiaries in which their voices and participation requires 
legitimization (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). It is necessary to use critical theory to add various 
defining strategies that can be of value in achieving sustainable peace. Considering that the 
research deals with “everyday reality and the structural logic that produces and reproduces that 
reality” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:58). It will discuss the frameworks that are important for effect 
practical approaches and changes that are impactful in African peacebuilding strategies.   
 
Research Technique 
This is a desktop research project that relies on primary and secondary analysis. Primary sources 
refer to “first-hand accounts of an event, a life, a moment in time. They are in their original form 
(diaries, letters, photos, etc.) usually without explanation or interpretation” (Tennessee 
Government, 2015). The use of these documents in this research is to provide “the essential 
building blocks for the historian's reconstruction of a moment in time” (Tennessee Government, 
2015). Secondary sources refer to “documents written at a later time than the event being 
researched, by someone who did not experience the said event” (Concordia Library, 2015). The 
reason for this secondary data is to analyse the rational, historical and normative behaviour of 
human beings in dealing with conflict situations. This shall be done in order to understand, 
interpret, and define events which inform proactive actions on how to act towards what is 
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“desirable and proper” when dealing with intractable conflicts in the African context (Mouton 
and Marais, 1996).   
 
This research mainly explores and describes various impasses of man and society; it also 
explains some empirical facts given in original documents (peace agreements), books, journals, 
news and internet sites of the ongoing conflict problems and limitations in peacebuilding 
processes. Thus, it aims to broaden the knowledge of African approaches in dealing with 
intractable conflicts and empower frameworks in peace mechanisms. Vertical Integration 
Peacebuilding is still in its early stages of application in addressing African conflicts. Thus, this 
research shall adhere to reliable sources such as peer reviewed books and journal articles.   
The Research Structure outline 
Chapter 2: Provides a literature background of peacebuilding. It deliberates on defining the 
concept, engaging the models and key aspects that makes up the concept and idea of 
peacebuilding and how it is being interpreted in this research.  
Chapter 3: It engages the theoretical phenomenon that guides peacebuilding approaches and 
peace mechanisms at a global, national and local scale. The chapter critically engages some 
theories that are considered in peacebuilding research and clarifies the reasons why they are not 
used in analysing in this research. It also clarifies why some theoretical ideas are borrowed in 
justifying some discourses in the building of peace. 
Chapter 4: Critically investigates the concept of liberal peace as an inhibiting factor to 
sustainable peacebuilding in Africa’s intractable conflicts. It deliberates on the aspect of 
intractability and how liberal peace approaches have become the source of conflict continuity 
more than building of peace. It exposes the weaknesses that lies in the liberal structures through 
critique of the liberal peacebuilding frameworks and its limitations in engaging indigenous 
peace. 
Chapter 5: Elaborates on the importance of legitimacy, inclusiveness and coherence in 
peacebuilding processes. It outlines on the key challenges of spoilers in the peace process and 
critically engages the various alternatives that can be utilised in addressing the relevant case 
studies. 
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Chapter 6: Provides a concluding analysis through a theoretical perspective. It engages on the 
effectiveness of the perspective in establishing peace mechanisms in post-conflict peacebuilding 
in Africa. It finally offers recommendations to the peacebuilding processes in Africa. 
Concluding remarks 
This research takes into account the strong dissent for critical engagement in African 
peacebuilding. As Devon Curtis (2012: 2) vehemently posits that “in light of the new global and 
African institutions, initiatives, and activities set up in support of peacebuilding efforts, the time 
is ripe for a reassessment of peacebuilding concepts, practices, and implications in Africa”. This 
study aims to add literature on African mechanisms and approaches towards the building of 
sustainable peace on the continent. It seeks to outline possible strategies that can be of impact in 
addressing intractable and protracted social conflicts. Most post-conflict countries face 
challenges of diffuse authority and marred by fractured and weak governance. These factors 
influence the resurgence of conflict, affect sustainable peace settlements and hinders 
opportunities for effective peace negotiation (Crocker et al, 2014; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). 
Thus in order to harness proper frameworks in recovering conflict situations in Africa there is 
much need for a “diverse portfolio of instruments and actors to deal with a wide array of 
different security challenges” (Crocker et al cited by Ahtisaari, 2014: ix).  
This chapter provided a foundational platform for the research project by illuminating the key 
components that are peculiar to this study and to bring out the core arguments to be presented. 
The research points out that Africa has been riven with conflict for decades and the fact that 
some of these conflicts have become complex and seem insolvable might be due to some counter 
interventions which are labelled by Sandole (2010) as “minimalist interventions”. On the other 
hand, maybe it is due to the lack of effective knowledge developed through pragmatic and 
holistic thinking of approaching each conflict environment as unique to harness the local, 
national and international skill and support in addressing the conflict problems at all levels and 
across all actors. In many African peace interventions of building peace, the key focus has been 
on maintaining a conflict free environment (negative peace). Therefore, this chapter has 
identified and summarised the important aspects, which provide the foundations of this research 
study.   
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Overview on Peacebuilding 
 
“Our review of literature says this appears to be bigger than in the past.” Bob Dietz17 
Introduction 
Peacebuilding has become one of the most important concepts in the fields of conflict 
transformation, resolution and management. There are various competing views due to the 
complexity and continuous changes in defining and understanding the concept. De Coning and 
de Carvalho (2013) points out that factors surrounding peacebuilding are not just in the 
definitions, but guided by key determining characteristics. Therefore, the unique qualities that 
characterize peacebuilding are the “long-term nature of the process, the interdependence of the 
actors, the multidimensional nature of the process and its concern with the consolidation of 
peace” (de Coning and de Carvalho, 2013: 11). Paffenholz (2009) explicates how peacebuilding, 
is interpreted practiced and understood through different schools of thought, which include 
conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. In the understanding of 
such a broad spectrum of factors pertaining to peacebuilding, it is important to consider a wide 
range of literature that surrounds the subject. Most importantly, the enterprise of building peace 
is an intricate matter, which requires clearly defined and robust approaches. Therefore, 
considering aforementioned schools of thought in peace and conflict studies, the approaches of 
peacebuilding in conflict transformation evolves on the different understanding of the term and 
channeling each and every effort into transforming, “deep-rooted armed conflicts into peaceful 
ones” (Paffenholz 2009: 4). Henceforth, there is much need to investigate the background of 
peacebuilding as a term and its practice to influence solving intractable and protracted conflicts 
in the African context. 
Understandably, peacebuilding strives to ‘transform societal relationships’ (Haider, 2014). 
Literature exposes various weaknesses in political, social and economic relations in building 
sustainable peace in African conflict zones and post-conflict reconstruction environments. Africa 
maintains a high percentage of civil wars. Elbadawi and Sambanis argued a decade ago that, 
“Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries (or about 40 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA)) have experienced at least one period of civil war…” (2000: 1). Therefore, this research 
                                                          
17 Bob Dietz is the Asia Coordinator Committee to Protect Journalists 
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aims to understand the limitations in political governance and policy approaches concerning the 
compacting of conflicts in Africa and ways of bridging that gap. Despite some of the conflicts 
having been resolved through peace agreements in Africa, the resurgence of conflict is evident in 
many cases. Thus, research in peacebuilding has often pointed to different peace mechanisms 
that can be of use in building sustainable peace in the continent.  
Most literature on peacebuilding emanates from western views and thus most dominant 
peacebuilding approaches developed from guiding principles based on examples in European 
models of peacebuilding (Lederach, 2005; Richmond et al, 2011; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). For 
example, the European Union has emerged as the major actor in regional and global 
peacebuilding in the past decade and has spent millions of dollars in supporting the framework of 
“liberal peacebuilding” (Richmond et al, 2011). Most models have seemed to be a success in 
their own right, but in African platforms where many structures of European peacebuilding 
strategies have been put in place they have resulted in conflict resurgence in less than five or ten 
years of negative peace (Belloni, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Scholars agree that African 
peacebuilding requires a flexible and inclusive approach both in theory and in practice. Such a 
platform may be a beacon for more successful programs and endeavors in the building of peace. 
Therefore, revisiting the various theoretical frameworks can allow a clear juxtaposition of 
models and theories in peacebuilding. This can assist in building strong approaches in solving 
intractable conflicts and at the same time avoiding resurgence of conflict in an African context.  
Defining ‘Peacebuilding’ 
The term ‘peacebuilding’ firstly appeared in the field of peace and conflict by Johan Galtung18 in 
the mid-1970s (Galtung, 1975). It has maintained its core reputation in the field of conflict 
resolution (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Nevertheless, it became much more significant in the field 
of conflict management, resolution and transformation when Boutros-Boutros Ghali the 
Secretary-General of United Nations in 1992 adopted it in the Agenda for Peace. Therefore, from 
the 1990s ‘peacebuilding’ has received very much attention as a significant tool and strategy of 
ensuring sustainable outcomes in building peace. 
At present, there is still no definite definition of peacebuilding. In the literature of conflict 
resolution, conflict transformation and peace studies, the concept has been defined in terms of a 
                                                          
18 Norwegian Peace and Conflict Researcher 
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wide range of issues, relations, activities and structural changes and this conceptualization has 
become universal at all levels including grassroots groups, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and UN bodies (De la Rey & McKay, 2006). According to Gawerc (2006:439), the 
concept is dynamic “having something to contribute in every phase of a conflict, and always 
moving/changing in response to the situation and the stage of the peacemaking efforts”. For this 
reason, various scholars have regarded it as often confusingly defined. Elizabeth M. Cousens 
(2001) emphasises that some definitions are so general that they include all forms that are 
important in addressing armed conflict without elaborate emphasis; some are very precise and 
targeted to a specific area; and others provide complicated situations of tough questions and 
comparative value of international efforts.  
Peacebuilding is concerned with ending or preventing the recurrence of violent conflict and 
supporting sustainable peace (Curtis, 2013; Ramsbotham et al, 2008). According to the UN 
system adopted by the Secretary General’s Policy Committee in May 2007, “Peacebuilding 
involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by 
strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundations 
for sustainable peace and development”. It is a rich concept, with highly contested issues. 
Various approaches in of the subject have been embarked upon to address the bitterness, 
memories and images, and structural sources that generate conflict in contemporary peace 
processes (Gawerc, 2006). Most wars in the late 20th century shifted from being inter-state wars 
into intra-state wars, attracting new ways and forms of addressing peace, hence peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding as stages of rehabilitating conflict zones into peaceful ones 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2011). It is in this framework that peacebuilding has been credited as an 
approach that explores a deeper understanding of conflicts in various schools of thought which 
are conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict transformation and contemporary issues. 
Hence it carries the capacity for “designing more comprehensive approaches” to address conflict 
through mechanisms that, “take into account the need for both systematic and relationship 
change” (Gawerc 2006:438).  
According to Thania Paffeholz (2013:13), “Peacebuilding is a long-term multi-track 
transformative contribution to social change, helping to create a just and sustainable peace 
beyond the narrow definition of a post-conflict period”. Peacebuilding is in two forms, which are 
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preventive peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding. The latter is the most dominant form 
of peacebuilding in most instances. Twenty-first century research in peacebuilding has brought 
much understanding in portraying the concept as tool for restoring stability in security threat 
(crime and violent) environments (Donias & Burt, 2014).  
Elizabeth M. Cousens (2001) offers an introspective approach in understanding peacebuilding by 
conceptualising it into two axes, “deductive” and “inductive” definitions. The former refers to 
conditions in which the definition deduced from existing abilities and dictates of international 
organizations and agencies. The United Nations Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali defined peacebuilding in his Agenda for Peace as “the process by which an achieved peace 
is placed on durable foundations and which prevents violent conflict from recurring by dealing 
with the underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems responsible for the 
conflict” (UN 1992, paragraph 57). Peacebuilding officially incorporated as a form of new 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations for the UN, thus deductively defined as a concept. 
This definition also distinguished peacebuilding from peacekeeping and peacemaking and 
became the model for most structural approach definitions (De la Rey and McKay 2006).  
More so, in an inductive context, its defined according to the content determined by a “matrix of 
needs and capacities in individual cases” hence definition might be a “problem” or a guided 
“solution” which could be more or less effective in guiding policymaking. For example, Wendy 
Lambourne in her addition to post-conflict peacebuilding in support for long-term effective 
policies, which promotes justice and reconciliation, defines the concept as “strategies designed to 
promote secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are 
met and violent conflicts do not recur” (2004:4). Thus, the definition addresses issues related to 
both short-term achievements through negative peace (absence of conflict) and long-term 
achievements of positive peace (absence of structural violence). 
Furthermore, one can view peacebuilding as an “effort that can be pursued at different stages of a 
conflict… might take place in the absence of a peace settlement, for instance, as in the Haitian19 
                                                          
19 Haiti has a history of dictatorship and subsequent military governments, which were replaced with a democratically elected 
president Jean Bertrand Aristide who was inaugurated in 1991. Aristide was overthrown in eight months’ time through a military 
coup and forced to flee.” Turmoil followed, including a mass outflow of refugees, economic sanctions mandated by the OAS and 
the UN Security Council, an aborted UN mission, failed mediation attempts, and finally, a UN sanctioned, US-led multinational 
military intervention in 1994 to restore Aristide to power”. Following this background, the UN and other various organizational 
stakeholders engaged in supporting the interests of Haitian development and development and as such supported indigenous/ 
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case” (Cousens et al, 2001:13).Peacebuilding is a flexible process that can happen anytime, and 
its occurrence cannot be limited or tied to a specific timeframe. Cousens et al (2001:14), 
emphasises that peacebuilding mechanisms does not necessarily require conflict to be put in 
place, thus, they can be done in “advance, alongside, or even in the absence of a peacekeeping 
operation or a formal peacemaking effort”. Therefore, in a peacebuilding process challenges and 
constraints met in the different timings can actually differ. Thus, this gives a glimpse of the 
different entry points in engaging peacebuilding and enables one to understand how the concept 
is understood or can be understood in different forms in literature. 
The definition that offers a substantive meaning is given by the Alliance for Peacebuilding 
(2012: 7): 
“…a set of long-term endeavours undertaken continuously through multiple stages of conflict (before, during 
and after) and involving collaboration at several levels of society … peacebuilding emphasises transformative 
social change that is accomplished both at the process-oriented level, and through tools such as negotiation, 
mediation, and reconciliation, and on the structural level, through the development of resilient institutions and 
social processes that allow conflict to be resolved through political, rather than violent means.”  
Wherefore, this gives the subject different broader perspectives and clearly acknowledges that 
there is still much to be learnt in peace research. In this case, it opens up channels, which still 
need exploration in African post-conflict peacebuilding. Hence, to give a broader and explorative 
framework of the subject, which incorporates the approaches in this research a new definition, 
put together from various scholastic views. Thus, peacebuilding is the task or process in which 
achieved peace settlement followed by various initiatives that promote a conflict free 
environment and ensure sustainable peace. Through democratic institution building; the 
maintenance of order and coherence; implementation of peace agreements; and deal with 
domestic cultural, ideological, economic, social and political dynamics which undermine the 
resurgence of conflict (Dawson, 2004; Smoljan, 2003; Tziarras, 2012; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). 
This definition is a structure from different views since there is no absolute definition of the 
concept. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
local structures to address the flooding of political violence, demobilize and reintegrate former soldiers, enforce the rule of law 
and “integrate marginalized communities and sectors into the economy”.  This helped in encouraging the local communities to 
unite and forge strategies in addressing the local violence and increasing criminal activities (international Peace Academy 2002). 
It is this process, which was guided by local knowledge, long-term perspectives, coordination and collaboration (across all 
leadership levels), human rights, rule of law and economic development, which encouraged an effective peacebuilding process.  
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Peacebuilding Debate 
Peacebulding approaches have been subject of debate amongst scholars, these include top-down 
approaches (paternalistic orinstitutional or elite approaches) and bottom-up approaches 
(‘peacebuilding from below’ or grassroots approaches) (Lederach, 1997; Maisse, 2003; 
Lederach, 2005). In most cases, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), non-
governmental organizations, inter-governmental institutions, regional organizations, various 
international institutions, government institutions and civil societies have found themselves 
channeling their contributions to peacebuilding by either of the two approaches. Scholars are 
agreed that for many years peacebuilding norms have been operated mostly from a liberal 
peacebuilding perspective in which most international institutions or elite organizations 
subscribe to (top-down approaches) (Lederach, 1997; Paffenholz& Spurk, 2006; Hoffman, 2009; 
Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Following various failures [through resurgence of conflict and 
violence in communities] in top-down peacebuilding approaches, others have resorted to 
‘peacebuilding from below’ as the panacea for sustainable peace. In tracing the course of 
peacebuilding, it has become clear that both approaches need to complement each other if 
effective results in building sustainable peace is to emerge (Lederach, 1997; Joeng, 2005; 
Ramsbotham et al, 2011). It is important to note that no single explanatory model of 
peacebuilding is capable of capturing the complex reality of what can and has to be done in 
addressing intractable conflicts (Dahre, 2008). John Paul Lederach (1997) and Devon Curtis 
(2012) agree that peace processes require a broad and flexible frame that is legitimately 
grounded and unique for each conflict environment, also interdependently guided, and supported 
at all societal and leadership levels.  
With all the various theoretical concepts, which have been pushed forward in guiding the 
peacebuilding framework, scholars and practitioners of peace have remained unsatisfied with the 
outcomes on the ground. The twenty-first century literature on peacebuilding has witnessed the 
development of a new concept and approach, which is “Hybrid Peace”. Nadarajah and Rampton 
(2015) argues that hybrid peacebuilding has developed a counter measure to quench the 
problems that have emerged through liberal peacebuilding frameworks. Ramsbotham et al (2011) 
emphasizes that ‘hybrid peace’ pulls together the end of both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches in peacebuilding without romanticizing either of the two. Tim Murithi (2006; 2007; 
2008) gives a different thrust of hybridity in peacebuilding. He argues that if peacebuilding is to 
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bring forth effective outcomes there should be ‘hybrid partnerships’ not ‘hybrid paternalism’ 
amongst institutions of peace. Building on this argument, Murithi (2007: 2) explains that, “given 
the asymmetrical relationship that the UN had with Africa, particularly in the early years, a 
culture of paternalism [dominance of UN ideas over African conflict problems] developed 
between the organization and the continent. Since then Africa has been trying to challenge and 
dispense with paternalistic attitudes from, and within, the UN system. Today, Africa is 
attempting to forge an identity as a collective entity capable of functioning as an equal partner 
[not just a recipient or receiving end but a recognized independent equal actor] in the 
international sphere”. Thus, the peacebuilding debate in the twenty-first century has developed a 
new framework, which requires a close attention and refinement in order to maximize on its 
strengths. This research adopts this discourse and seeks to elaborate on the various sentiments 
that can be of much use in Africa. 
Approaches and concepts in peacebuilding 
Sandole (2010:8) looks at ideas around the “building of peace” and provides anecdotes of 
understanding negative and positive peace as a way of understanding the purpose of 
peacebuilding. The concept has been utilised by organisations from a minimalist approach and 
have mainly focused on negative peace outcomes. However, Sandole (2010) argues that real 
peacebuilding includes both minimalist approaches for immediate peace outcomes creating room 
for maximalist approaches, which adheres to positive peace, hence long-term peace initiatives. 
There is consensus among scholars that in complex problem conflict situations, peacebuilding 
requires patience, commitment and, strong communication and dialogue among all stakeholders 
(Sandole 2010; Spector 2012; Cousens et al 2001; Ramsbotham et al 2011). More so, Cousens et 
al (2001:13) clearly emphasise that peacebuilding efforts can be pursued at different stages of a 
conflict and can take place even in the absence of a peace settlement (the case of Haiti is a 
testament to this). 
Twenty-first century literature on peacebuilding has reviewed and assessed various problems 
encountered in peacebuilding in the previous decades and has come up with various frameworks. 
Since the terror attacks against the USA on 11 September 2001, much concern has been on 
“statebuilding and regime-change interventions ‘peacebuilding’” especially with the support, 
which comes from the US administration (Ramsbotham et al, 2011:232). According to 
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Richmond et al (2011), the European Union, as one of the major actors in regional and global 
peacebuilding, has come up with a framework for ‘liberal peacebuilding’. It suggests that their 
overall goal is to “prevent violent conflict, and to facilitate the construction of the liberal state, a 
social contract, democracy, the rule of law, civil society and development” (2011:455). A new 
perspective on effective peacebuilding has been dominant in recent literature in which the 
concept has been divided into generational approaches. The key focus has been on the third-
generation approach transitioning to the fourth-generation approach which is termed “liberal 
cosmopolitan peacebuilding” (Richmond et al 2011:459) or “cosmopolitan conflict 
transformation” (Ramsbotham et al, 2011).  
Various concepts in peacebuilding include, people to people, peacebuilding from below, civil 
society-led discourses, multi-track diplomacy and John Paul Lederach’s leadership pyramid 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Sandole, 2010). These are just a few of the most used concepts in 
peacebuilding, which have been used since the 1990s and 2000s. This concept is described as a 
“transformative and cosmopolitan model” (Ramsbotham et al, 2011:233). Thus, literature in 
peacebuilding portrays the various concepts and how they have been used to influence the 
structure of peacebuilding.  
Peace education is one of the key approaches in peacebuilding that is engaged to transform 
various societies into peace. According to Bar-Tal and Rosen (2009), peace education is a tool 
for social construction. The argument endorses the approach as a way of ameliorating conflict-
ridden societies since it involves both the youth and the old. Thus in the event that peace 
settlement is not achieved in the present generation, there is still much hope from the youth. 
Brantmeier (2013) notes that there is need for peace practitioners (through peace education), “to 
deconstruct power dynamics and understand the intricacies of place in order to conserve and to 
protect ecosystems from which they derive sustenance. We have the power to choose status quo 
and the power to choose change”. In the process of peace education communities are socialized 
in ways which facilitates reconciliation processes and cultural reconstruction through their own 
traditional values and strengths as  Lederach (2005) demonstrates and argues for in his book 
“The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace”. It carries various unique qualities 
of sustainability, which include building tolerance of the other (especially in identity related 
conflicts), promotes participation of locals in the process of building peace, and it draws learning 
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from the local cultural and traditional values of peace. Bar-Tal and Rosen present it as a 
mechanism which deals with societal orientation in societies involved in conflict by giving 
meaning to “its societal life now and directs its goals for the future” (2009:557). Therefore, as an 
approach in peacebuilding literature, peace education is an effective mechanism in solving 
situations of intractable conflicts.  
The Dynamics of Understanding Peacebuilding: Different Schools of Thought 
A myriad of issues across various literature shed much light on the conception that stimulates the 
practice of peacebuilding. Paffenholz (2009) provides the various lenses of glancing through the 
different theories that governs in the practice of building peace. These schools of thought 
include, conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation and the complementary 
school. The practice of peacebuilding adopts various elements from these different schools 
though each school has different influence in peacebuilding (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). There 
is no clarity on the origins of these terms and there is much confusion often created with these 
terminologies and conceptual frameworks in understanding their influence on practice. In the 
1990s, the practice of peacebuilding characterized by the testing of many approaches in building 
sustainable peace. The past two decades has provided many answers to different conflict issues. 
That has led to the conclusion, “that only the involvement of a variety of different actors and 
approaches can succeed in sustainable peacebuilding, including grassroots organizations or other 
civil society actors” (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006: 18).  Various scholarly views, organizational 
reports and discourses agree that building sustainability in peace processes require extensive 
deliberations and participation of different stakeholders and approaches (Lederach, 1997; 2005; 
Sandole, 2010; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Curtis, 2013; Donias & Burt, 2014). Understanding 
these schools of thought can give much clarity on the evolution of peacebuilding and the need for 
various approaches in the practice of peacebuilding. The unpacking of these theoretical 
frameworks provides a platform to develop a new discourse of building peace in an African 
context.  
Conflict Management and Peacebuilding 
According to Ra him (2002: 208), “conflict management is the process of limiting the negative 
aspects of conflict while increasing the positive aspects of conflict”. Paffenholz (2009) notes that 
the conflict management school depends more on diplomatic channels and initiatives when 
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ending conflict. The largest contribution of the Conflict Management School is its focus on those 
in power who have the ability to end large-scale violence through a negotiated settlement. John 
Paul Lederach’s (1997) work blames conflict management thought for institutionalizing peace. 
His argument bases on the role of mediation, which only concentrates on engaging the top 
leadership of conflicting parties. Commenting on the same note, Paffenholz (2009: 3) clarifies 
that the process often ignores the “need for facilitation by different internal and external actors 
before, during and after the negotiations”. The approach also overlooks the deep causes of 
conflicts (Hoffman 1995). According to the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) (ISS Africa.org), 
conflict management approaches in peacebuilding have been interested more in assisting 
governments, regional and international institutions in developing peace support policies and 
operations, implementing regional protocols, and training for peacekeeping deployments and 
regional standby capacities in Africa. Paffenholz (2009: 3) highlights that “peacebuilders, 
according to the logic of this school [conflict management], are external diplomats from bilateral 
or multilateral organizations”. Its focus is on short-term negotiation phases as a source of 
securing peace thus peace agreements/ accords falls under this school of thought. 
Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding 
Conflict resolution focuses mainly on the termination or elimination, and reduction of all forms 
and types of conflict. Conflict resolution school relates to the process of rebuilding relations 
between conflict parties or resolving disputes through addressing the interests of the parties in 
conflict. According to Lederach (2003), conflict resolution is much more interested in reaching 
immediate agreement. Therefore, its primary focus is on producing content rather than 
relationships. This school of thought relies much on power-based approaches [for the purpose of 
influence] and interest-based approaches [the actor who is likely to gain something or benefit 
more from the settling of the disputing parties is the best arbitrator]. Most international NGOs 
are the main promoters of conflict resolution approaches in the modern days. They are building a 
network of peace co-ordinations between national and local NGOs, in which they conduct 
conflict resolution, training workshops, peace education and dialogue projects. Paffenholz (2009) 
points out, that the critique of conflict resolution school of thought as an approach in peace 
building peace is twofold. Bercovitch (1984) mentioned the first issue as he argued that the 
improvement of communication between conflicting parties does not necessarily mean the 
parties would agree to end the war. The second critique dismisses the thinking that work done by 
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civil society and at the grassroots can easily spill over to the national level (Richmond, 2001). 
Thus, such misconceptions in the conflict resolution school of thought have misguided the 
building of peace in many instances. 
The Complementary School and Peacebuilding 
The complementary school of thought is a congruence of both conflict resolution and conflict 
management thought. It argues that in building a strong entry point for building sustainable 
peace there in need to acknowledge the strengths of the two schools and put them together. 
Scholars who pay much allegiance to this though argue that approaching peacebuilding from 
both ‘top and down’ is a much logical step. Therefore, Paffenholz (2009) shows that peace 
theorists in the 1990s worked on trying to develop approaches, which addresses the dichotomous 
gap between conflict management and resolution. However, the main limitation with this school 
of thought is its failure to account on the issue of coordination. Paffenholz (2009: 4) notes that 
scholars are agreed that, “different types of interventions can take place at the same time” in the 
building of peace but they cannot be fully coordinated. Thus, this has become a pitfall in the 
practice of peacebuilding through this approach. 
Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding 
The conflict transformation school values more of relationship-centered approaches in building 
peace.  The primary focus of this school of thought is on transforming deep-rooted armed 
conflicts. It seeks to outline strategies for effective building of peace through consideration of 
various perspectives and understandings.  Ramsbotham et al (2011: 9) tries to explain it as the 
“the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition”. However, the main difference between the 
conflict transformation school of thought and the other schools is that “it does not only focus on 
ending an undesired conflict, or creating endless communication opportunities but also focuses 
on how to create greater future outcomes” (Paffenholz, 2009: 4). For this reason, scholars agree 
that this school of thought does not only allow different frameworks (or multidisciplinary20 
approaches), but also sustained platforms to pursue long-term change. It admits the various 
challenges encountered, and that they are different scenarios, which require dynamic initiatives 
to solve. As a framework in building peace research, it embraces the assessment of each conflict 
                                                          
20 Multidisciplinary engagement includes drawing significant approaches from other fields such as politics, international 
relations, strategic studies, development studies, individual and social psychology in order to learn how to address complex 
conflict systems adequately. (Ramsbotham et al, 2011: 8). 
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environment situation in order to apply the most necessary approaches rather than a one-size-fits-
all kind of approach. Thus, “such a framework emphasizes the challenge of how 
to end something not desired and how to build something that is desired” Paffenholz (2009: 4). 
Peacebuilding Models 
Since the mid-1990s, the focus of peacebuilding research has shifted its attention from the role of 
external actors and their influence in the building of peace. John Paul Lederach’s work, 
“Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies” (1997) changed much 
perceptions and influenced a shift of focus from “external actors to the important role of actors 
from within the conflict country” (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006:18). In tracing this history, there is a 
birth of new models in the practice of peacebuilding. New scholarships on the building of peace 
mushroomed to focus on international, national and local initiatives in the field (Curtis, 2012). 
This informed a wide range of both theoretical and practical views of monitoring, practicing and 
analyzing the progress of peacebuilding in post-conflict states. It is important to note that every 
approach or model in peacebuilding requires careful consideration before practice. Scholars warn 
against ‘romanticizing’ approaches and models, which may result into traps or entrenchment of 
the existing structures of conflict or violence (Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham at el, 2011). 
Peacebuilding as development and politics 
Peacebuilding is as a platform for development and politics (Smoljan, 2003; Cousens at el, 
2001). Smoljan (2003) argues that there is a strong synthesis between peacebuilding and 
development, and in order for long-term /sustainable peacebuilding to emerge, there is need for a 
close relationship between economic policy and peacebuilding. The Agenda for Peace by the UN 
from 1992 developed with this kind of thinking in making policies towards building peace. With 
the understanding that there is a huge shift from inter to intra state conflicts, new approaches to 
building peace have been directed to relate more with development and also to influence 
structural reforms to “expend material and political resources in societies where needs are 
perceived to be chronic” (Cousens et al, 2001:10). In giving an elaborate role of the concept and 
its functional relations to politics and developments, Cousens et al (2001:13) posits that 
peacebuilding should not be just be, “equated to the entire basket of post war need… Rather, it 
should be seen as a strategic focus on conflict resolution and opening of political space, to which 
these other needs may or may not contribute”. 
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There are many implications encountered when addressing international peacebuilding efforts. 
Thus, international assistance is often burdened by a certain knowledge base of the frailties and 
strength of societies they need to support (Cousens et al, 2001). Peacebuilding models in 
international policy are then, shaped by the intentions of international organizations. For 
instance, the World Bank has peacebuilding programmes, which are organised in three thematic 
concerns that include gender-based violence, youth empowerment and employment, and 
community-led development (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Hence, most literature in peacebuilding 
has been influenced by deductive perceptions. As Cousens et al (2001) argued, in many cases 
these international actors lack sufficient knowledge of local terrain, history, habits and languages 
yet they define the models to fund in peacebuilding processes. States are building blocks for 
international security. Hence, whether the state is democratic or autocratic has become less of a 
threat than lack of state capacity [that is the fragility or how strong the state is] (Houton, 2014). 
In fact, peacebuilding has been driven [by certain actors] through ‘politics of stabilisation’ in 
which the “donor” actors may favour certain interests and groups over others hence creating 
complexity. Houton (2014: 6) clearly exhibits that, “peacebuilding interventions remain largely 
ad hoc, piecemeal and insufficient scale to address sustainable political change”.  
Twenty-first century literature has witnessed the mainstreaming of peacebuilding models in 
international policy and various governance strategies in post-conflict states (Ramsbotham at el, 
2011). Since 1992 with the United Nations’ (UN) Agenda for Peace various international 
organizations have taken a center-stage in defining their positions in influencing the building of 
peace and resolution of conflicts. Ramsbotham at el (2011) highlights how the World Bank 
created the Post-Conflict Fund21 (PCF) in 1997 and emerged as a leading player in post-conflict 
peacebuilding. Its focus is on funding projects that address the problems and issues that maybe 
effective in limiting the chances of relapse into war. On the same note, the UN was involved in 
building various networks and institutions of channeling initiatives for peacebuilding such as the 
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)22 in 2006. By September 2011, the PBF had generated 
US$400 million and was funding 193 projects in 22 countries.  
                                                          
21 Post-Conflict Fund was formed through the World Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit.  
22 “Following a request from the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Secretary-General established a Peacebuilding 
Fund (PBF) for post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives in October 2006. The PBF is managed, on behalf of the United Nations 
Secretary-General, by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, supported by the Peacebuilding Support Office 
(PBSO). The UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office) is the PBF fund administrator.” http://www.unpbf.org/  
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According to the UN Peacebuilding architecture the most immediate and frequent needs in 
recovering a country from conflict and ensuring sustainable peace includes, “safety and security, 
including rule of law; support to political processes and reconciliation; basic services such as 
water, health and primary education; institution building and public administration; economic 
revitalization, including jobs and livelihoods” (UN PBSO, 2010). This builds on Paul Collier’s 
arguments about the value of socio-economic and development advancement in post-conflict 
recovery as the key to sustainable peace. Thus most liberal peacebuilding strategies [which have 
become dominant in most current peacebuilding missions] by international 
institutions/organizations has become much more focused on accelerating economic recovery in 
post-conflict zones as a model for building sustainable peace. 
Peacebuilding as “top-down” and “bottom-up” processing 
There are various diverse theoretical approaches to peacebuilding in the fields of conflict 
transformation, resolution and management. These comprise top-down (institutional) approaches 
and bottom-up (grassroots) approaches (Maiese, 2003). In understanding the contemporary 
shortcomings in conflict resolution in which “intractable” and “protracted social conflicts” have 
become dominant, it has become much more difficult for peace organizations, governments and 
communities to work on sustainable peace independently of one other. Therefore, various 
approaches to peace have attracted more top-down approaches. There is a range of grassroots 
approaches and the field remains divided between these approaches. This separation has led to 
failures in the resolution of conflicts. The adaptation of conflict transformation [an inclusive 
term] serves as a way of bridging the barriers of communication and clash of ideas (institutional 
leaders versus civil societies) to address the forces that generate the conflict (Garwerc 2006). 
This has led to the new embrace of national/local ownership in the building of peace. However, 
some scholars in the late twentieth century were quick to ‘romanticise’ the ‘local’ as the only 
possible way for ensuring sustainable peace. On the same note, twenty-first century approaches 
have become more cautious and investigative in finding various ways, which are suitable to the 
conflict environment, if bottom-up approaches are to yield a long-term outcome. 
Orjuela (2003) informs the modeling of peacebuilding practices by suggesting an extensive 
consideration of cultural and traditional values of a conflict society. This argument has been 
shared by Lederach (2005) and Joeng (2005) who values the understanding of the ‘local’ as an 
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entry platform for effective peace and establishing governing, negotiating and cooperative 
capabilities which can sustain peacebuilding measures in the long run. UN peace missions in 
Africa and international organizations before the new millennium placed little or no value to 
local capacities that are useful in providing support for intervention programs in building peace. 
In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon urged national ownership as a central theme in 
post-conflict peacebuilding (UN 2009). According to Timothy Donias, such a conclusion 
reflects, “the common sense wisdom that any process not embraced by those who have to live 
with it is likely to fail” (2014:1). Importantly, embracing the ‘local’ in social science research 
has become the talk of the day in the 21st century literature, however, Donias (2014) like 
Hoffman (2009) warns on the “romanticism of the national ownership/ local”. Thus in as much 
as domestic knowledge, practices and resources can be utilized or mainstreamed in 
peacebuilding, the international capacity should not be sidelined or regarded as insignificant 
(Donias, 2014; UN 2011). Henceforth, this knowledge drives a bargain to the African Union’s 
(AU) peace practices and intervention missions which seem to have adopted more external 
(borrowed) approaches from their European counterparts and the UN (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). 
Peacebuilding as Statebuilding? 
Curtis (2013) argues that peacebuilding in Africa has been used more as a template for state 
building, thus in many instances institutions have prioritized state reconstruction measures and 
governance. In as much as, state reconstruction and governance are important in reorienting a 
fractured and divided state there has been various loopholes. Many problems and limitations 
identified in post-conflict state reconstruction are a concentration of institutional rehabilitation 
and re-building of institutional frameworks without community interaction and civil society 
engagement. In most instances in many post-conflict African countries, peacebuilding efforts are   
often pushed on elections rather than efforts that are “sustainable and comprehensive to empower 
actors within civil society” (Kamniski, 2011: 5). Curtis articulates that  
…many of the countries that are sometimes heralded as current postconflict ‘success stories’ are countries with 
strong state apparatuses, such as Rwanda and Ethiopia. Strong, well-institutionalized states therefore seem to be 
necessary for peaceful development, with the ensuing logic that international donors should assist with 
statebuilding efforts following civil war (2013: 80).  
Thus in most cases, peacebuilding and statebuilding have been regarded as synonymous in 
some literature.  Houton (2014: 2) basis such a standpoint on the fact that, “the state is the 
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primary vehicle through which domestic and international peace is sought”. Thus, scholarly 
views often describe peacebuilding and statebuilding as inseparable. This is problematic since 
statebuilding is more of a sub-component of peacebuilding, which has its own goals. 
Peacebuilding aims to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict. Henceforth, statebuilding 
contributes to that notion by establishing and strengthening political, administrative and 
governmental institutions.  
Communication, dialogue and legitimacy in building peace 
Some of the issues, which are valued much in the process of building peace, are communication, 
dialogue and legitimacy. Arguably, these three factors are the most significant courses in post-
conflict recovery and peacebuilding. However, they have received very little attention in peace 
research practice. Lederach (1997 & 2005) advocates for the participation of different 
stakeholders [aside of those in government and leaders] in the process of building peace. Many 
scholars share these same sentiments as John Burton’s (1990) concerns are noted by Joeng that,  
…representatives of states often do not resolve conflicts, but tend instead to arrange settlements that ‘paper 
over’ underlying grievances which will be the source of escalating conflict in the future. This is because 
representatives of state sometimes do not adequately represent the needs of all that will be affected by the 
settlement. To overcome this shortcoming, problem solving parties assemble both governmental and non-
governmental people who can widely represent the needs of all parties, including those not adequately 
represented by representatives of the states. The workshops consist of meetings between these people and social 
scientists who help them probe deeply into the basic roots of conflict, stimulate dialogue between the parties in 
search of mutually acceptable solutions and introduce social science insights where they are deemed to be useful 
(1999: 31). 
These values adhere to Track II diplomacy, as they emphasise on communication and dialogue 
amongst all stakeholders involved in the conflict to deal with the challenge of spoilers and ensure 
a sustainable peace building process. This means to encourage the recognition of all possible 
avenues across all social and leadership levels in engaging the peace processes.  
The Story of Wajir Women and their role in legitimate local peacebuilding.  
The story of the Wajir23 women remains the most ideal scenario for understanding the influence 
of different actors [even community ones] in mobilising peace or conflict. Wajir district is in the 
                                                          
23 “Wajir district in the North-Eastern Province of Kenya. The population is in its majority formed of nomadic pastoralists who 
need extensive areas to move with the animals in search for pasture and water. The conflict potential of the region is extremely 
high because of the rivalry between the different clans for controlling and using those scarce natural resources. The society is 
 50 
northeastern part of Kenya, near the Somalian and Ethiopian borders. Somali clans mostly 
dominate the district. Wajir just like most parts in those regions suffered from  the internal wars 
and conflicts in the neighbouring Somalia and Ethiopia.  With the collapse of the Somali, 
government in 1989 there was a large influx of refugees into Kenya. The increase of refugees in 
the Wajir region stirred up interclan fighting, increased the flow of arms and fighting groups 
making life difficult. The government of Kenya declared the region as a state of emergency as it 
had developed into the worst case of violence that has ever happened in the region. When the 
violence was at its peak, there was increase of crime and most women feared for their children, 
for their market businesses that kept their families fed, and they were tired of the violence, which 
made them feel unsafe. This triggered their common fears, encouraged them to gather first in 
small quantities, and agreed on a common idea. The idea was that the market place should be a 
safe place everyone. Lederach narrates how the market place quickly developed in a safe place, 
“…for any woman of any clan background to come, to sell, and to buy. Women were looking out for their 
children. Access and safety to the market was an immediate right that had to be assured. Since women mostly 
ran the market, they spread the word. They established monitors who would watch every day what was 
happening at the market. They would report any infractions, any abuse of someone because of her clan or 
geographic origin. Whenever issues emerged, a small committee of women would move quickly to resolve 
them. Within a short period of time, the women had created a zone of peace in the market. Their meetings 
and initiatives resulted in the creation of the Wajir Women’s Association for Peace.” (2005:11). 
The women’s initiative in eliminating violent conflicts from market places managed to attract 
government attention and influence initiatives towards building peace. There was dialogue 
between the women and the men of the community with the community authorities who took the 
matter to the government authorities and arranged a meeting for the women. This art of 
communication and dialogue through understanding their values and traditions managed to yield 
much legitimate results for their community (Lederach, 2005). The story of Wajir women has 
remained a symbol of effective local participation in building of peace. 
The importance of Communication and Dialogue in building peace 
Therefore, scholars of Track II diplomacy posit that, consistent communication and dialogue, 
which is inclusive of all stakeholders, gives room to legitimate support and a voice to the 
vulnerable in conflict (local communities, women and children). It is imperative to note how 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
traditional, the leading role is played by the elders, the so-called wise men” (http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-documentation-
639_en.html accessed 04/08/2015). 
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communication and dialogue have been neglected as a catalyst, which bridges both institutional, 
and grassroots approaches in peace research. Erzurum and Eren’s (2014) acknowledges 
communication as the driving force, which keeps the process of peacebuilding moving.  
More so, communication as a catalyst in synthesizing top-down and bottom-up approaches 
allows integration between the macro-level (national and international organs) and micro-level 
(local and regional communities) to interact without bureaucracy in order to build peace together. 
Twenty-first century literature on post-conflict peacebuilding has presented how uniform 
approaches to peace have been at an impasse due to exclusiveness. Wherefore a call for inclusive 
ways of building peace (Lederach, 1997; 2005; Joeng 1999; 2005; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; 
Richmond, 2011) strategies which gives a conscious consideration to grassroots issues which 
influence institutional decisions or vice versa for positive peace outcomes. Notably, the process 
of building peace is very long and thus requires much commitment and patience. 
Literature has presented strong theoretical and concrete perspectives in peacebuilding, which 
include the tracks of diplomacy, types of negotiation and intervention, and people-to-people 
approaches. It has become apparent that all these perspectives are effective in their own 
dimensions but years of research and observation have proved that each theory and perspective 
in building peace cannot operate independently from the other (Gawerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et 
al, 2011). History has recorded how institutional decisions for peace agreements are resulting in 
negative peace, yet this peace is short lived. In various instances in South Sudan region of Abyei, 
DRC and Somalia, some effective initiatives in peacebuilding, such as people-to-people 
processes, have proven to be effective and yet their effort in some instances are thwarted at 
institutional level and lacked legitimacy. As such, the landmark for sustainable peaceful means 
becomes obsolete without full legitimate support. 
Legitimacy of people-to-people initiatives and various grassroots peace support programs in 
conflict communities or villages have always been in precarious position with governments. 
There has been difficulty in translating local people-people peacebuilding initiatives to state 
levels despite local successes. Their adaptation at state-level may be suppressed if they do not 
have buy-in from a legitimate authority. Therefore, organisational support without government 
support may suppress the development of the initiatives and thus they need to be legitimized 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Therefore, to yield much success, governments and international 
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organizations (as legitimate authorities) are required and needed. For instance, various people-to-
people initiatives adopted between the Palestinian and Israeli communities lacked  legitimate 
authority and the whole peacebuilding process was undermined (Maoz, 2004).  
Scholars have noted that local/national ownership [grassroots or people-to-people initiatives] in 
the building of peace requires effective communication and dialogue which keep all stakeholders 
from local, state and international levels in the loop (Donias, 2014).  This ensures cohesion with 
all legitimate figures for the legitimisation of the process. Therefore, leading to the 
implementation of an effective process on a large scale with enough support. This builds an 
influential legal and acceptable capacity in all political, social, cultural, traditional and economic 
platforms in building peace. The lack of legitimate voice to micro-level peace initiatives due to 
‘institutional rhetoric’ (bureaucratic barriers and red tape) has been the main cause of 
peacebuilding failures. 
Generational approaches in Peacebuilding 
In the peacebuilding literature, scholars articulate that there are “generations” of peacebuilding, 
which have evolved and developed over the years (Roberts, 2011). Since the Cold war, there are 
four generational approaches to ending conflict recorded in the literature on the subject 
(Richmond et al, 2011). The first generation approach, which is conservative in nature, 
subscribes to top-down approaches, which are hegemonic and impose statebuilding and peace 
strategies. It attests that peace can be achieved through military force, rather than through 
negotiations and agreements, as has been the case in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq (Roberts, 
2011; Richmond et al, 2011). The second generation approach has been referred to as an 
orthodox form of the first-generation approach since it is also top-down in approach but mainly 
focuses on liberal institutional reforms [pluralism and democratic reforms] (Ramsbotham et al, 
2011). These focus on state economic engagement as the main foundation of post-conflict 
recovery. Thus Richmond et al, argues that it “relies on military presence and coercion or 
conditionality to build ‘proper’ state institutions for liberal-market-oriented states, as was seen in 
the early years of international engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo” (2011: 454). 
Second generation peacebuilding has paved the way for orthodox liberal peacebuilding which is 
the third generation approach to peacebuilding. 
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The third generation peacebuilding approach, unlike the first two generations, is sensitive to 
micro-level (local) involvement in participation and considers local ownership and culture in 
peacebuilding. In peacebuilding literature, it is referred to as “orthodox liberal peacebuilding” for 
its values of democratic reforms and pluralization in political participation, and the protection of 
human rights (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Richmond et al, 2011). In theoretical 
terms, with these liberal strategies, the framework is able to undermine intra-state conflict 
through peace negotiations and agreements reached at a macro or elite level, with the aspirations 
of involving citizens more directly into the peace processes (Richmond et al, 2011). However, 
these third generational approaches, still remain top-down in approach as they remain influenced 
by the perspectives of donors, organizations and institutions rather than the local people they 
intend to serve (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Richmond et al, 2011). Most 
international practices to peace building such as that of the United Nations (UN) “family”, the 
European Union (EU) and the World Bank are guided by this generational approach 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Richmond et al, 2011). 
Finally, there is the fourth generation approach. In their analysis of the EU peacebuilding 
framework, Richmond et al (2011) clearly argued that the third generation approach had various 
weaknesses; hence, the need for a new emancipatory framework, which is just and durable, as 
well as integrative of both macro (government and international organizations), and micro 
(local/community) level initiatives. Various scholars of conflict transformation advocate for this 
fourth generation approach Lederach as one of its proponent notes,  
An infrastructure for peacebuilding is oriented toward supporting processes of social change generated by the 
need to move from stagnant cycles of violence toward a desired and shared vision of increased 
interdependence. Such an infrastructure must be rooted in the conflict setting. It must emerge creatively from 
the culture and context, but not the slave of either (1997: 84). 
Scholars in conflict transformation in the first decade of the new millennium agreed that to 
ensure effective peacebuilding there is need to privilege local/community involvement to give 
priority to the negotiation of local and international perspectives (Richmond, 2008; Ramsbotahm 
et al, 2011; Richmond et al, 2011). More so, they suggest that methods of peace should be built 
from different spheres which include grassroots (bottom-up) and various social ontologies; in 
relation to governmental, institutional and legal frameworks with “consent and an engagement 
with difference and hybridity” (Richmond, 2008: 163). Therefore, in simple terms, conflict 
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transformation theories in the twenty-first century, such as vertical integration peacebuilding 
(Donias, 2013), the transformative cosmopolitan model (Ramsbotham et al, 2011) and liberal 
cosmopolitan peacebuilding (Richmond et al, 2011), are protégés of this fourth generation 
perspective. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter paid a competent follow-up on various foundations in peacebuilding. It is 
imperative to note that many scholars agree that peacebuilding is one of the most dominant 
concepts across all disciplines in the study of conflict and peace. However, as popular as it is, it 
remains a learning process. It does not have a one-size-fits-all solution. Notably, there is still 
much to pursue in the African scholarship on the theory of building peace. Through most 
peacebuilding practices have been (and are still being) engaged on the continent, most of the 
approaches in the past decades have been alien and evasive to the conflict environment to ensure 
lasting peace.  
The arguments that propelled in the conflict problem-solving literature by scholars such as John 
Burton, Edward Azar who are specialists in International Relations and war emphasised on 
various ways of addressing conflicts. Since 1970s, their work received distant consideration 
because it was not focusing on ideological conflicts, which were dominant at that time 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2011). However, literature in the past two-decades seemed to have revisited 
their roots in realising that the various kinds of conflicts, which have become dominant are 
intractable, deep-rooted and socially protracted (Burton, 1987; Azar, 1990). Hence, this has 
triggered an evolving thought framework based on the conception that there is always a need to 
think beyond the circumstances at hand in order to harness effective mechanisms that guide post-
conflict peacebuilding. Ramsbotham et al (2011:233), endorses the standpoint of evolving and 
effective mechanisms as they argue that, “effective and sustainable peacemaking processes must 
be based not merely on the manipulation of peace agreements made by elites but, more 
importantly, on the empowerment of communities torn apart by war to build peace from 
below...” (Ramsbotham et al, 2011: 233). Therefore, it is clear that peacebuilding in the 21st 
century is faced with the new nature of conflicts which are ever involving into complex and 
deep-rooted situations. Thus, there is much need for strategic and constructive approaches that 
are holistic and transdisciplinary in approach to incorporate the dynamic social differences that 
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require much attention in order to ensure sustainable building of peace. Fourth generation 
peacebuilding offers various channels which need exploration especially in African 
peacebuilding strategies. The background offered in this chapter has evidently provided the 
foundations of the thinking behind more than 50 years of peace research, and yet still Africa 





CHAPTER 3: Concepts and Theories for building peace in conflict 
transformation 
 
“Blind commitment to a theory is not an intellectual virtue it is an intellectual crime.” Imre 
Lakatos24 
Introduction 
Conflict is an endemic determinant that affects human societies extensively. From a normative 
point of view, conflict is condemned and denounced; viewed as a disease, which necessarily 
require eradication. Such, normative thinking has been abstract for different concepts and 
theoretical entry points in addressing conflict problems. In Patrick Chabal’s perspective, taking a 
normative approach is ‘ahistorical’ and limits interpretative focus on understanding the 
foundations of conflicts “in their local context and what their long-term consequences are likely 
to bear” (2009: 160). Considerably, various approaches to peace have focused on boosting civil 
society participation and improving communication between conflict parties through conflict 
resolution practices. On the other light, diplomatic initiatives in which negotiations and peace 
agreements are drafted has been the backbone provided by conflict management landmarks. 
Lederach (1997) and Paffenholz (1998 & 2000) problematizes these thought frameworks for 
having a blinkered focus in limiting the building of peace to mediation, negotiation (between 
leaders of conflict parties) and communication (of conflict parties) only. Paffenholz clearly 
outlines that there is often a side-lining of most internal and external actors in the peace 
processes, “before, during and after the negotiations” (2009: 3).   
There is much evidence of limited conflict transformation theory, concepts and practice in most 
African conflict research. Conflict in Africa is viewed as a virus that requires eradication, thus 
much intervention has been done through conflict resolution and management strategies. Many 
scholars and organizations in peacebuilding view conflict transformation as ‘idealistic’, and ‘too 
new age’ thus dismissing it in preference to conflict resolution (Lederach, 2003). Scholars such 
as Ramsbotham et al (2009 & 2011), view conflict transformation as an extension of conflict 
resolution strategies. It is a sad reality that various scholars are still trapped in defining the 
semantics of conflict transformation. Respectively, one should note that the trap has been 
                                                          
24 Imre Lakatos was a Hungarian philosopher of Mathematics and Science 
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sustained for more than a decade simply because there is still a dependency on normative ideals 
of addressing conflict in a changing world, which requires constructive engagement. In 
consideration of the intractable and protracted social conflicts of South Sudan, Somalia and 
DRC, it is no gain saying that there is much need to harness our deepest critical reflection 
prowess as social scientists with a clear understanding that social life is never stable. 
Social psychologists argue that social patterns are transient and yet requires cumulative 
engagements (Gergen, 1996). In reference to conflict, one can clearly note that conflict 
transformation theoretical framework embraces various scopes and praxis that can be applicable 
and relevant to the changing (unstable social patterns) and complex (unpredictable sources of 
conflict) nature of conflicts in Africa. This research study is designed under the theory of vertical 
integration peacebuilding. Vertical integration is a reflection on peace practice adopted from an 
intense study of peace building effectiveness for over a decade and analysis of its cumulative 
impact across 16 different empirical cases since 2007 (Donias, 2013:2). Peacebuilding needs to 
be flexible to consider various approaches and adopt mechanisms, which are suitable to address 
specific localities particularly in complex and multifaceted conflicts. Vertical integration offers a 
flexible platform for approaches from both elite-levels and bottom-levels (Donias, 2013; Donias 
and Burt 2014). In other words, it is an approach structured from a hybrid peacebuilding 
perspective.  
The thinking behind the concepts and theories discussed in this chapter is to create a critical 
distance from a crisis mentality. A crisis mentality focuses on treating a conflict scenario as a 
disaster that requires an immediate management solution. Resulting in the scheming of “quick 
political solutions” to address the escalation or continuity of conflict through peace accords and 
intense negotiations. Lederach (1997: 74), warns that the biggest challenge is that, “little 
preparation is made for sustaining the peace process over the medium and long term”. Hence, the 
evaluation of the various theories and concepts in this chapter will point out on the various 
weaknesses of some approaches in addressing intractable conflicts and the limitations as far as 
theory is concerned. Thus, the main intention is to provide researchers with the necessary and 
feasible frameworks and mechanisms to penetrate the conflict environment and engage on an 
effective peacebuilding process, which may yield sustainable peace in [Africa’s] longstanding 
conflicts. 
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Understanding Conflict Transformation (Theory) 
Conflict transformation seeks a thorough engagement for a conflict overhaul to inhibit perpetual 
violence and social unrest in deeply rooted conflict situations. Since the 1990s, though the term 
conflict transformation was not popular amongst various scholars, some of the ideas gained 
much attention as an alternative strategy of addressing the increasing number of civil wars. In a 
growing reality that most wars are no longer inter-state but intra-state, most scholars in peace 
studies have argued that, “contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions 
and the identification of win-win outcomes” (Miall, 2004: 4). Therefore, this gives a more 
thorough understanding of the contemporary approach in conflict transformation which outlines 
the need for “(re)construction and/or (re)conceptualization” and transformation of “existing 
conflict intervention measures” (Ramsbotham et al, 2009:22 cited by Shulika 2013: 13). 
In addition, advocates of the conflict transformation school of thought have identified 
opportunities for effective peace in engaging the cultural and human resources in the given 
conflict setting. The people and the materials in the given society base their argument on 
investigative frameworks to highlight the complementary roles that can be played in 
transforming communities. To magnify the lenses of creating opportunities for constructive 
change in order to reduce violence, promote justice in the social structures and interactions, and 
addressing problems that threaten human relationships in the long-run (Miall, 2004; Lederach, 
1995 & 2003). Therefore, this gives an understanding of how conflict transformation as a term 
has been used to “indicate a comprehensive and long term approach to social change in situations 
of violent, often intractable conflict, and reference will also be made to development and aid, 
security and ecology as being relevant to the conflict transformation processes” (Hendrick 2009: 
4). Tellingly, this clarifies the need for a wide-ranging approach which is able to consider 
various transdisciplinary networks which support groups within society in addressing conflict 
problems with a variety of actors playing important roles rather than outsiders (playing key roles 
in) mediating and constructing platforms for the future outcomes (Maill, 2004). 
Before conflicts can be successfully managed, there is need for transformation to be engaged in 
addressing various societal issues, which can easily escalate violence. Shulika (2013:10) in her 
research, hypothesized that “the exclusion of the problem of fragmented ethnic groups, which 
continues to create a lack of trust and cooperation in the society” will remain the platform for 
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elusiveness in ensuring peaceful dialogues and reconciliation dialogues aimed at national healing 
in South Sudan. The continuity of conflict (civil war) and disruption of process of both state-
building and peacebuilding in South Sudan even unto this day has been based on ethnic fault 
lines.   
In Somalia, one can refer to how the clan based civil wars developed into complex cases of 
terrorism and spread into proxy wars with countries such as Ethiopia. The foundations of the 
DRC wars are also found in the enclaves of ethnic divisions though resources have been justified 
to be the major drivers of conflict resurgence. This picture, explains the various complexities in 
each conflict situation and the uniqueness of each case though very similar elements maybe 
identified. In conflict transformation perspectives there are different attitudes and behaviours 
(political, economic, or cultural oppression, lack of participation within government or society, 
corruption, marginalization and authoritarian governing principles and exclusion) towards certain 
emerging societal contradictions that can perpetuate conflict (Nicolaides, 2008:11). Hence, this 
calls for strategic peace mechanisms that are flexible in setting the trends of transformation 
[which include reconciliation] for the building of sustainable peace.  
Conflict resurgence or relapsing of conflict following peace agreements is one of the key issues 
being investigated in this research. This draws much needed attention to how sustainable 
peacebuilding can be engaged. According to Warnecke and Franke (2010: 75) “Stimulated by the 
"Agenda for Peace" (Boutros-Ghali 1992), the international community broadened its post-
conflict portfolio with the development of a more comprehensive conception of 
multidimensional peacebuilding in an effort to actively promote a sustainable peace process”. 
Multidimensional approaches form the essence of conflict transformation theories, which aims to 
identify each barrier to peace outcomes. They draw attention to more pragmatic and holistic 
strategies in pin pointing the concepts and theories that can be borrowed and applied for effective 
practical transformation outcomes in a given conflict society.  
Conflict transformation theories endeavour to identify the root causes of conflict and influence a 
peaceful change in the existing patterns of behaviour. According to the United States Institute of 
Peace (2011:15-16) the structural roots of conflict are changed by “creating a culture of 
nonviolent approaches that proposes an integrated approach to peace-building aimed at bringing 
about long-term changes in personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions”. Conflict 
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transformation seeks to address underlying political, social and economic systems in which there 
can be a symbiotic social upgrade for both ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ transformation. In which peace 
approaches from below can easily influence the decisions at the top, and the decisions at the top 
are clearly made from an informed position of all actors involved in the conflict. In this situation, 
conflict transformation can happen intentionally or even unintentionally. The latter may be, “a 
by-product of the broader social and economic changes that the actors within a conflict neither 
planned nor could avoid, but to which they have to adjust” (Botes 2003:8). With this 
background, one can clearly indicate that conflict transformation theories and concepts of 
addressing conflicts and building peace accentuates to constructively develop mechanisms which 
are adequately effective to conceive meaningful platforms of addressing conflict recurrence and 
chronic episodic violence from re-emerging. A few of the models and concepts in conflict 
transformation that has been used include Complexity Theory, Johan Galtung’s Positive and 
Negative Peace Paradigm, Ripe Moment Approach of William Zartman and Kumar Rupisinghe’s 
Eleven Points Model. A brief explanation of these theories and concepts shall be given below; 
however, they do not possess the mechanisms required to tackle the intractable problems in 
South Sudan, Somalia and DRC.  
Theories and Concepts in Solving Conflicts 
Complexity Theory: is a theory that has its roots in the natural sciences. It has been adopted in 
the field of various social sciences faculties in order to bring much understanding in the 
difficulties that may be encountered in translating deep and sharp situations. This theory has 
become widely accepted in the field of peace and conflict studies to strike a balance in ushering 
in the concept of transdisciplinarity in peace research. According to Hendricks (2009:4) 
“complexity theory begs integration at theoretical and practical levels and it is possible that 
transdisciplinarity could spur this development within the peace and conflict filed and for this 
reason it receives attention here”. In conflict transformation research, Complexity Theory has 
been focused on transcending the intra-personal level relationships between the conflict parties 
and conflict interveners into inter-personal and inter-group levels.  
Complexity Theory has been commended for its effectiveness in analysing intractable conflicts. 
In this case, it builds its foundations on a multi-framework research approach adopting and 
engaging samples of conflict settings to devise strategies of addressing conflict situations at 
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hand. Aesthetically it is an attractive idea, but in reality it is more technical (top-down in 
practice) in approach and adheres to elite approaches as the only source of hope in enhancing 
peace. Complexity theory departs from an all-knowing angle, such that there are mostly under-
resources to engage with local actors in addressing conflict problems. This makes it vulnerable 
for practitioners to gain much trust and support from the locals they intend to help. For instance 
in the Abyei25 region some of the smallest initiatives of building trust between the Messariya and 
Ngok Dinka ethnic groups such as the Abyei Common Trust26 which could have been utilised by 
the authorities in easing the complex conflict situation were neglected and lacked support from 
the other key international and state level stakeholders.  Lederach (1997, 2005) and Joeng (2005) 
agree that all stakeholders involved in conflict and in the peace processes need a ‘political space’ 
to engage and forge relations as they operate from different views. Therefore, it is apparent to 
note that complexity theory could have been plausibly used in engaging this research but due to 
the above-mentioned factors, some important issues would be at the risk of being left out. More 
so, it is more effective to understand its effectiveness in a fieldwork research in which its 
abilities are weighed and tested. 
Ripe Moment Approach: William Zartman clearly posits that conflicts are effectively resolved 
through timing the efforts of resolution. His argument focuses on the various conditions and 
opportunities in peace processes that can be utilised by mediators in negotiating to end conflicts. 
Zartman (2001:8) outlines that “parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so—
when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the 
parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament”. It is at this instance when 
conflicting parties reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ that ripeness is regarded as due. In 
international relations, the ripe moment approach has gained much credibility for third-party 
intervention in the resolution of conflicts. Northern Ireland and Cambodia have recorded a 
success story on this approach. Logan and Croft (2004) identifies the different ripe moments that 
were missed in securing peace between India and Pakistan. With all these factors in place, one 
can look at DRC, Somalia and South Sudan.  
In consideration these three African cases, various factors can be brought to light in trying to 
determine the ripe moment for negotiation and engaging in the process of ending the continuous 
                                                          
25 A disputed territory between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. It is located in South Kordofan State 
26 
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conflicts. The first thing to understand, is that all these cases presents deep situation of 
intractability in which all the conflicting parties “seem [very] unable to extricate themselves---
either alone or with outside help” (Burgess and Burgess, 2003). For instance, South Sudan as the 
newest state is still trying to define itself. And it is holding out on its neck for breathe in a 
suffocating conflict zone fuelled by ethnicity (Ngok Dinka vs Nuer [and other minority groups]), 
resource control (grazing lands, oil and water) and territorial disputes (contest over control of 
Abyei Region by both Republic of Sudan (RoS) and Republic of South Sudan (RoSS)). 
Perceiving the Somalian clan and warlord conflicts since 1991 and the territorial contest, which 
goes back beyond that age, and coupled with the emergency terror attacks, it is clear that all the 
conflict trends are deeply regenerating into worse situations. This then poses questions on when 
was the ripe moment supposed to be for these countries. Was it 25 years ago [For Somalia before 
the warlord and clan clashes], or 16 years ago [For DRC when the Lusaka accord was signed]? 
The truth in this instance is that these conflicts are puzzling and complex. Rather intractable 
cases have higher if not absolute chances of spoilers if a ripe moment opportunity is to arise in 
one of the many factors influencing conflict. Henceforth, the question will remain. Is there ever 
going to be a ripe moment for DRC, Somalia or South Sudan? 
Johan Galtung’s Positive and Negative Peace Paradigm: In the philosophy of peace research, 
the concepts of positive and negative peace are the core of peace theory. Sandole (2010) 
emphasises that the purpose of peacebuilding can be clearly understood through comprehending 
the concepts of positive and negative peace. According to Johan Galtung (1964:2), negative 
peace is “the absence of violence, absence of war” whilst positive peace means “the integration 
of human society [the removal of injustice/structural violence amongst all political, economic, 
and societal levels from individual to international levels (Ramsbotham et al, 2011)]”. Johan 
Galtung in the 1960s builds three models that give much insight to his positive and negative 
peace paradigm and these include the model of conflict, violence and peace (see Galtung 1969; 
1990; 1996). Ramsbotham et al (2011:10) identifies that through understanding how conflict is 
influenced by contradiction, attitude and behaviour, one can be able to define conflict as a 
“dynamic process” which can be transformed into positive or negative peace. This process can 
either escalate into violence (when parties in society or structure begin to pursue their interests 
with hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour leading to growth and intensity of conflict 
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formation) or be de-escalate (when dynamic changes occur [through intervention] in attitude, 
conflict behaviour and transformation of relationships begin to occur in a conflict society).  
In Galtung’s view, the best level of addressing conflict is when the society eliminates structural 
violence. In this instance, his argument transcends that accumulation of negative peace is not 
guarantee for sustainable peace, since it is simply suggest that everything is normal when peace 
agreements are signed and unity governments have been put in place. It is important to 
understand that in the building of peace, the level of negative peace that is mostly associated 
with signing of agreements, ceasefire and disarmaments is just but the beginning of the process. 
Thus in most cases peacebuilding ends before it has even begun hence continuous resurgences 
and rebellions have emanated in DRC regions, South Sudan communities and Somalian 
territories. Aspects of reconciliation, social transformation and re-integration have been totally 
neglected. People have usually become vulnerable in post-conflict societies because they are not 
given a purpose in rebuilding their country because the society has remained idle on principles of 
negative peace.  
Grewal (2003:2) notes that, “the theory of peace has undergone changes since 1964 and 
Galtung’s views on peace and violence have changed to a broadened focus on the causes and 
effects of violence and peace”. With the new knowledge evolution, there has been disagreements 
on the various aspects of issues that can be labelled under negative peace and positive peace. 
Haessly (no date) clearly outlines that there is always a contest of focus amongst peace 
researchers when it comes to the factors to be engaged on when addressing issues of peace and 
violence. For instance, some may focus on negative peace whilst others put an effort to aspects 
that can put an end to structural violence. These factors have created much room for strong 
critics from some scholars such as Kenneth Boulding (cited in Atack, 2009:41) who dismisses 
the basis of the theory of negative peace regarding it as confusing in defining and understanding. 
Some scholars have further argued that, it is “impractical” to have a total absence of war 
especially in a post-conflict environment (Furley and May 2006). Atack (2009) challenges the 
actual fruition of positive peace, in pointing out how some scholars argue that, there is no 
guarantee or absolute removal of the causes of conflict in positive peace. In witnessing the 
constant resurgences of conflict in DRC and South Sudan, there is much evidence to how the 
theory of negative peace and positive peace has its challenges as a framework. 
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John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model: This model stands as one of the most successful models 
in the building of peace and transformation of broken relationships in conflict environments. 
Ssentongo and van Raalten (2007) came up with a Conflict Intervention Model that was 
developed from Lederach’s peace pyramid. They acknowledge the pyramid model for setting up 
successful components of restoring and transforming communities in conflict. Michelle Maiese 
(2003) commenting on Lederach’s pyramid model, posited that it made it easier for actors to 
determine the right approach to focus on in the building of peace and also help in providing the 
simplest ways of describing the numbers of people involved at each level.  
John Paul Lederach (1997) argues that in internal armed conflict situations, the leadership in 
every level of the affected communities requires a proper platform for negotiation and 
implementing accords in transforming society into peace. Lederach therefore, presents the 
leadership pyramid for addressing conflict. The leadership pyramid consists of three levels, the 
top leadership (military/political/religious leaders with high visibility), middle-range leadership 
(ethnic/religious leaders, academics/intellectuals, humanitarian leaders (NGOs) and Insider-
partial teams) and the grassroots leadership (local leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs, 
Community developers, local health officials and Refugee camp leaders). Scholars are agree that 
in managing conflicts in various situations in countries, progress should be achieved at all levels 
if conflicts are to be completely resolved in both international and internal situations.  
Looking at Diagram 1 below, one can understand that the top-level leadership emphasises on 
high-level negotiations on ceasefires in conflicts. In most intractable conflicts such as the ones 
addressed in this research, most negotiations were engaged in by top-level leadership to work out 
plans for peace. However, it has become apparent that in most cases the peace agreements that 
have been negotiated in some instances neglects or downgrades the legal responsibility of the 
peace agreements. For example, the Lusaka ceasefire agreement (DRC v Uganda), which 
attempted to end the 2nd Congo war in 1999 on territorial conflicts, witnessed the document 
being labelled as the ‘modus operandi’ of ending conflicts. Lang (2007) clearly indicates that the 
treatment of peace agreements as a particular way of ending conflicts is problematic if the 
documents are to overlook some issues that undermine the rule of law such as crimes against 
humanity. Most importantly, legal virtue is one of the most aspect mainly overlooked by 
officials, government actors and opposition leaders in an effort to strike a deal for peace. The 
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dangers of such actions are in reducing chances for future reconciliation processes (at grassroots 
levels) in transforming society into peace. This gives much understanding of why Lederach 
emphasises that conflict problem solving requires the comprehension of all three levels. 
In addition, Lederach (1997:41) endorses the middle-range level (level 2) leadership to be in the 
position of understanding the top leadership functions as well as the plight of the grassroots 
level. Therefore, in an effort to build peace this level 2 provides phenomenal information and 
skills that are relevant to the building of effective peace in bridging both the top-level leadership 
and grassroots level. According to Sandole (2010: 47) level 2 players are “nongovernmental 
actors whose objective is, in the presence of trained, experienced facilitators, to share perceptions 
with one another about the conflict and how it might be dealt with”. They pave the way for 
effectiveness in bringing all actors in the process of peace by creating opportunities for “cross-
track communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration” (Nan cited in Sandole 2010: 
47). The grassroots leadership receive much of their training from level 2. Thus, their association 
with the middle-range leadership helps in reducing prejudice and ensuring the survival of 
reconciliation and post-conflict trauma commissions. Therefore, the coordination of these three 
levels ensures a flow of relevant information to reduce the resurgence of conflict. However, in 
most cases creating such a network in most intractable conflicts has suffered, as most top 
leadership seems to disregard or ignore the information or the initiatives from both the middle-
range leadership and worse still grassroots initiatives. 
Diagram 1: Peace-building Levels in Conflict Societies: Actors and Approaches to 
Peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997: 39) 
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More so, Lederach’s pyramid model is one of the most effective and recommended theories in 
peacebuilding. Therefore, it is important to reflect on both vertical integration peacebuilding and 
Lederach’s leadership pyramid. The latter focuses on the importance of communication of 
people across all leadership levels to allow representation of ideas at every level. However, the 
former does not only focus on improving communication and relationships across all hierarchical 
levels of society but seeks for the legitimisation of decisions and initiatives across all levels 
(particularly grassroots level decisions and initiatives towards peace). It seeks to provide 
mechanisms that empower and endorses holistic decisions and strategies through a coherent, 
inclusive and legitimate process at all levels.  
Understanding the Concept of Vertical Integration in building peace 
In considering the various theoretical concepts above, it is important to acknowledge that this 
research aims to inform the building of constructive mechanisms to address issues of conflict 
resurgence and ensure sustainable peace in intractable situations. The study explored concepts 
above in order to identify the various frameworks that have dominated the peacebuilding world. 
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However, this research adopts hybrid peace approaches and pays particular attention to vertical 
integration perspective. Vertical Integration theory is not a new concept, but its use and practice 
in conflict transformation and peacebuilding is a recent phenomenon. Thus, it has been adopted 
as vertical integration peacebuilding. In conflict transformation, vertical integration 
peacebuilding can be regarded as an extension of conflict transformation theories, which include 
“cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory” (Ramsbotham et al, 2011) and “liberal 
cosmopolitanism” (Richmond et al, 2012). These theories can be regarded as fourth generation 
peacebuilding for they show an emancipatory approach to peacebuilding and acknowledge the 
impact of peacebuilding from below (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). There is much hubris in previous 
approaches to peacebuilding as they maintain a static notion in practice. They ignore some 
conflict realities such as resurgences, direct violence and crimes against humanity, which are 
common in most intractable conflicts. Considerably, there is need for an approach that does not 
only focus on ending conflict per se but also rebuild the state by establishing the rule of law, 
rehabilitating societies and rebuilding state structures. 
The foundation of vertical integration 
The concept of vertical integration peacebuilding embraces hybrid peace approaches and 
accommodates various perspectives through its inclusive representation approach. It 
acknowledges the participation of governments, NGOs, civil societies, local communities and 
international communities to engage on a legitimate platform (Donias and Burt, 2014). Just like 
lederach’s leadership pyramid the concept of vertical integration peacebuilding, aims to bridge 
communication across all societal structures or levels. There is still limited literature on vertical 
integration peacebuilding. On 17 October 2013, a workshop titled “Towards Vertically 
Integrated Peacebuilding: Bridging Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches”27 was held. In the 
report of this workshop Timothy Donias noted that “the concept of “integrated” peace building 
could be expanded to include not just international actors - as has been the practice to date - but 
also the governments and citizens of states affected by conflict” (2013: 1). There is an 
understanding that there has been a lot of confusion among scholars and practitioners of peace 
building, which has disturbed ‘order and coherence’ in the peace building system. This theory 
                                                          
27 The “Balsillie School of International Affairs and organized in conjunction with the 2013 annual conference of the Peace and 
Justice Studies Association” held this workshop. It brought together scholars, activists and policy-makers to address both 
challenges and opportunities of vertical integration in peacebuilding contexts”. It was held at the CIGI Campus in Waterloo, 
Canada on the 17th of October 2013. More information is available on the CIGI website:-
http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/rethinking-peacebuilding/towards-vertically-integrated-peacebuilding-workshop  
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draws its value from an emancipatory perspective that values local ownership of peace. It 
negotiates and legitimizes local community values in statebuilding and peacebuilding and at the 
same time does not ignore the impact of global and high-level forces on local communities. It 
acknowledges “dialogue and communication” as the centre of every process in building peace. 
The World Summit Outcomes (2005: 21) various states emphasized and agreed on,  
the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation 
with a view to achieving sustainable peace, recognizing the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to 
address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and 
reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development.  
The objective of this study is to clarify how vertical integration peacebuilding offers a 
theoretical framework for inclusive peacebuilding. Hence, this is a potential approach for 
structuring integrative mechanisms and holistic way to address contemporary complex conflict 
situations in Africa.   
The values of an effective peace process 
 Scholars agree that inclusive approaches are the backbone of effective peacebuilding (Lederach, 
1997; Crocker et al, 2014; Donias and Burt, 2014). They aim to break the barrier of uniform and 
bureaucratic structures imposed at the top and desensitize local conditions and initiatives 
(Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Paternalist structures which are fuelled by imposed 
strategies and red tape exists between international institutions/organisations, government 
institutions, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the people in post-conflict peacebuilding 
bearing a 50% chance of conflict relapsing in the first post-conflict decade (Collier 2004; Murithi 
2007). This explains most of Africa’s conflict zone countries. This study relies on a thorough 
analysis of text data and numeric data on how elite-level approaches have been imposed in 
African conflicts resulting in the constant eruption of latent conflicts, even in cases where peace 
agreements have been signed. Thus, it seeks to expose the bias towards liberal peace approaches 
that has produced tentative or deeply flawed peace. 
 
According to Donias and Burt (2014), Haiti presented a case of unsolvable and complex 
insecurity until the UN adopted a vertical integration strategy with a decentralised coordination 
from international, national and local levels in which the security system has been reformed 
completely since 2007. Donias and Burt (2014) further buttresses that, in adopting various 
strategies of vertical integration in peacebuilding the most promising vehicle for effective 
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change, in local-national and international engagement, is through interactive dialogue among all 
stakeholders, thus there is a need to establish forums for such interaction. There is much need to 
explore the various options and strategies that can be utilised in Africa’s longest and intractable 
conflicts. 
Vertical integration can be related to fourth generational theories of peacebuilding in the conflict 
resolution frameworks. These theories include the “cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory” 
or “transformative cosmopolitan model” which has been suggested in the literature of conflict 
transformation by scholars such as Ramsbotham at el (2011) and “Liberal Cosmopolitanism” 
suggested in the European peacebuilding framework by Richmond et al (2012). In fourth 
generation peace-building, Richmond et al (2012), Ramsbotham et al (2011), argue there is an 
embrace of an emancipatory paradigm of peace and the building of integration from various 
theoretical frameworks of peace that are drawn from peacemaking strategies and technical 
processes on the ground. They portray communication as one of the central agents of effective 
peacebuilding in which all ideas are shared openly amongst everyone involved in the conflict 
(peace organizations, governments and communities) to achieve sustainable peace (Ramsbotham 
et al, 2011). The most effective quality to be harnessed interpretively from this theory is its 
holistic manner, adaptive analytic frameworks, a broad communication network and a strong 
inclusive policy to avoid spoilers to the process. This ensures a close monitoring process to all 
stakeholders and attracts multi-disciplinary or transdisciplinary engagement in devising solutions 
to the core problems at hand. The transdisciplinary notion has become much useful in most 
social sciences disciplines in 21st century, with the understanding that society is made up of 
various social components that can be traced through sociology, anthropology, social 
psychology, and many more disciplines, which explains societal structures. Vertical integration 
peacebuilding harnesses all societal prowess in rebuilding a functional and peaceful society.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has looked through various theoretical concepts that have been guiding the building 
of peace over the past decades. The main aim is to identify, learn and separate the various 
loopholes and strengths in the new trend of hybrid peacebuilding. Lederach (1997) clearly 
admitted that there is much need for more inclusive approaches in the process of building peace 
and the various concepts identified in this chapter clearly highlighted why Lederach’s demand 
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and proposition back then is much more relevant in this day. There has been a clarification on the 
adaptation of hybrid peacebuilding approaches in this research. A particular reference to the use 
of vertical integration peacebuilding as a theoretical concept guiding this research framework 
clearly explained. Therefore, these theoretical perspectives inform how the issues raised in this 






















Chapter 4: A defective strategy, repulsive outcomes: the 
consequences of Liberal Peace approaches in addressing African 
conflicts. 
 
“A less optimistic variation on this theme is that the push for a liberal peace represents naivety and 
misunderstanding about the nature of politics in most post-conflict societies.” Mark Hoffman 28 
Introduction 
This chapter illuminates the consequences of liberal peacebuilding frameworks in an African 
setting plighted with intractable and protracted social conflicts. It highlights the various aspects 
that defines intractability. David Keen (2012) clearly articulates that most conflicts experienced 
in Africa seem to be endless situations and involve various armed groups, which have 
consistently proliferated into many conflicts. This study critically engages phenomenon in 
building peace in African post-conflict countries. Literature in conflict resolution, conflict 
management and conflict transformation points out various foundational causes of continuous 
and relapse of conflicts all over the world (Burgess and Burgess, 2003)29. Necla Tschirgi 
(2015:477) highlights that considering, “the tragic consequences of failed peace agreements in 
Angola, renewed conflicts in Haiti and Rwanda, and protracted wars in Afghanistan, Sudan, and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) highlighted the need for new instruments and 
approaches to support sustainable peace in complex emergencies and intrastate conflicts”. These 
outcomes are testament to some of the various ill prepared and inadequate peace approaches by 
the UN & AU peace operations, and other international agencies of peace. Since the 1990s, 
peacebuilding interventions operated as ad hoc, piecemeal and highly fragmented programs. 
They have disguised themselves in the mantra of local ownership and yet crowded with external 
driving factors; with alien principles to the local factors, they represent (Tschirgi, 2015). 
Considering these circumstances and the consequences of relapse into violent conflict 
experienced over the years in countries such as Somalia, Haiti, Timo-Leste, DRC, and South 
Sudan etc. It is clear that alternative strategies are required not only in addressing African 
problems but at a global scale. 
                                                          
28Lecturer in international relations in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics(LSE)   
29 http://www.beyondintractability.org/ 
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In order to find an entry point to new constructive peace mechanisms, which can be of much use 
in Africa’s conflict predicament there is, need to deliberate on the conceptual framework that 
defines our approaches. The researcher opposes the inhibiting frameworks that are associated 
with liberal peace approaches. The argument is that, they exacerbate intractability and contribute 
to post-conflict resurgences than peace in most African situations. The conflict problem in most 
post-colonial African states perceived through liberal ideological (‘liberal democratic peace’) 
standpoint (Doyle, 2005). Henceforth, logically, the solutions to the conflict problems regarded 
to be in correcting or addressing the ideological misnomer through inducing the necessary liberal 
values. Therefore, by understanding such a foundation, various scholars have identified that the 
demands of successful peace transformation processes lies in addressing ethnic diversity, 
democratizing political systems, building state capacity and liberalizing economic institutions 
(Curtis, 2013). Thus in as much as the aspect of addressing ethnicity and building of state 
capacity may be very considerate (though with the means remain questionable), it is important to 
note that the same cannot be said on the aspect of democratization and liberalization of economic 
institutions.  
The researcher argues that various reports provide mistakenly blanket solutions to peace to be in 
the supremacy of the agencies, which overestimate the ideas, and strategies of liberal peace. 
Such circumstances have resulted in dangerous consequences as some strategies are 
incentivizing to rebel groups in countries such as DRC where violence and conflict has always 
gained them a seat on the negotiating table (Keen, 2012). In Somalia, the United Nations and 
various western donors, which include the World Bank, United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the European Community, have pushed for the development of a 
strong and powerful civil society, which has reigned as the sole provider of service delivery and 
employment, but it has little state building initiatives. This has become an incentivizing platform 
for the managers of these civil societies such that they engage in obstructionism to hinder the 
reestablishment of the state (Mahomed, 2010). Hence, the dominant adherence to specific 
engagements by International agencies of peace has even blinded and diverted some national and 
civil society agencies into betraying the value of local peace ownership, therefore, stalling the 
process of sustainable peacebuilding. Bjorkdahl and Hoglund (2013) clarify how the prowess of 
liberal peace in international peacebuilding has witnessed the criticism of the local as impotent to 
engage constructively, as well as to respond with urgency and mobility. This chapter outlines 
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how such a perception in the arena of peacebuilding neglects transdisciplinary and pragmatic 
fundamentals of peace in Africa that might be harnessed to “reduce the risk of overt violent 
conflict and pave way for durable peace and development” (Bjorkdahl and Hoglund 2013:291). 
Building new blocks for peace debate 
Sadiki Koko (2009) assessed that the transformation processes of building peace are always “a 
recipe for competition, heightened contestations and, if not well managed, violent 
confrontations”. This assessment poses an interesting rhetoric to revisit if various African 
conflict transformation processes, which may include services such as security sector reform, 
disarmament, demobilization, rule of law and reintegration are receiving proper support. The 
purpose being to deduce the liberal theoretical functions which (might) have weakened and 
alienated management and transformation strategies for peace in a given conflict environment. 
This forms the basis to identifying the importance and essence of holistic and pragmatic 
approaches to peace through local initiatives and empowerment of civil societies. It edifies the 
role they may play in building the capacity for sustainable local peace. Re-tracing such steps 
helps in outlining the important roles played by both international actors and local actors; and in 
gleaning the relevant ideas, strategies or new insights that can be utilised from both internal and 
external facilitators of peace. This may allow for proper consideration of the informal political 
rules and power networks that command social influence into developing local strategies to 
peace ownership as well as allowing international actors to view the different patterns of 
relationships and understand the reactions required in the conflict context to bring in the urgency 
and mobility required for effective outcomes (Hendrick, 2009). Of course, various outcomes in 
history and in this present day are the benchmarks, which informs research, and inspire the 
building of new blocks to advance knowledge on the effectiveness of certain practices in 
addressing the long-standing problem of conflict relapse in post-conflict states. 
In addition, the researcher endorses Ducasse-Rogier’s (2004) assessment that intractable conflict 
situations have not only enhanced by the history and complexity of the societies in conflict 
situations. But also by the wrong peacebuilding prescriptions and diagnosis (approaches and 
mechanisms) by the third parties and actors (organizations and states) leading to ill-effects in the 
process (Coleman et al, 2007; Eriksen, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Though 
the main attractor(s) of intractability lies in the former, it is the inconsistences of the latter 
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approaches to effectively evaluate and stabilize the situation, which keeps on attracting new 
conflict elements that further deepens the conflict into complexity. In considering, the various 
peace initiatives that have embarked on in Africa with hundreds of peace negotiations and 
agreements signed in countries such as South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and the DRC. It remains a 
worrying phenomenon that for the past four years the fragile states index has subsequently 
ranked these countries with a Very High Alert status even after more than decades of peace 
intervention for some (Fragile States Index 2012-2016). Muruthi (2006:9) posits, “Vast amounts 
of resources have been utilised to craft peace agreements which have often collapsed under the 
weight of competing interests”. To offer a compelling argument this chapter exposes the setbacks 
of liberal peace and the limitations of its paternal approaches in institutional relations and its 
weaknesses when it comes to support local ownership in peacebuilding. This outlines the 
incompatibility of liberal peace in ensuring sustainable peace in the African conflict crisis as they 
lack the value-added elements of “local cultural assumptions, norms and values as well as 
traditional and grassroots notions of justice and community-based political dialogue” (Murithi 
2008:28). The findings discussed in this research chapter deliberates on this thinking and affirms 
to the shortfalls of liberal peace through the case studies in question. 
Underlining the Continuity of Conflict problems in African countries. 
In following African history, there is no doubt that it records the most damaging conflict 
atrocities of all times. Chabal (2009) tellingly explains that factors surrounding such kind of 
outcomes lay behind the fact that civilians are deliberately the primary targets during the 
conflict. Armies and militaries directly or indirectly attack them as a way achieving their aim. 
Patrick Chabal (2009: 159) in explaining the nature of African conflict attests that it, “is not an 
episodic calamity but an endemic condition, which affects a large proportion of the continent’s 
population”. As such, many African countries have recorded deadly conflicts and witnessed 
atrocious calamities in countries such as Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, DRC, Rwanda, Angola, 
Central African Republic, Burundi, Liberia and Eritrea amongst others. The consequences of 
these internal conflicts are much fearsome when sustainable peace settlements seem far from 
being a reality. There is no doubt that both local and international communities remain morally 
challenged by such situations due to grave security threats posited by each conflict case.  
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For instance, the DRC has been in conflict for over a decade and half, following the end of a 
despotic era under President Mobutu. Despite the extensive involvement of various international 
organizations of peace and different regional state actors there are still no effective conditions 
that allow peace to endure. Eriksen (2009) clarified that United Nations Organization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)30 failed because of one-size-fits all strategies, 
contradiction between UN policies and the key domestic actors and, the use of a flawed and 
contradictory model in the state building process. This case demonstrates how peace processes 
engaged with a clear assumption that all the strategies would ensure a smooth social progress and 
stability without any proper consideration of the “problematic nature of transition” (Chandler 
2013:6). Following such an outcome Paris (2004:40-51) emphasises that the challenge for such 
detrimental outcomes is the focus to liberalise the state before building up the necessary 
institutions that can support the process. Tellingly, these feeble institutional frameworks cannot 
handle the ‘competition and conflict’ that is build up at the same moment; therefore, they cannot 
sustain the friction at hand. Somalia, DRC and South Sudan share these sentiments and 
demonstrate a burden by international donors to democratize the countries without proper 
institutional frameworks leading to continuous abortion of the peace building processes. In such 
circumstances, conflict relapse is but an inevitable course.   
Critical analysis of this matter poses questions on the virtues of various elements of liberal peace 
that are dominant in most African conflict countries as a way of building peace which have been 
deliberated on in the previous chapters. Hoffman (2009) argues that there is much evidence that 
in post-conflict societies most organizations involved in peacebuilding push for “individual 
rights, obligations and accountability”, which are far-fetched concepts to the culture of the 
communities, which value family over the individual. Interestingly, most African countries have 
communities, guided by strong traditional beliefs and societal values; as such, this may needs 
strong consideration in structuring peacebuilding approaches, which can yield sustainable 
outcomes. Northern Somalia or Somaliland is a perfect example of how indigenous mechanisms 
and social structure utilized to make peace through their community concept known as the 
Xeer31. Murithi (2008:18) articulates that, “all societies around the world have both indigenous 
                                                          
30 ‘Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Cong’ (MUNOC). 
31 The Xeer (Pronounced “Hair”) is an unwritten but loosely accepted code of conduct. It governs relations amongst members of 
different clans in regards to sharing of common pool of resources (water and grazing land)). It emphasizes on the values of 
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and endogenous values, resources and institutions”. He outlines that the main challenge in the 
processes of peace making or peacebuilding in Africa is that they are dominated by distinctive 
Western and Eurocentric bias; hence, there is much need to rectify such asymmetrical growth of 
knowledge in theoretical paradigms of approaching peace on the continent. In this regard, it is 
important to understand that very little attention has been paid in acknowledging the fact that 
some conflict communities do not necesarrily require a “rapid democratization” characterized by 
partisan (party-politics) elections in most cases but indigenous social structures/systems of 
election. 
In addition, the practice of early (party-contesting) elections has proven to be highly destabilising 
in most African cases as tensions (‘competition and conflict’) exacerbate during the electoral 
processes (Hoffman 2009). The case of Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 and that of Burundi in 2015 are 
some of the latest clear testaments of the African conflict plight, ignited following issues of 
democracy and elections. Elections have become a point of weakness for conflict relapse in most 
African states. Snyder et al (2014: 190) concurs that, “early elections typically take place when 
the rule of law is weak, making it more likely that elections will suffer from irregularities and 
that losers will refuse to accept the results peacefully”. Though democratisation sounds good and 
interesting, there should be consideration of the social cleavages that guides the attitude and 
reaction of people towards certain political actions. This demands for extensive civil education, 
and the building of strong and integrative institutions to sustain, the major political changes that 
may need to take place in fragile conflict societies. Nevertheless, this remains an elusive cause 
amongst the international and local peace agents in Africa. Thus following cases such as that of 
DRC, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste have recorded very active large-scale peacebuilding 
participation in the past decades but little tangible outcomes have emerged with rather recurring 
conflict or increase in the fragility of the state (Yamashita, 2014). This questions the process and 
strategies of the peacebuilding paradigm at hand. It also calls for the need to investigate on the 
necessary measures that can be taken to maximise better peace outcomes not only in Africa, but 
also across the world. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interdependence and inclusiveness and it is the basic foundation for social contracts or covenants between lineage groups 
(Murithi 2008: 20).  
 77 
Challenging the influence of liberal frameworks in conflict continuity 
The focus here is to investigate and interpret the various factors that have perpetuated 
intractability leading to recurrence of the conflict problems. The interpretation of these cycles of 
violence and relapse of war following peace agreements, ceasefire or post-conflict peacebuilding 
has been blamed on weak peace mechanisms (alien approaches to peacebuilding which lack 
reconciliation, legitimacy, and inclusiveness) and weak institutions (which are guided by 
processes alien to a particular conflict society/community in question). Therefore, since the late 
twentieth century the peacebuilding scholarship had started to question the ability of liberal 
peace in building sustainable peace in non-western countries. In fact UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-Moon’s reflection on broader issues in peacebuilding in 2009 emphasised the theme of 
national ownership of peace with a clear understanding that peace processes that are guided by 
those who are not likely to live with it will likely fail (UN 2009).  
Timothy Donias (2014: 2) buttresses the ownership of peace by observing that, “the inherent 
limits on the breadth, depth and duration of any external peace-building mission suggest that 
deep-rooted, sustainable change of the kind peace building seeks to bring about requires the 
long-term support and commitment of a critical mass of domestic actors”. However, the 
implementation of the broad-based national ownership peacebuilding remains troubled unless 
equal institutional partnership than institutional paternalism has been built (Murithi, 2008). For 
instance, the UN remains the most powerful and most resourceful institution in spearheading 
peace support operations in the world, its engagement with AU peace support operations should 
always carefully consider the temptation to easily impose ideas and yet with clear consequences 
of frustrating the development of new and local ideas that may be locally owned. However, 
scholars note that the UN and AU trapped in forging a syncretic system of specific peace ideas 
and strategies of addressing peace in the past decade32 but their conduct has remained 
paternalistic in practice though both actors prefer to regard it as a partnership.  
However, liberal peacebuilding remains a dominant framework consistently used since the 
Agenda for Peace as a guiding principle by international organisations such as World Bank, EU, 
UN, AfDB, AU and various international non-governmental organisations in addressing 
conflicts. It is important to clarify that even though in 2009 the UN invoked a new approach of 
                                                          
32 Through the Annual Joint meetings by the UN Security Council and AU Peace & Security Council with the first meeting 
engaged in April 2007. 
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national ownership in peacebuilding, it remained a rhetoric, which lacks effective practice as was 
emphasised in the 2011 UN peacebuilding workshop (UN PB Workshop 2011). In consideration 
of such a background, it remains clear that proper mechanisms to put in place various national 
peacebuilding ownership have not been identified as yet since pro-western interventions and 
initiatives are still dominantly practiced in addressing most conflict challenges in Africa. In light 
of this the researcher delineates the limitations of liberal peace in African conflicts (which are 
still practiced in this day) in order to forge alternative salient patterns that need to be considered 
in setting up strategic (nationally/locally owned) peacebuilding frameworks that inform 
sustainable peace mechanisms in conflict transformation. There is much need to critically engage 
the various standpoints of liberal peace frameworks and expose their weaknesses in delivering 
sustainable solutions in Africa’s intractable conflict situations.  
Most liberal peace scholarships have argued that these peacebuilding failures and setbacks in 
African countries “had more to do with improper sequencing or a lack of coordination or 
insufficient commitment by outsiders, not problems with the liberal idea itself” (Curtis 2012: 
11). In idealistic terms, one can stand to believe such an assessment. However, Sriram (2007) 
notes that such an assessment is driven by various under-examined assumptions of the African 
communities and which has resulted in various unintended consequences. Tim Murithi (2006) 
argues that it is a necessity to examine and consider alternative practices of peacebuilding on the 
continent, which fall beyond the parameters of liberal peace. These alternative practices of peace 
maybe identified within indigenous approaches to peace, informal economy, and social solidarity 
(within people-to-people initiatives, within community groups engagement, within representation 
of ethnic communities in structures, or within religious groups). Such alternatives may help in 
building up effective institutions that are necessary for a fully functional state.   
Coleman et al, (2007) clearly posits that intractable and protracted social conflicts are cancerous 
such that they are always mutating hence maintaining a malignant conflict state. Thus in most 
cases the greatest fault line has always been the generalization of regarding conflict challenges as 
the same. Therefore, there has been an application of standardized liberal approaches by 
international and regional actors in addressing all African conflict problems resulting in horrible 
and difficult experiences (Coleman et al, 2007; Hoffman, 2009; Joeng, 2005; Lederach, 1997; 
Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Piecemeal peacebuilding intervention and construction reforms that 
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are subject to weaknesses and detrimental outcomes (exclusive of indigenous approaches) have 
been the foundation of many peace missions in Africa. The resistance to approach the conflict 
environment with sensitivity limited its opportunities to only standardized liberal approaches.  
Incentivized Peace as the rubric for Conflict continuity in Africa 
Several unique issues that identify with liberal peace approaches weakens the process of building 
peace. These are inhibiting factors to successful building of peace in these complex conflicts. 
Various scholars on African conflicts such as Curtis (2012), Keen (2012), Ducasse-Rogier 
(2004), Eriksen (2009), and Ramsbotham et al (2011) agree on these factors.  
Firstly, the trends of most conflict or post-conflict environments reveals that there are always 
multiple warring parties, which actually jeopardizes and distorts the role of mediation. 
Immediately, one may acknowledge that most African (colonial) liberation wars where fought 
from many fronts by different groups, but the continuity and increase of such conflict fronts in 
the so-called independent states is a clear sign of both government and peace actors’ 
incompetence to set-up effective institutions that are key to sustainable peace. The increase of 
warring parties is encouraged by two major factors, which include the slowness of actors to build 
an effective security sector reform in a post-conflict peace process and the adherence to ‘blinded’ 
political mediation as the source of legitimate peace.  
For instance, the International Centre for Transitional Justice posits that the Congolese army is 
underfunded and ill-equipped, which has resulted to its incompetence to effectively provide 
security and commit criminal acts which include grave violations of human rights (ICTJ 2016). 
This incompetence in the security sector reform has become the source of conflict enhancement 
as the military cooperates or compete with rebel groups in victimising civilians and exploiting 
the natural resources of the country (ICTJ 2016). More so, international actors in peace have 
resorted to political mediation aided with peace agreements as the route to successful peace 
outcomes. The idea standing behind this strategy has been to forge political and economic 
liberalization as way of branding sustainable peace but with little or no success amongst African 
countries (only Mozambique [’s proxy war] is recorded to have had a successful intervention 
[however, with very unstable circumstances even to this day]33). Countries such as Angola, DRC 
                                                          
33 A proxy war refers to a war, which is indirectly created and support by a major power, which does not get directly involved. 
“Mozambique’s civil war was noted for its brutality, meted out in particular by Renamo, a rebel group that was founded, 
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have endured failed peace agreements, and Sierra Leone’s three peace agreements signed 
between 1996 and 1999 successively failed due to the multiplicity of warring parties.  
Secondly, in some situations warring parties are more driven by greed (power, territorial control 
and exploitation of mineral resources) than grievances hence continuation of war is more 
beneficial to them than peace (if peace is to be pursued there are ensured structures of 
legitimizing corrupt and disreputable interests that are forged through peace agreements). Peace 
agreements are the most formidable documents in liberal peace, however, they often been abused 
and narrowed to concentrate on those who have access to the negotiating table. David Keen 
(2012) notes how such a procedure has become so much predictable and subject to abuse. Keen 
articulates that those with the intentions of a securing seat at the negotiating table or feels that the 
negotiations are not going their way, have resorted to incentivizing violence as a tool hence 
promoting a continuous cycle of conflict. Once the process of peace seems to be rewarding for 
rebels, opposition warring parties or perpetrators of violence (who might be the government), it 
encourages the resurgence and emergence of new groups and renewed conflicts in the hope of 
scoring a stack on the negotiation table. For example, the M23 rebel group, which led the DRC 
2012 conflict resurgence against the government, received amnesty from the government under 
the 2013 Nairobi Declaration. They have pushed since then to get political legitimacy in the 
government structures and in the failure of such recognition war and violence is the threatened 
consequence (Kagire 2016). Amos Sawyer (2004: 451) commenting on the Liberian Peace Talks 
(1996) and that of Sierra Leone (1998) clarifies that peace agreements “substantially, if not 
totally, controlled by armed groups whose leaders could hardly find in such arrangements 
sufficient incentive to blunt their greed and ambition”, are not sustainable at all.  
Thirdly, in instances where neighbouring countries are involved in supporting rebel conflicts 
complexity is most likely to be edified. The Global Policy Forum (online website) clarify that 
Ugandan and Rwandan militia groups have been supporting and influencing continuous conflict 
in the DRC. The invasion of the eastern Congo (North and South Kivu) by Rwandan troops 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
financed, and armed by foreigners bent on destabilizing the country: first by white Rhodesia, then apartheid South Africa. A 
peace agreement ended the war in 1992 and led to multi-party elections in which Renamo came second, as it has done in every 
election since. But the rebels retained an armed force despite agreeing to disarm, claiming that Frelimo, the ruling party, has also 
reneged on its promises.”  (Bowker et al, 2016). This conflict was recently renewed in 2013 as Renamo blamed the government’s 
political elites (largely Frelimo) for looting the country’s economic wealth at the expense of common citizens. However, the 
government forces have responded with brutal force affecting many civilians and villages. This instability clarifies how peace 
agreements without proper transformation and effective peacebuilding strategies is detrimental to sustainable peace. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/06/mozambiques-invisible-civil-war-renamo-frelimo-dhlakama-nyusi/ [Accessed 20/01/2017] 
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furthered the crises in the already destabilised environment. Swart (2011) clarifies that Rwanda’s 
continued desire to keep its influence in the Kivus, continuously undermined the political 
transition, which had started in 2003. However, though there were suggestions made before by 
the UN Security Council in 2003 to sanction such countries, there was no effective stance taken 
to effect such an action.  
Lastly, states that suffer from weak security and political systems prior to the outbreak of the 
conflict are most likely to end in intractable and protracted conflict situations. Practitioners in 
peacebuilding have often emphasised that success in the process of building of peace in areas 
such as these is in engaging systems, which ensures that violence declines over time (Jones, 
2015). Somalia was under a brutal dictatorship of President Said Barre for two decades, which 
disrupted and divided the clans such that when he was removed from power in 1991, the clans 
could not come together and form a government. The DRC demonstrates a history of 
dictatorship, which ended through a war that weakened the entire security sector of the state. 
South Sudan presents more of a unique situation of a newly independent state created after a long 
civil war with various ethnic, religious and resource tensions. Such challenges, mainly ethnic 
tensions have remained the centre of conflict in this new state. It is clear that the DRC, Somalia 
and South Sudan share destabilized backgrounds though they are unique in their own ways. 
However, they also share a history of weak conflict restructuring or recovery strategies, which 
are a cause of endless conflict challenges. 
Lessons learnt from the conflict haunted houses (DRC, South Sudan & 
Somalia Cases) 
In understanding the facts provided above, the issues pertaining to the cases in this study are vast 
and have a lot of historical qualifications and analysis. Considering the fact that this study seeks 
to illuminate the various theoretical grounding in the building of effective peace in Africa, it is 
important to identify some of the aspects that are of note. These aspects reflects the shortfalls of 
most liberal peace approaches in African peacebuilding processes. The challenges experienced in 
this day of conflict relapse in these countries are not because state actors or non-state actors are 
not acting enough to address the conflict problem, but it is because there are some local factors  
side-lined  regarded as irrelevant or have just not been incorporated. The DRC, South Sudan and 
Somalia have a history of conflict that goes back to more than two decades. In addition, despite 
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the involvement of NGOs, and various regional and international actors in trying to build peace 
their efforts have been in contempt. There are different factors, which have and may continue to 
hinder the sustainable peace if not approached differently. Therefore, the plight of civil society in 
Somalia, the UN peace mission in the DRC and the AU mission in South Sudan highlighted 
below clarify on the problems that are incentivizing conflict relapse and continuity. The 
argument is that even if multi-dimensional approaches developed with a pure liberal perspective 
they remain ineffective in an African setting rather there is need for integrative multi-disciplinary 
approaches that values local ownership of peace.  
A Civil Society in Obstruction: The case of Somalia 
The demise of Barre’s authoritarian rule witnessed the reinforcement of clans “...as central 
providers of public goods to their members” (Lake 2014:303). This immediately pushed clans 
from egalitarian societies into hierarchical structures, in which warlords manipulated and 
dominated as they had access to weapons and stolen food. This scenario alone has fought and 
blocked the re-emergence of the state whilst allowing the increase of terrorist organizations and 
criminal activities. With this picture in mind, it remains an interesting phenomenon that despite 
challenges and setbacks Somalia had gone through in establishing a functional state, the private 
authorities’ remains major role players in service provision and as such remains the major 
unifying factor amongst citizens (Abdulle, 2008). The civil societies are a perfect example of the 
private authorities, which has amassed much influence in the state. Surprisingly, public authority 
is still virtually silent and ineffective despite the efforts of consolidating state structures. Thus, 
this section offers a critical analysis of the consequences of over-dependence on liberal 
perspectives. 
The civil society in Somalia has demonstrated a distinct cultural context. In other words, it is the 
only civil society in history, which has taken shouldered state duties of service delivery and 
engage on day-to-day governance of stately issues. The role of the state has been overtaken and 
overshadowed. David Lake (2014:304) posits that,  
“Although Somalia, through its decentralized structure, may be one of the sovereign polities best able to cope 
with the absence of a state, the larger point is that the continued vibrancy of private authorities and their further 
entrenchment into society continues to prevent the consolidation of the Somali state”.  
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The civil society in Somalia has taken an active role in channelling in service delivery of 
resources provided by donors. However, the active role of civil society in this case has been 
more of distributing resources instead of mobilizing the public on participating in building an 
effective governance system as well as working on channels of ending conflict. Thus, the role of 
civil society in Somalia are restricted to service delivery only, instead of educating people on 
peace initiatives that can be used as basic platforms for building tolerance and consolidating the 
state, so as to usher in the expected peace outcomes. However, their role has been regarded more 
as a source of income and power than representation as the sole distributors of service delivery, 
hence the very own existence of civil society has become the hindrance for state re-
establishment. These are the loopholes, which have distorted the role and the position of civil 
society in rebuilding the state and building sustainable peace in the country. The major 
destabilizing challenges to the effectiveness of the civil society are its overdependence on 
external support, lack of coherent and coordinated strategy, and their distinct cultural context 
(Shane and Farah 2008). 
The donors have entrusted the duties of the state to civil societies. Ibrahim (2008) outlines how 
the international community has tried to re-build the state through a two-track method in 
Somalia. He posits that the first track is top-down process, which intends to build a transitional 
government through power sharing agreement between the political elites and warlords, which 
has resulted in consequential failures. The second track is a bottom-up approach, which focused 
on funding civil societies for local project initiatives. This track received various support and 
funding from the World Bank, European Union and USAID just to mention a few. Most of these 
institutions favoured the idea of engaging state building through civil societies arguing that it is a 
pillar of democratic values and will eventually lead to effective governance. These efforts have 
made the civil society to be “more powerful and reliable in delivering goods and services than 
the national government institutions that exist in Somalia” (Ibrahim, 2008: 9). It is important to 
understand that the existence of such a strong civil society has weakened the consolidation of the 
state. Scholars are agreed that the existence of powerful private authorities outside the national 
structures in a state building process may lead to various competitions, and destabilizes the 
legitimization processes of service provision (see Chapter 5) (Lake, 2014:305; Ibrahim, 
2008:10).  
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The development of different private authorities has created various challenges such that there is 
no distinction between profit driven organisations and civil societies in Somalia. This 
environment has become a problem in creating more divisions that distort peacebuilding and 
state building processes. A stateless society has not only incentivised civil societies but also 
warlords and criminals who have attained public support through provision of basic services 
such that it weakens the advocacy for a strong central government. 
From Monuc to Munosco34: traces of a haunted peace process in DRC  
The presence of the UN in the Congo (then- Republic of the Congo, now-DRC) can be traced to 
its first peacekeeping mission from 1960-64 (United Nations Operation in the Congo ONUC). 
Since then the UN’s presence in Africa has stretched to “promote democratic institutions, 
supporting economic and social development, establishing peace between aggressive nations and 
promoting and protection of human rights” (Global Issues 2014). The aftermath of the 1st Congo 
war (1996-97) witnessed the toppling of President Mobutu Sese Seko35 from power through a 
coup by a coalition Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-
Zaïre36(AFDL) which was led by Laurent Kabila37.The conflict left the country which had 
already been plighted with weak security and governance institutions in a devastating state.  
In 1999 the UN made its second mark in DRC through its mission known in French as the 
‘Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Cong’ (MUNOC). 
MUNOC’s main mandate was to protect civilians from under circumstances of imminent threat 
of violence. According to the UN, after the signing of the Lusaka peace agreement the first initial 
role of MONUC when launched by resolution 1279 was ‘to plan for the observation of the 
ceasefire and disengagement of forces and maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire 
Agreement. Later in a series of resolutions, the Council expanded the mandate of MONUC to the 
supervision of the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and assigned multiple related 
additional tasks”.  
                                                          
34 MISSION DE L’ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LA STABILISATION EN RD CONGO 
35 Zaire's (now DRC) longtime dictator from 1965-1997.  
36AFDL was a “coalition of Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundan and selected some Congolese dissidents, disgruntled minority groups 
and nations that toppled President Mobutu Sese Seko”  
37 Laurent Kabila was “the president of DRC from 17 may 1997 who overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko through a Coup” 
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Civilian Loss & The Ghost of Failure 
It is important to note that the judgement of success or failure of the UN Peace Mission in the 
Democratic of Congo is not in the institutions that were set up but in the effectiveness of the 
mission in protecting the civilians. The loss of civilian confidence, support and respect reduced 
MUNOC into a debacle and a ghost of a disastrous failure. Chapter VII of the UN resolution 
1291 (2000) the Security Council gave MUNOC the authority to protect civilians through all 
necessary means (including the use of force) in a moment of imminent threat (Reynaert, No 
Date: 14). For a mission mandated with such a task, MUNOC had limited security personnel and 
inadequately trained peacekeepers. As a result, in May 2002 RCD-Goma38 attacked and killed 
more than 180 people in Kisangani near a UN base. Despite the early alert of the news to the 
UN, they could not respond due to the lack of military capacity to challenge the crisis. Reynaert 
(No Date: 16) clarifies a widely shared view by various scholars that “the Kisangani massacre 
illustrated the gap between MONUC’s mandate and the capacity to support it and the UN’s 
inclination to tone down civilian protection when it feels that the use of force might offend 
parties to the peace process”.  
The Eastern part of DRC has experienced endemic violent conflicts that has been fueled by 
political leaders who manipulate ethnic differences, rebel attacks who seek political relevance 
and recognition, local land disputes and clashes over resources (food and minerals). These 
violent outcomes have witnessed thousands of killings and displacement of many families. 
MUNOC could not contain the attack of civilians in Ituri and South Kivu in 2003 and 2004 soon 
after end of the 2nd Congo war. Rebels attacked the capital of Ituri, Bunia when the Ugandian 
troops withdrew from the territory. However, the Uruguay MUNOC battalion URABATT, sent, 
did not protect civilians who were under threat, which resulted in the kidnapping and killing of 
more than 400 civilians close to the MUNOC compounds within a period of two weeks. The 
failure of MUNOC in these areas particularly in Bunia (Ituri) and Bakavu (South Kivu) resulted 
in the first anti-MUNOC protest by the people. In 2008, North Kivu was continuously threatened 
by rebels, and witnessed the massacre 67 civilians in Kiwanja by CNDP39. Despite the presence 
of 120 MUNOC peacekeepers who were camping within a three-kilometer radius of the 
                                                          
38 “Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma is a rebel group based in Goma during the Second Congo War (1998-2003” 
 
39 Congrès national pour la défense du peuple, CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People)  
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massacre, they could not protect the local civilians. The massacre marked the end of the 
Nairobi40 and Goma Peace Processes41, which had instilled so much confidence that conflict, will 
cease. These outcomes clearly demonstrate the inconsistencies of the international community in 
fulfilling the mandate of civilian protection. Such consequences resulted in the disregard of UN 
peace mission in the Congo as Dizolele (2004) wrote in the New York Times that even “Children 
throw rocks at the UN mission trucks as they pass on the road”. Erikson (2009: 659) observes 
that in the DRC, MONUC failed because it was “hampered by a lack of knowledge of local 
conditions and unwillingness to adapt policies to local context”. 
The main mandate of MUNOC was to protect civilians. However, it did not devote any 
resources, time or effort in checking out any rumors of local violence by rebels, and or 
investigate any of the massacres that where committed in various local communities until this 
day (Human Rights Watch, 2014). One can clearly stand to confirm and endorse the argument 
that the government, international actors (UN staff and diplomats) consider the local-level as an 
“outside the perimeter of their legitimate responsibility, and thus as being unimportant, 
unfamiliar, unmanageable and not legitimate” (Matagne 2011:81). This has become the source of 
numerous and very serious obstacles that affect the development of peacebuilding initiatives at 
multi-level. In just one decade (1996-2006), the conflict in the Congo had witnessed “three 
Congolese rebel movements, 14 foreign armed groups, and countless militias; killed over 3.3 
million Congolese; and destabilized most of central Africa” (Autesserre, 2008). 
Democratization and the loopholes of crisis 
In trying to fulfil its mandate, MUNOC focused on establishing a democratic government 
through elections; and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement 
(DDRRR). Scholars agree that the main challenge that has haunted the DRC peace process since 
1999 is the extensive democratization of the process. The structures of building peace in the 
country neglected the different social dynamics, which include ethnicity, cultural and traditional 
values, as well as social hierarchies that make up the backbone of the communities (Autesserre, 
2011; Matagne 2011). The purpose of this section is to outline the various factors that have 
caused the failure of MONUC and how MUNOSCO is mostly likely to suffer the same 
                                                          
40 Nairobi Communique of 9 November 2009 
41 Goma Peace Agreement  
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consequences if various approaches remain trapped within a liberal peace framework and 
neglects inclusive local peacebuilding initiatives.  
It is important to clarify that the DRC is characterised by various polarities, which are mainly 
ethnic. The bedrock of both 1st and 2nd Congo wars was mainly driven by various ethnic forces, 
which support and promote their own agenda. Dijkzeul (2008) contends that the establishment of 
an election mechanism often marks the end of peacebuilding process and the establishment of a 
package for economic recovery. The DRC however, has proven to be a unique case. Menodji 
(2013) notes that, “After ceasefires, peace building organisations placed precedence on creating a 
stable electoral process. However, in the DRC, elections increased instability in a fragmented 
society which had not yet solved antagonisms”. The aftermath of the elections resulted in the 
increase of ethnic driven conflicts in the eastern Congo. For instance, Laurent Nkunda42 
unleashed violence portraying himself as the defender of the Tutsi minority from the FDRL 
rebels whom he declared rallied intentions of perpetrating genocide against the Tutsis. Despite 
the fact that millions of people in the Eastern Congo had voted for Kabila for promising them 
peace. It is clear that the promise alone was not enough, as it required a strong institution to back 
the promise up. The lack of strong institutions that control and secure the rule of law created 
much room for violent perpetrators. Therefore, it is clear that though the election process was 
regarded a success and peaceful, it was not the end of peacebuilding process.  
Democratization process in the DRC has been a distraction that has robbed effective 
peacebuilding process. It is only when the election was about to take place in 2006 that MUNOC 
engaged in direct confrontation of the threats towards civilians. The very same force was 
nenacted in Ituri and South Kivu when civilians were being murdered. When the 2nd national 
elections were conducted in 2011 they were posing more danger and the aftermath witnessed 
clashes erupting between protesters and security forces with the former declared the polls to be 
fraudulent and mismanaged.  Scholars contends that the international community has been so 
much focused on establishing democratic values in the DRC such that it ignored various local 
factors that perpetuates violence. The obsession of democratising through the ballot diverted all 
                                                          
42 Laurent Nkunda is “former General in the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo and is the former warlord 
operating in the province of Nord-Kivu, sympathetic to Congolese Tutsis and the Tutsi-dominated government of neighbouring 
Rwanda”. 
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the attention of MUNOC from the various local conditions and grievances, such that within a 
year after the elections, Eastern Congo was in full-swing crises.  
The transition of MUNOC to MUNOSCO in 2010 the latter still remains trapped in the former 
operational framework despite the better facilities and increased number of personnel to “a 
maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 
members of formed police units” excluding the judiciary, civilian and correction components. 
Though Munosco’s mandate is twofold, protection of civilians, and that of stabilization and 
consolidation of peace; it remains a worrying phenomenon that MUNOSCO’s operations are still 
alienated to local decisions. The democratization process in the DRC has remained largely 
focused provincial and national level changes whilst neglecting the challenges at grassroots 
level, which are likely to promote the democratic intent. The UN, international organisations and 
diplomats ignored the various rumours of local violence and causes of local conflicts, which 
include land, and identity issues that were and are still very evident in the Congolese local 
communities today. Autesserre (2011) vehemently posits that the failure of international 
intervention in the DRC is their blinkered focus on national and regional levels of conflict whilst 
they blindsided the various causes of violent conflicts in the local grassroots. Matagne (2011:80) 
in his review of Autessere’s assessment43 emphasises that “local conflicts over land, food and 
mineral resources as well as political power fueled continued and widespread violence, 
especially in the eastern parts of the country”.  
Violence and the social cleavages of power in South Sudan 
The history of South Sudan is that of endemic violence which driven by multiple causes that 
include territorial disputes, resource conflicts, ethnic tensions and inter-state conflict44. In the 
post-independent state of South Sudan ethnic tensions and differences have emerged as the 
centre and major driver of conflict in the youngest African state. Ethnic tensions have always 
been party and parcel of the entire Sudanese crises but they have often been overshadowed by 
the bigger conflict challenges which prioritised the independence of the South from the Arab 
North due to various disputes which include territorial dispute, unequal distribution of resources 
(oil, water and land), and extensive religious differences.  
                                                          
43 The assessment made by Séverine Autesserre in her book “The trouble with the Congo” 
44 Inter-state conflict between the republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan.  
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When the Republic of South Sudan attained independence in January 2011, the suppressed 
political and social differences, which widely believed to be ethnic oriented amongst the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), began to emerge. Within a period of three years 
following independence, a civil war broke out triggered by the political differences between 
President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. Vhumbunu (2016) confirms that 
the political relationship between these two has been strained and uneasy both within the party 
and in government. With the increasing tension amongst the two individuals in 2013. Vhumbunu 
(2016: 5) outlines that, “the non-cooperative relations between the Office of the President and 
that of the Vice President, and contestations over skewed and irregular army recruitments in 
2013, were also factors in the civil war, which was triggered by disagreements within the 
presidential guard over alleged orders to disarm Machar-aligned Nuer members as a result of an 
alleged coup.” The tension, which started as a political squabble between Kiir (of the Dinka 
ethnic group-the largest group in the country) and Machar (of the Nuer ethnic group-second 
largest ethnic group) quickly, escalated into ethnic violent clashes. The BBC news (2014) posits 
that in as much as ethnic killings have been evident since the outbreak of the civil war, both Kiir 
and Machar command prominent supporters from each other’s communities. Machar’s 
supporters are believed to have instigated violence against Kiir’s regime labelling it as corrupt 
and seize the oil-producing capital town of Bentiu. Therefore, the political leaders in South 
Sudan have resorted to the use of violence as a means of attaining their desired end. 
Ethnicity and the legacy of violence  
The Republic of South Sudan consists of 10 states, which divides the nation. It is a culturally 
diverse country with multi-ethnic groups. Shulika and Uzodike (2013:24) argued way before the 
outbreak of the civil war that “While this ethnic diversity speaks to the country’s rich national 
heritage, it has also always been a source of internal ethnic discord in South Sudan.” South 
Sudan has more than 60 ethnic groups but the most dominant one is the Dinka, followed by the 
Nuer and the Murle. These groups have long-standing tensions, traced back beyond Sudan’s 
independence in 1956 (New Sudan Council of Churches 1999). These inter-ethnic clashes 
portray the bigger picture of the local threats that stands in the way of an effective and successful 
transition of the country from conflict to sustainable “post-conflict recovery and long-term 
peacebuilding”. The major ethnic tension between the Dinka and Nuer triggered by the political 
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tension in December 2013 as soldiers belonging to these ethnic groups fought against each other 
resulting in massive ethnic killings in Juba as the latter suffering huge causalities.  
The loopholes of relapsed conflict in South Sudan 
Following the independence of the country, the Government of South Sudan, and the various key 
stakeholders (internal and external) which include the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD); the African Union (AU); the United Nations (UN); civil society 
organizations (CSOs) and different individual countries engaged in joint efforts to establish the 
institutions that sustains South Sudan as an independent state. Da Costa & Karlsrud (2012) 
tellingly posited that United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) engaged on a local 
peacebuilding approach in trying to address the challenges that might stir conflict in the future. 
The authors clarify that though the engagement of UNMISS was in the name of local 
peacebuilding, the engagement was only done with the local elites. The Government of South 
Sudan and the stakeholders were virtually absent in the rural areas that exacerbated the wide 
divide between the centre (top leaders-government) and the periphery (communities-rural area), 
which makes up the large percentage of the country.  
The international community was quick to focus on building a state without addressing the 
crucial challenges of internal conflicts and political reconciliation (Tran 2014). Both the 
government and international actors failed to establish effective security sector reforms, which 
could have been the bulwarks to withstand the outbreak of a civil war in 2013. It is important to 
note that the such weakness are still evident and the division amongst IGAD45 on the way 
forward concerning the peace agreements of South Sudan in 2015 and 2016 consecutively poses 
higher chances of failure in the peace process. The assumption by the international community 
that the new South Sudan’s conflict tensions had ended with the South and North tensions was 
the biggest mistake, which allowed the long standing ethnic conflict tensions infect the society. It 
is important to note that peace agreements in the case of South Sudan mostly regarded with 
suspicions, tensions and mistrust. Thus, there is a deep need for mediators to address the political 
challenges which lies within the political differences and the needs of both Kiir and Machar 
through an incorporative strategy that brings all the issues into agreement (Vhumbunu, 2016:11).  
                                                          
45 Uganda and Sudan have acute political differences, Ethiopia and Kenya differ at times on the peace process to engage, and the 
addition of plus five U.S., UK, Norway, China, the Arab League, and others opened room for more competing interests.  
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Reaching out to the Conclaves of Hybrid Peace 
Scholars agree that in as much as top-down approaches have their impasses in building peace, 
bottom-up strategies do not possess a magical touch for lasting peace either, and therefore both 
initiatives are necessary and need to be harnessed (Autesserre, 2011; Matagne, 2011; 
Rambotham et al, 2011). The consideration of hybrid peace approaches in this research is meant 
harness the multi-disciplinary and transdisciplinary facets that enrich the process of sustainability 
in building peace. An acknowledgement of the various peacebuilding levels that can be of use in 
addressing the African conflict. This meant to challenge the monolithic and one-size-fits-all 
peace strategies brought forward by liberal peace frameworks in addressing African peace hence 
the loopholes and impasses in the cases highlighted in this study. Matagne (2011:80) in his 
assessment of the failures of liberal peace proponents in the DRC confirms how, “Top-down 
approaches were therefore implemented and they only allowed for short peace intervals in the 
eastern Congo because they did not take into account the complex dynamics at the local-level”. 
The extensive consequences of peace agreement failure and relapse of conflicts in Africa today 
requires inclusive approaches that balances practical local knowledge and international efforts to 
complement the growth of local capacity by supporting the growth of local institutions across all 
level from grassroots to the top levels of government. Thus, hybrid peace acknowledges the 
existence of both micro-level and macro-level tensions that affect settlement of peace and as a 
result, it allows for comprehensive approaches that investigate and scrutinize both local and 
international causes of peace process failure. Murithi (2008) acknowledges that the use and 
engagement of hybrid peace approaches in Africa may be of use in endorsing indigenous and 
endogenous peace architecture that addresses the core conflict problems that stand unique in 
each African conflict.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has outlined the various factors that have affected sustainability of peace in Africa. 
The investigation of Somalia, the DRC, and South Sudan exposed the complexity that challenges 
the post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. It critically engages the defective nature of 
liberal peace frameworks in African peace, by outlining how its inflexible nature often neglects 
the key values that may be of effect to sustainable peace. Wherefore, the emphasis for the need 
of hybrid peace strategies that mitigate the challenges to the building of sustainable peace. This 
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allows for the emergence and recognition of some indigenous and endogenous peace practices in 




Chapter 5: Negotiating Legitimacy, Inclusiveness and Coherence in 
African peace  
 
“Africa’s story has been written by others; we need to own our problems and solutions and write our 
story”. Paul Kagame46 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates the challenges to the renewal of conflicts within a short period 
following peace agreements. There is a confrontation of different peacebuilding approaches and 
peace agreements that have been strangled due to various loopholes in the peace processes. 
Distanced and alien principles to African conflict communities by international actors has 
attracted criticism from various scholars over the past decades. These approaches are criticised 
for their lack of local knowledge, inclusivity and coherent peace practices. As clarified in the 
previous chapter, the biggest setbacks to Africa’s sustainable peacebuilding lies within the liberal 
peace framework. The liberal peace framework in Africa is biased towards western approaches 
to peace. Little considerations have been made to unpack the various political and social 
opportunities for building peace within the African conflict-bound societies. Peacebuilding 
practices has mainly been conducted as ad hoc projects by most if not all international and inter-
governmental organisations. These approaches have reduced the effectiveness of peace building 
and limited it to mechanized intentions, calculated outcomes that are within the reach or 
influence of those who plan it.  
 Therefore, to negotiate for a better platform of building peace in African setting, this chapter 
adheres to a conflict transformation perspective, which seeks to redeem local actors, 
governments, international and inter-governmental organisations, and non-governmental 
organisations from the trappings of normativity and institutional inadequacies (Jeng, 2012).  The 
research therefore, explores how local and indigenous factors that may be beneficial in building 
sustainable peace are often neglected. Thus, the analysis endorses the values of national 
ownership in peacebuilding as a way of provoking thinking toward integrative mechanisms 
which promote the legitimisation of local/ community peace initiatives or participation, 
                                                          
46 Paul Kagame is the President of Rwanda. 
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inclusivity of indigenous and cultural practices in the mainstream peace frameworks, and 
promoting the establishment of coherent peacebuilding programs (Donias, 2014).  
A comprehension of challenges to African peace is outlined to show the missing link in ensuring 
sustainable peace in the continent. Peacebuilding in Africa is surrounded by different challenges 
in communication and dialogue that may have proven to be illusive to address due to the 
complexity of their nature. This chapter does not only embrace a hybrid peace approach but also 
engages transdisciplinary thinking to provide an ultimate platform in addressing the conflict 
challenges at hand. Scholars in contemporary peacebuilding agree that these various links top-
down or bottom-up approaches can never provide solutions independent of each other. In 
addition, it is important to note that the integration of both approaches is only the foundation of 
an effective peacebuilding intervention, which still requires more alternative perspectives to 
ensure maximum output towards building sustainable peace. Most peacebuilding strategies have 
been side-lined because of singular approaches, which are regarded as normative. As such, 
governments, inter-governmental and international organisation still limit their focus to national 
and regional level in negotiating peace whilst neglecting the local (Autessere, 2011).  
The investigation in the case studies, establishes a solid ground for negotiation and exposing the 
loopholes that may require adequate consideration in setting up effective peace structures. 
Among these loopholes are the lack of adequate political space for local/community 
participation, rigid peace frameworks, ad hoc peacebuilding programs and the dominance of 
alien approaches. Considering such factors, most African post-conflict peacebuilding missions 
have suffered continuous setbacks. Peace scholars, practitioners and organisations have come to 
revisit their frameworks and approaches to put up effective mechanisms that can maintain 
sustainable peace. Murithi (2009: v in Abdalla et al, 2009) vehemently concurs that, “indigenous 
institutions and cultural traditions in Africa are endowed with valuable lessons and insights that 
can contribute towards the urgent task of building and sustaining peace”. Therefore, this 
endorses the need to negotiate for the legitimization, inclusivity and setting of coherent local 
peace frameworks in Africa as outlined below, followed by the importance of communication 
and dialogue and finally unpacking the importance of recognising local ownership as a pathway 
to sustainable peace.  
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Understanding legitimacy, inclusiveness and coherence in building peace 
Understanding these concepts helps in transforming the perceptions of building peace in Africa. 
It embraces the difference that entails in every conflict society and seeks to harness the key 
values that need consideration in constructing effective peace mechanisms. Uzodike and 
Moolakkattu (2012: 6) argues that, “the very idea of conflict transformation not only eschews the 
obstruction of constructive dialogue but also endorses the need for the profound and long term 
alteration of conflictual relationships or interactions that support violence by tackling the 
structural, attitudinal, and behavioural dimensions of conflict”. Engaging and defining 
legitimacy, inclusiveness and coherence for the different processes in building African peace 
may be effective in establishing the strategies to break free from the continuous conflict trap in 
Africa. The understanding of the concepts can harness to interpret local aspects and challenges to 
foster a constructive dialogue that shapes the building of sustainable peace. 
Legitimacy in building peace 
Legitimacy is the centre of almost all political relationships and yet the most neglected in the 
state-building [and peacebuilding] literature (Lake, 2008). Building and restoring legitimacy in 
post-conflict or civil war societies is argued to be the most difficult and important thing (Lake, 
2008; Higashi, 2015). The process of building legitimacy is poorly understood in the world of 
peacebuilding [and state-building]. Despite the mention of considering, local peacebuilding 
initiatives or local ownership of the peace processes in different literature for the past decade 
most international stakeholders and governments seldom considers the importance of local 
initiatives in the context of cultural practices and societal values within grassroots communities 
when it comes to building peace.  
Higashi (2015) in his book “Challenges of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding” confronts 
how the generation or construction of legitimacy in any ‘host state’ has not received full 
examination by theorists or practitioner in International relations considering the active role of 
peacebuilding in world politics. This tellingly, explains how the construction or erosion of 
legitimacy in peacebuilding plays a critical role in ensuring disastrous future or intended 
sustainable outcomes. Higashi boldly outlines that the role of legitimacy in peacebuilding has 
been grossly undermined and yet it has taken a centre stage in all the discussions around world 
politics in the contemporary debates and studies. It is for this reason that the role of legitimacy in 
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peacebuilding has to position clearly and outlined to be able to establish all the constructive 
situations and practices in societies that guarantee sustainable peace. 
Defining Legitimacy 
Zuam (2012:51) outlines threefold important objectives of legitimacy in state- and 
peacebuilding. These include, firstly to provide security and maintain the rule of law (if the state 
is seen or regarded as weak by the population or various societal groups, rebellion is likely to be 
stirred). Secondly, to provide strong institutional structures that support effective provision of 
public services (social services and public infrastructure reinforces the support and legitimacy of 
the state). Thirdly, to provide sustainable state institutions established upon the normative 
structures of the represented societies. The third objective is more revealing for peacebuilding 
practices, which involve international stakeholders. It posits how legitimacy in any initiative is 
supposed to come from the moral authority, beliefs and expectations of the particular 
communities or societies involved (Gulliver, 1971; Zuam, 2012). With this understanding, one 
can define legitimacy as the authority derived “from a mutually-beneficial contract in which the 
ruler [state] provides a social order of benefit to the ruled [community or society], and the ruled 
in turn comply with the extractions (e.g., taxes) and constraints on their behavior (e.g., law) that 
are necessary to the production of that order. The contract becomes self-enforcing – or legitimate 
– when individuals and groups become “vested” in that social order by undertaking investments 
specific to the particular contract” (Lake, 2008: 3).  
Peacebuilding & Legitimacy 
Building sustainable peace requires the setting up of proper legitimate structures from grassroots, 
middle-level and top-level leadership in political and social hierarchies. Ramsbotham et al 
(2011) argues that there are various people-to-people peacebuilding initiatives, which have 
proven to be effective in various post-conflict communities, but they had been short-lived due to 
lack of support from both middle- and state-level leadership to endorse them as legitimate. With 
this understanding, one can adopt Baya’s assessment that,  
“Indigenous mechanisms fit in situations of state fragility and failure. In view of the absence of modem state-
based institutions and mechanisms for the control of violence and the regulation of conflicts, people take 
recourse to pre-state customary ways. Due to the fact that indigenous mechanisms are not state-managed or 
organized, they are credited with legitimacy by the communities in which they are sought. They can be 
pursued without recurrence to the task of state and nation building. Instead of trying to impose western 
 97 
models of the state and the nation on societies to whom these models are alien, one can draw upon existing 
indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution which have proven their efficiency” (2009:98). 
It is important to negotiate for the recognition and support of all local peace initiatives by the 
government and the international community to build a mutual trust in the entire peacebuilding 
process. This allows the reconciling of similar normative interests and commitments between the 
local and international efforts to peace, in order to build peace mechanisms that are considered 
legitimate by the society [if the strategies are imposed they are most likely to fail when the 
international presence disappears] and beneficial to the course. For instance, in the DRC 
Erickson (2009) confirms that MUNOC failed because it failed to consider the local factors that 
could have been helpful in effective in building sustainable peace.   
The impact of Legitimacy in building peace 
Effective peacebuilding outcomes in Africa need to negotiate a platform of constant dialogue 
amongst all local, government and international stakeholders. This is required for the purpose of 
encouraging integration of ideas that are supported and recognised at all levels of leadership. 
This ensures a legitimate voice for local ownership in the process of building peace and gives 
room for proper institutionalisation of profitable cultural and traditional values by international 
communities in their state-and peacebuilding support engagements. This may help in dealing 
with the spoiler problem in most post-conflict peace processes. In addition, as such ‘institutional 
rhetoric’ (bureaucratic barriers and red-tape procedures) which resulted in the massacre of 
thousands in Kivu regions (DRC) and failure of peacebuilding in various African states can be 
avoided. 
Jean Arnault (2015:22-23) explores how domestic legitimacy was constructed in Guatemala to 
blend in together “international norms and local realities” in the processes of building peace. He 
outlines that domestic legitimacy was built in three specific ways, which are representation, 
participation and performance. He posits that, ‘representation’ from wide range stakeholders in 
government and insurgency allowed the covering of broad interests and issues that ranges from 
ethnicity, economic and social features that guide the society and state. ‘Participation’ allowed 
the formation of Civil Society Assembly which broad forward a wide spectrum of social 
representatives, which helped in consolidating the credential of the peace negotiations. Finally, 
the parties involved in the peace process performed by engaging pro-actively and tangibly by 
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showing their openness and willingness to address their differences, which captured the minds of 
the public and marked a watershed in the peacebuilding process. Learning from this perspective, 
one can take into consideration the cases of South Sudan, DRC and Somalia. It is important to 
acknowledge that the ethnic tension in South Sudan, which is the centre of conflict and the 
spoiler effect to the peace negotiation process, demonstrates the need of a legitimisation process 
such as that of Guatemala.  
Inclusive peacebuilding 
The concept of inclusive peace traced to Dag Hammarskjöld47 principles of peace, which shaped 
and refined the contemporary process of building peace in the twenty-first century. Melber 
(2015:11) notes that Hammarskjöld principles “were based on an understanding that it was only 
by embracing a variety of different interests and actors that a framework for lasting conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding could be achieved”. In light of this, conflict transformation 
proponents seek to establish that sustainable peace is an outcome of engaged processes, which 
negotiates various interests, relationships, discourses, and in some instances, the societal 
structures that perpetuates violent conflict. This has to be achieved through embracing inclusive 
approaches to building peace. It endorses the need to consider and give much support to some 
research perspectives, which investigates how conflict is viewed and defined from different 
angles. Crocke et al (2014), therefore, assesses that it inspires in guiding the anticipations of the 
conflict patterns that can affect the world in the future, and in this case Africa.  
The idea of ‘inclusive peacebuilding’ has inspired research in trying to address the challenge of 
conflict relapse in most post-conflict environments following peace agreements or settlements. 
Peacebuilding literature in the 21st century began to focus on more hybrid peace approaches as a 
way of challenging the absolute (top-down or bottom-up) approaches, which have continuously 
failed to secure sustainable peace in Africa. Looking at the literature, Lederach (1997: xvi) 
establishes that the contemporary processes of building peace in conflicts “calls for long-term 
commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of a society, an infrastructure that 
empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the 
contribution from outside”. This assessment assures on the need for flexible peace approaches 
                                                          
47  
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that are able to tackle the political, social, environmental and economic issues that may hinder 
sustainable peace.  
The impact of inclusivity in the peace processes 
Inclusivity in peacebuilding process seeks to mitigate the exclusion of actors in peace 
agreements, which has resulted in spoilers. Most peace agreements often engage a limited 
number of actors, which result in limited representation of people’s views and aspirations in the 
peace process. This has undermined the participation of local, cultural, traditional, minority 
groups and civil society actors in most peace processes over the years. UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki Moon (2009: 5) endorses the need and importance of inclusive peacebuilding as a source 
of redemption. He argues that, “Local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, 
including marginalized groups, have a critical role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table 
for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the 
country’s future”. This offers an extensive platform that is critical in addressing spoiler 
problems, exclusionary policies and absolute peace approaches, which have been detrimental to 
post-conflict peacebuilding in the DRC and Somalia in particular. Therefore, Hammargren et al 
(2015:5) concurs to the importance of inclusivity by exposing how, “peacebuilding practitioners, 
researchers and policymakers have recognized the importance of inclusivity and regularly 
discuss best practices and methods within various fora at the United Nations, as well as in civil 
society circles, for increasing engagement in peace processes.” 
Scholars such as Stephen Stedman produced extensive seminar work in addressing the complex 
nature of protracted crises and spoilers in Somalia. The focus of the work addresses various 
factors, which [has] influence[d] groups and individuals to spoil the peace process in the country. 
The case of Somalia has telling incidents of reconciliation processes that were blocked and 
endemic conditions of warfare. Spoilers in Somalia have proved to possess quite a foothold in 
undermining peace accords, perpetuating violent criminality and lawlessness, protracted warfare, 
and state failure. In some instances, others have engaged on peace building strategies to undercut 
crime, violence and increase of conflict in local communities only to undermine the revival of an 
effective central government. Thus, Stedman’s work anchors the solution to these crises in the 
inclusion of spoilers in peace negotiation process. Some peace mediators have treated the 
broadening of inclusiveness in peace with cynicism, however, Thania Paffenholz (2015:3) 
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provides a solid assessment, which clarifies the effectiveness of inclusive negotiation of peace, 
“Contrary to assumptions made by many mediators, broader inclusion does not reduce the 
likelihood of reaching agreements. Only in one case was an agreement not reached when a high 
number of included actors had significant influence on the process.” 
Gender and civil society have gained much momentum in the contemporary peace process due to 
the rise of inclusiveness in peacebuilding. The role of women in peace process has increasingly 
been supported to take a centre stage in the DRC due to the increasing use of rape as a weapon of 
war. Gender consideration entirely breathes some new perspectives in the peace processes as 
women provide an experience and angle that undermined and left out in the peace and 
development policies. In their investigation of the inclusivity of women in the UN’s Peace, 
Support and Cooperation (PSC) framework Reilly and Warren finds out that: 
“While women interviewed agree with the Government, for example, that security sector reform and the 
consolidation of state authority are top priorities and vital to achieving peace, the analysis and solutions the 
women put forward are different. Women repeatedly point to inextricable links between social, economic, 
and personal security, backed by the rule of law. These assessments are oftentimes based on their personal 
experiences and the reality of their lives. In contrast, the DRC Government relegates the social and economic 
development aspects of the PSC Framework to the bottom of its list of priorities” (2014:7). 
Considering that, the conflict in the DRC has exposed the widespread social inequality. The 
inclusion and greater participation of women at every peace process and peacebuilding level 
enables the comprehension often left out perspectives in structuring strong security sector 
reforms, social and economic reforms that are key in building sustainable peace policies.  
More so, civil societies have gained much trust from the international actors in the peace 
process over the past decades (Belloni 2001; Fagan 2005). In Somalia, the civil society has 
been entrusted with state roles such as service delivery. The role of a civil society in peace 
processes is to offer an extensive civil education and a voice, which checks the 
responsibilities of the state and negotiates on the role and relationship of the local community 
with the international norms in peacebuilding processes. Fischer (2011:300) posits that, “civil 
society initiatives have been undertaken in peace education, dialogue projects, the 
empowerment of women and youth”. Civil-based initiatives have played a significant role in 
bridging various challenges affecting youth, women and even ethnicity challenges. However, 
it is a huge challenge when the role of civil society is over emphasised by international 
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organisations and entrusted with the roles of the state undermines the whole process of 
inclusivity as in the case of Somalia. Thus in Somalia there is need for more educational 
oriented civil societies that guard and invest the norms of governance and the importance of 
state-building in ensuring sustainable peace. For instance, in July 2016 the civil society 
alliance in South Sudan “urged the IGAD48 authorities not to interfere or take side in the 
affairs of South Sudan and not undermine the transitional government of national unity” when 
they had suggested the handing over of Juba international airport to the UN for protection 
(Atekdit, 2016). This reaction endorses the missing link in the Somalian civil society that is to 
safe guard the existence and role of the state if sustainable peace is to be ensured. The 
inclusion of civil society in processes should be viewed as an entry point for peace education 
and a driving force behind the formation of strong functional government. This is a platform 
to reach out to different people [across different levels and diversity] and have them  
participate in the decisions that pertain to their peace. Also to revisit their local and societal 
values that they channel into rebuilding a peaceful society.  
Coherent Peace Approaches 
Judy Cheng Hopkins (2014) in a video49 on coherent peacebuilding policy explains that, 
coherence in peacebuilding is having shared and well defined objectives internally50 (within a 
nation) as well as externally51 (with the international community). She further clarifies how 
coherence and coordination are interchangeable terms in which the former explains more on 
policy formulation and the latter explains more of program intervention. This research explores 
the limitations by various actors in peace to negotiate on local values that are profitable to peace 
that are neglected in peacebuilding policing and programs. Thus, it seeks to fill the gaps on the 
issues and concepts that maybe key in addressing the lapsing and relapsing of conflict in Africa 
even within five years or less following peace agreements. Henceforth, understanding the 
effectiveness of coherence in guiding peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery policies and 
strategies can provide new and strong perspective in confronting the horrors of African conflict 
                                                          
48 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)  
49 A video titled “Towards a More Coherent Peacebuilding Policy Community” made for the ACCORD Peacebuilding Seminar 
which took place in Johannesburg, on 19-20 February 2014. 
 
50 Defined by Internal actors who are all local actors involved in the peacebuilding activities taking place in a conflict system or 
country 
51 Defined by all international actors involved in the peacebuilding activities in a conflict system or country 
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problems. Considering that this research engages Africa’s most intractable conflicts, which are in 
the DRC, South Sudan and Somalia, there is much need to understand not only the foundations 
of the conflicts but the strategies of peace which have been engaged so far but had not yielded 
significant results. These three deadly conflicts in the history of the continent have received the 
much attention from different actors, which ranges from local, national, inter-governmental, non-
governmental and international but with little impact towards achieving sustainable peace. The 
negotiation of coherent peace approaches in this instance seeks to revisit and challenge 
organizational values and liberal norms that co-opt the peace agenda, and guide their priorities to 
correlate with sustainable peace. As such coherent peacebuilding principles in any community 
systematically challenges the operating in ad hoc, piecemeal and highly fragmented programs 
which disguise themselves in the mantra of local ownership and yet crowded with external 
driving factors, with alien principles to the local factors they represent (Tschirgi, 2015: 478). 
Most peacebuilding processes in the 21st century have been set forth in ad hoc projects. 
Peacebuilding initiatives in most if not all post-conflict recovery strategies have been run as ad 
hoc programs and as such Houton (2014: 6) emphasises that this remains the greatest impasse as 
piecemeal engagement seeks to address sustainable political change. Coherent peace approaches 
in this research refer to strategies that do not only rely on the presence of international 
community or joint government committees that meant to provide quick solutions to the conflict 
problems. These engagements are important and have played, and are still playing their role. 
However, the relapse of conflicts following such engagements calls forth for a deep solution 
inquiry, which may help in addressing the impasses sustaining such a crisis, and in this case ad 
hoc peace. Ad hoc peace engagements create an invisible barrier amongst the different 
peacebuilding agents in a conflict community. International peacebuilding systems are often 
guided by specific [short-term] timeframe projects and specific goals that assume the needs of 
the conflict community to address the conflict crisis. Peace researchers have come to agree that 
hese short-term projects inhibit a full cycle of transformation to take place, as they are too rapid 
for conflict/post P conflict societies to manage (Paffenholz & Spurk 2006; Hoffman, 2006; 
Vorath 2012). Timothy Donias (2014) argues that peacebuilding process should be regarded as a 
permanent process, which is incorporated in state-building governance institutional missions and 
projects in all post-conflict peace strategies.  
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The UN peacebuilding literature in the 21st century began to establish the need for coherent 
peacebuilding strategies. In May 2007, the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee adopted a 
“conceptual basis for peacebuilding for the UN system” which focused on reducing the risk of 
lapsing and relapsing into conflict through coherent and tailored peacebuilding strategies that 
address specific needs and build national ownership in the conflict countries. It is clear that most 
peace actors in conflict countries are driven by different visions and goals but unless they are 
coordinated to engage on the common goal of sustainable peace, coherent peacebuilding remains 
a challenge. Cedric de Coning (2008) endorses the United Nations’ integrated approach concept 
as an effective way to consider in addressing coherence and coordination dilemma in post-
conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding systems. He affirms that “Pursuing coherence helps to 
manage the interdependencies that bind the peacebuilding system together, and coordination is 
the means through which individual peacebuilding agents can ensure that they are coherent with 
the overall strategic framework” (De Coning, 2008:85). Coherent peacebuilding meant to assist 
in pulling together all the resources and actors together in ensuring maximum impact in tackling 
conflict challenges that may disturb the effective building of peace. De Coning (2008:88) 
clarifies that “A complex peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction system requires a wide 
range of internal and external actors, including governments, civil society, the private sector and 
international agencies, to work together in a coherent and coordinated effort.” Various phases of 
disjointed peace engagements and decisions have been evident in Africa’s longest conflict 
countries, which include DRC, Somalia, and South Sudan, hence the consistent relapse of these 
conflicts.  
Hammargren et al (2015:5) argues that, “for peacebuilding processes to lead to sustainable 
peace, participation and engagement from a broad spectrum of society is required over an 
extended period of time.” Whenever a peace agreement or cease-fire agreement signed, it now 
marks the beginning of post-conflict intervention and calls for the support of the international 
community in the peace process and in the implementation of various strategies. This phase 
chronologically advances in three stages, which are the stabilization phase, the transitional phase, 
and the consolidation phase in which “the host society has developed the capacity to manage and 
sustain its own peace process without external support” (De Coning, 2008: 88). Scholars often 
agree that peacebuilding intervention ends when the society has reached such an 
accomplishment.  
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In the DRC, international organisations have consistently failed to assist the internal actors to 
consolidate the peace process and transform the causes of the conflict. This is largely because 
international actors have kept their strategies separate from the local values. The UN reports 
have clarified on several incidences in the DRC where inconsistency on their security intel has 
resulted in the massacre of civilians by rebels and rival ethnic groups, hence its coherence as an 
agency of peace in the country has been questioned by both local and some critics even unto this 
day (Human Right Watch, 2014). In Somalia, the international actors have engaged on an 
imbalanced focus by engaging civil societies in advancing development and humanitarian 
dimensions more. In turn this has created more problems for peacebuilding process as security, 
politics, human rights and rule of law are still separately advanced by some local actors (tribal 
clans, or warlords) who in most cases oppose the formation of a functional state. In South Sudan, 
international actors are yet to directly engage the fact that a range of local actors need to be 
engaged on the foundations of social inequality and injustice that is perceived amongst the ethnic 
groups. The confrontation of all these issues can assist in addressing many of the potential 
loopholes of conflict resurgence, and assist in transforming the societies into achieving 
sustainable peace and development.  
Effective communication and dialogue in building peace processes 
Effective communication and dialogue among stakeholders in the peace negotiation and 
engagement has to be guided by the three concepts extensively discussed above. Each process of 
negotiating peace agreements should provide a legitimate platform for local peace initiatives, 
inclusively engage stakeholders at a broader scale and have coherent structures that are 
sustainable even in the state governance and local institutions. According to Ramsbotham et al, 
(2011: 374-80) the focus towards addressing protracted and intractable conflicts shifted in the 
21st century with a new interest to constructively engage conflict from all dialogical spheres in 
which the solutions are not only built in the approaches but also by employing a strategic 
engagement in communication amongst conflicting parties. To give clarity, Kievelitz et al, 
(2003) articulates how the UN, World Bank and other bilateral organisations began to distance 
themselves from mere diplomatic level intervention (in conflicts) into constructive thinking 
engagement at the dawn of the new millennium. Much support has been given by donors since 
early 2000 to fully engage in sustainable peace approaches. However, despite the call and 
widespread literature on national/local peacebuilding ownership, most people oriented initiatives 
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remain unnoticed. Gender contributions remain in the doldrums with very little practical 
platforms. In addition, as such there is need for effective communication and dialogical 
platforms through the inclusion and legitimisation to set up institutional support for those 
undermined voices trapped by traditional and liberal peace frameworks.  
Erzurum and Eren (2014) argue that in every peacebuilding process, communication is the main 
driving force that ensures the survival of the process. Dialogue is the pivot that holds every peace 
agreement. Communication and dialogue in peacebuilding processes need to be consistent and 
inclusive of all stakeholders in order to understand the values and norms that construct 
legitimacy and ensure a coherent peacebuilding process. In most African peace processes, 
international organizations and actors have engaged in ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategies, which are 
monolithic in approach and as such neglected a dialogue between the local and international 
peace approaches, which has destroyed the foundation of cooperation, and working on 
complementary peace measures.  
Integrative peace approaches and hybrid-peace theories explores on transformative ideas that 
upholds measures, which promote sustainable peace. They engage on communication as the 
synthesis that interact top-down to bottom-up, local to international, and grassroots- to top-
leadership in every peacebuilding process. It is essential to understand that in some post-conflict 
environments such as Somalia where trust amongst the clans dismantled under the rule of Siad 
Barre, these situations place a huge demand on the various actors to engage on consistent 
communication and dialogue to build an interactive momentum that can drive transformation 
amongst societies. Communication helps in reducing competition, duplication and waste 
amongst agencies involved in the peace processes in the same conflict constituency. Thus 
communication and dialogue can help in harnessing organisations to cooperate in developing 
strategies, sharing information and mobilising resources that essential to post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacebuilding.  
Communication and dialogue in peace present itself in various forms and ways in the 
peacebuilding literature. It manifests in the theoretical concepts and perspectives that guides 
processes of building peace which include types of negotiation and intervention, top-down or 
bottom-up approaches and tracks of diplomacy. All these perspectives and concepts have their 
unique and effective role to play in communicating strategies of building peace in each stage. 
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Scholars agree that despite the unique attributes of all the concepts and perspectives research 
clearly outlines that they complement each other to communicate for the effective building of 
sustainable peace (Garwerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et al, 2011).  
The importance of Local Ownership in African peace processes 
Having understood the above-discussed concepts, one can notice that they all share the common 
understanding of how failure in peacebuilding processes is mostly driven by the lack of local 
support or ownership of the process. They expose failure in building sustainable peace as an 
outcome of imposed peace strategies, which rarely acknowledges the legitimacy, which lies 
within the traditional and societal norms of every community. There is lack of understanding on 
how effective peacebuilding can be built on the altars of inclusive peace strategies. In 
understanding Zuam’s (2012:55) perspective, African peace is in need for a reconciliation of all 
top-down post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding strategies “with local needs and 
conditions and to resolve some of the tensions between vertical and horizontal legitimation 
efforts”, so as to channel the standard moral imperative that lies within local ownership of peace. 
The local involvement in the design and setting up of institutions therefore, commands social 
compliance, which helps in strengthening the effectiveness, and sustainability of the peace 
processes even in the absence of external/outside support. Scholars on African peacebuilding 
processes agree that most setbacks and failures are accredited to the “liberal peace frameworks”. 
They institutionalize western liberal norms and constrict local involvement in the establishment 
and building of the new social and political institutions (Autesserre 2009, 2010, 2011; Curtis 
2012; Donias 2009, 2014; Murithi 2006, 2007, 2008; Tschirgi 2004, 2015; Zaum 2012; Pouligny 
2009; Sending 2009).  
Local ownership peacebuilding confronts the key challenges within the peace processes with 
practical knowledge (insider perspective) of issues which constantly cause the lapsing and 
relapsing of conflict in order to complement the theories of technical knowledge of international 
actors (outsider perspective) to the conflict problems. Therefore, the local ownership perspective 
provides an empowering context of understanding political, social, and economic issues that 
often stir sporadic violence such as land clashes, resource disputes (minerals, oil, water, or 
grazing land), and tribal clashes. Most international efforts in peacebuilding often approach these 
issues separately and regard them as a small price to pay in their focus of setting up national 
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institutions of governance. They pay little or no attention to the different levels of peacebuilding 
“where local violence might play a significant role in the prolongation of conflict” (Da Costa & 
Karlsrud, 2012:56). Thus, the engagement of local ownership in literature has sort to redeem 
African peace from technocratic approaches that have proven to be detrimental to sustainable 
peace. Özerdem and Lee (2016:146) concludes that “peacebuilding planned and implemented in 
a technocratic way by envisaging the challenge as different pieces of puzzle in the shape of 
different programmes and projects would likely fall short in achieving sustainable peace.” 
Local ownership is argued to be of help in effective “building and maintenance of local capacity” 
(Zaum, 2012: 56). Scholars agree that the support of local ownership strengthens the building of 
local institutions that are often duplicated by parallel bureaucracies of international aid structures 
that seek to employ peacebuilding and state-building projects. Thus this ‘sucks out’ local 
capacity by denying the state “financial resources” through parallel bureaucracy and “its most 
qualified public servants” to international organisations who pay larger salaries. Though most 
donors have recognised this challenge, which is very evident in Somalia, they increasingly 
remain channelling their support of aid through projects instigated by non-state actors, which 
constantly weakens (through replication) the institutions they intend to build and strengthen. It is 
only Britain’s Department of International Development (DFID), which has realised this impasse 
and amended its approach to endorse local ownership to support and increase the local capacity 
in peacebuilding and state building.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter explored the fundamental contemporary factors in conflict transformation 
perspective to peacebuilding. It harnessed the important functions that pull together mechanisms 
that may be useful in empowering local institutional capacity in post-conflict reconstruction and 
peacebuilding. It demonstrates how the negotiation of legitimacy, inclusivity and coherent peace 
approaches in African peace can go a long way in reducing the lapsing and relapsing of conflict. 
The engagement of communication and dialogue helps in identifying the missing diplomatic 
links in every peacebuilding level in the conflict society. Unless there is proper integration, 
communication and inclusivity in African peace processes between the international actors and 
local actors, sustainable peace remains trapped. The value of local ownership in peacebuilding 
bring forth an empowering strategy that negotiates for practical engagement between the top and 
 108 
the bottom. It actually clarifies that peacebuilding requires the involvement of all stakeholders, 
and any engagement independent of other key actors is most likely to overlook important factors 


















Chapter 6: A Redeeming Strategy: The relevance of Vertical 
Integration in building African Peace (Recommendations & 
Conclusion) 
 
“The deepest of level of communication is not communication, but communion. It is wordless ... beyond 
speech ... beyond concept.” Thomas merton52 
Introduction 
As identified in this research, the story of Africa tells a troubled history of post-colonial violent 
political and social transitions which are coupled with civil wars, civil unrest, terrorism and 
genocide. Cilliers and Schünemann (2013:1) endorses that, such kind of history, “is not 
surprising considering the divisiveness of the original boundary-making processes, the coercive 
nature of colonial rule and the messy process of independence”. More than two decades have 
now passed since the last legacies of colonial political dominance died in Africa with the end of 
South Africa’s apartheid regime. The post-colonial African state has been characterized by intra-
state conflicts, civil unrests, genocides, violent protests and endemic conflict cases. All case 
situations seem to have acquired a hopeless taste, in which peace seem to be a far-fetched 
concept. Despite decades of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding participation to 
address the conflict plight in most countries, sustainable peace changes are yet to materialize. 
The fault lines to the immaterial consequences of peace strategies are identified within the 
separate functionalities of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace, which have 
developed competing interests of superior relevance rather than integrative complementary 
interests to address the problem. Various stakeholders in peace are separated along these 
frameworks and as such, have remained cornered in their own ideological spaces. This hinders 
the recognition and involvement of various (local) indigenous and endogenous peace 
mechanisms from finding their place in the processes of negotiating peace at all political and 
social (leadership) levels53. 
The adoption of inclusive and integrated approaches in conflict transformation meant to ensure 
effective peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997; Joeng, 2005). The research argues for the use of 
                                                          
52 Most influential Catholic author of the 20th century.  
53 See Lederach’s Levels of Leadership Chapter 2. 
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flexible mechanisms and frameworks that support local ownership. They provide a better 
platform for expanding the local capacity to effectively harness their potential in yielding more 
results in the peacebuilding process (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Donias, 2013). The engagement of 
integrated frameworks in building peace allows the enhancement of comprehensive techniques 
that are driven from different perspectives that may be traditional, academic, local, national or 
international. Most liberal peacebuilding approaches in Africa are driven from different polarized 
levels (macro-micro) with very little effect in securing a peaceful sustainable post-conflict 
environment. The case studies engaged in this research present the loopholes that are consistently 
instigating the relapse of conflict and hindering the sustainability of both state building and 
peacebuilding. Donias & Burt (2014:5) in their analysis of peacebuilding through vertical 
integration perspective argues that, “peace must be built simultaneously from the bottom up, the 
top down and the middle out as well as on the emerging debate on ‘hybrid peace governance”. 
Thus to build sustainable African peace, various theoretical standpoints and approaches need to 
be revisited to challenge their effectiveness in addressing the intractable and contemporary-
conflict issues on the continent.  
This chapter justifies the analysis and findings of this research by engaging the perspective of 
vertical integration peacebuilding to provide a flexible platform of engaging ‘hybrid peace’ 
approaches. According to John Paul Lederach (1997:83), building peace in societies require 
flexible approaches which traces “how conflict emerges from, evolves within, and brings about 
changes in the personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions” and this helps in building 
transformative strategies, “for developing creative responses that promote peaceful change 
within those dimensions through nonviolence mechanisms”. Most African conflicts intractable 
and protracted in nature such that one conflict case is often driven by multiple factors, which 
include ethnic tensions, resource conflicts, power dynamics, territorial disputes and ‘incentive’ 
violence54. To offer a redeeming strategy in quietening the continuity of such consequences 
demands engagement from local, national and international community to combine their efforts 
and ideas to ensure sustainable outcomes. Therefore, this research concludes by critically 
engaging the need for effective alternative peace approaches in Africa, explores the effectiveness 
of vertical integration peacebuilding as a flexible hybrid peace approach to engage local 
                                                          
54 See Chapter 4, Analysis of David keen’s incentivized violence as a tool for negotiation. 
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ownership practices in African peace, and finally gives an overall conclusion of the research 
perspectives.  
The need for effective alternative approaches to African Peacebuilding 
The conflict transformation perspective “brings into focus the horizon toward which we journey, 
namely the building of healthy relationships and communities, both locally and globally. This 
process requires significant changes in our current ways of relating” (Maiese 2003:1). In 
understanding this dynamic thinking one can relate how the history of peacebuilding in Africa is 
clouded with monolithic and paternalist peace approaches that have enhanced complexity in the 
process. Peacebuilding meant to revive the political, economic and social fibres that make the 
society functions again in a well-coordinated and coherent system. For instance, in most post-
conflict reconstruction engagement in Africa the liberal peace framework has focused on peace 
agreements and elections as key peacebuilding strategies, whilst neglecting comprehensive 
engagement of actors within civil societies and communities to strike a social balance and 
representation from both the top and bottom (Kamniski 2011). 
More so, one can use the example of African Union to clarify on the challenges that have 
undermined sustainable peace and on the need for alternative peace approaches. In Fafore (2016) 
investigation of why ‘Africa remains punctuated by violent conflicts’ despite the establishment 
of African Union peace and security architecture, he highlights the huge gap that exists between 
the African Union and regional economic bodies (ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD etc.) as one the key 
hindrances to sustainable peacebuilding. This gap is a consequence of lack in inclusive 
deliberation of processes, cooperative engagement, and proper coordination amongst actors 
driving peace and security. The AU’s practical approaches to peace still remains trapped in 
liberal peace frameworks and though their peace and security architecture remains an African 
peace structure, the practice on the ground is totally distanced from the desired structure on 
paper. Most African scholars argue that the lack of funds by the AU remains the biggest 
challenge to the reality of African peace approaches. However, it is important to acknowledge 
that both the regional bodies and the AU have the greatest voice in distancing themselves from 
paternalist peace approaches when engaging with donors, non-governmental organizations and 
international stakeholders on the need for alternative peace engagement that are driven through 
local ownership and inclusive perspectives. Thus, this helps to increase the capacity of the local 
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actors in building peace. Increasing local capacity in peacebuilding processes in Africa is very 
much needed to ensure a sustainable cause as opposed to “an elite driven, top-down, outside-in, 
technocratic and overly formulaic experiment in social engineering that lacked local legitimacy” 
(Hoffman 2009:11). 
The broad perspective 
The research explored the various broad perspectives that are key to learn from in shaping the 
African peace mechanism. Inclusivity in peace processes requires engaging factors that are 
particular to your society and community. It is also important to note that there should not be 
romanticism of any peacebuilding process but rather careful consideration of processes for the 
purpose of sustainability.  
Tschirgi and de Coning (2015) provides a broad analysis in which they establish the various 
perspectives and understanding of peacebuilding compiled in literature over the years. They 
clarify on how peacebuilding should be understood firstly as; ‘Context-Specific’ thus it requires 
tailor-made strategies that are appropriately contextual. Secondly, peacebuilding is ‘Political’ 
therefore, “peacebuilding strategies need to be firmly grounded in an accurate understanding of 
the relations among multiple domestic and international actors with different motivations and 
agendas”. Thirdly, peacebuilding is as a ‘Multi-faceted Enterprise’, which addresses various, 
issues (governance, rule of law, justice, social reconstruction etc.) and from multiple fronts 
hence, one cannot address it through a single specific sector. Fourthly, peacebuilding as an 
‘Endogenous Process’ which requires representation and guidance from all societal levels 
(national-led and inclusive strategies [women and civil societies]). Fifthly, peacebuilding process 
requires anchor and support from ‘Local Structures, Systems, and Processes’ for the purpose of 
broadening and strengthening capacity in local institutions. Sixthly, peacebuilding should 
consider ‘Addressing Regional and Transnational Factors’ that drive55 internal conflicts. Finally, 
peacebuilding should be ‘constantly changing’ since there are constant radical changes in the 
“causes and dynamics of contemporary conflicts”. (Tschirgi & de Coning 2015:3-4). 
This expresses the flexible and dynamic perspective international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, regional actors, state actors, civil 
                                                          
55 Transnational and cross-border driving factors of internal conflicts “Factors such as cross-border flow of arms, refugees, 
natural resources and transnational organized crime and terrorism--along with security strategies designed to deal with them--fuel 
and exacerbate local level conflicts” (Tschirgi & de Coning 2015:4).  
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societies and local actors need to consider in engaging in sustainable peacebuilding. Each 
conflict environment has unique qualities that need understanding and as such requires 
approaches that are considerate of the social norms, political sensitivities, and factors that 
constantly and consistently cause conflicts. This endorses the need for new and broad alternative 
peace building approaches in addressing African conflicts. The research has explored these 
different dynamics in trying to support the advancement of hybrid and integrated peace 
frameworks in African peace.  
The impact of Vertical integration peacebuilding  
The adoption of vertical integration peacebuilding in this research meant to provide the most 
flexible, inclusive and integrated way of penetrating societies and yield effective results. This 
allows for comprehensive peacebuilding techniques acquired across multiple-disciplines; by 
trans-disciplinary approaches; or through indigenous and endogenous peace strategies. Integrated 
frameworks are considerate of the various societal structures that can be of use in advancing and 
ensuring sustainable peace. Donias & Burt (2014: 5) endorses this view by clarifying that “peace 
must be built simultaneously from the bottom up, the top down and the middle out as well as on 
the emerging debate on ‘hybrid peace governance’.” Vertical integration peacebuilding provides 
a solid foundation for perfect ‘hybrid’ peace frameworks that blend in African societies, since its 
approach in any conflict environment is to decipher the various factors that undermines positive 
peace outcomes across all levels of society.  
DRC, Somalia and South Sudan presents various setbacks, which have thwarted the success of 
sustainable peacebuilding. It is clear that in the DRC, citizens have lost much trust and 
confidence in the international peace supporters for failing to support and protect civilian lives. 
The case of Somalia presents a contestation between clannism, civil societies and state building. 
South Sudan shows evidence of a polarized society, which is barely recognized as need for a 
more inclusive and integrated peace approaches by the key peace stakeholders. Such intra-social 
cleavages which are curved by tribal and ethnic differences, “points to the need to think more 
holistically and more strategically about which linkages – across which axis – are especially 
critical for peacebuilding” (MacCandless et al 2015:4). Vertical integration peacebuilding 
thinking provides a perspective of how in these countries better coherence and coordination 
across all actors in international, national and local levels need to be improved. Timothy Donias 
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(2015:240) clarifies how vertical integration challenges the peace process to build state-society 
relations, to reconcile national and local ownership, “of engaging the citizens and civil societies 
of conflict affected states as agents, rather than objects, of peacebuilding initiatives” [which is 
key in the three countries].  
The conflict transformation perspective argues that peacebuilding aspires to create a ‘political 
space’, where all structural limitations; barriers to peace; and stability and development are 
negotiated and eliminated (Cousens et al 2001). Various scholars agree that a ‘political space’ in 
peacebuilding is a strategic platform where all stakeholders from international actors, 
government actors and diplomats, civil societies, citizens and local authorities negotiate their 
relevance in the peace process. It is clear that in most peacebuilding processes, particularly those 
that involve peace agreements, such spaces are rarely there. The peace agreement process often 
involves the ‘big-men’ and there is always an assumption that their agreement directly trickles 
down to peace and yet in most cases like in the DRC it has never been the case. Vertical 
integration advocates for an inclusive and legitimate peace process, which encompasses broad 
stakeholder participation. McCandless et al (2015: 2) concludes that, “ultimately, just as vertical 
linkages between the local, national and international drive conflict and fragility, they offer 
crucial entry points for thinking and practice around building and sustaining peace”. 
Vertical integration peacebuilding focuses on empowering the local citizens to participate in 
building their peace. Scholars agree that most local conflicts (inter-and intra-community) which 
forms the part of the causes of bigger conflict continuity are rarely (or never) touched by the 
international dimension of peacebuilding. Thus, Kamatsiko (2015:57) argues that vertical 
integration provides alternative grassroots peacebuilding engagements, which “reveal that 
vertical linkages within broader categories such as ‘the local’ can be no less important to the 
success of peacebuilding initiatives”. This provides a platform for increasing the local capacity to 
build peace, something that is greatly needed in African peace approaches.  
Recommendations for effective peacebuilding in Africa: an integrative 
perspective 
Having engaged on the various impasses and challenges in policy and practice of peacebuilding 
in Africa’s intractable conflict situations, this section seeks to recommend policies and strategies 
that may help in setting up effective peace mechanisms that ensure a meaningful inclusion across 
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all political and social structures as identified in the previous two chapters. The task of building 
peace in the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan is quite a challenging one, as Africa’s longest 
conflicts they have demonstrated much complexity and tenacity for blinkered and inflexible 
peacebuilding frameworks. The factors that can transform the challenges peculiar to the 
continuity of conflict in these three countries primarily lie in comprehending the local, national 
and international peace structures in confronting the various social, political and security 
polarities that exist not only in policies but in peace agreements and practice of building peace.  
Comprehensive institutional support to local threats to curtail sporadic violent outbreaks: 
There is need for both international and government actors to take all the local rumors of violent 
threats seriously. The relevant institutions of peace involved in the countries need to establish a 
comprehensive structure that integrates the political, social and security challenges from local, 
national and international levels. For instance, in the DRC, several incidents of civilian 
massacres have been recorded and are still taking place in the Eastern Congo with very little 
response from the UN troops and relevant actors in mitigating the continuity of such issues. The 
government and its stakeholders need to improve on their communication with the local 
communities in order to create a viable political, social and security framework that seek to avert 
conflicts and disputes that are instigated by ethnic differences, resource control, land disputes 
and power dynamics. Programs have to be put in place to facilitate transformative activities that 
cohere the civilians, civil societies and government actors in establishing community-based 
peace mechanisms and conflict aversion strategies that are inclusive of local leaders, women and 
children without resorting to violence.  
Support of State Apparatus by International actors and donors to increase national and 
local institutional capacity: There is much need for the establishment of effective local 
institutions particularly in Somalia and South Sudan. The strength of clans in Somaliland and 
effectiveness of Civil Societies and warlords in providing service delivery in Puntland has 
undermined state building and peacebuilding. The international and regional actors involved in 
state-and peacebuilding need to empower the state apparatus by channeling their resources 
through it to strengthen its relevance through effective employment and service delivery. The 
stakeholders need to engage on massive support for skills training within the local and national 
institutional structures to demonstrate the relevance and need of a state as well as the validity of 
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the peace process. Such engagement can help quell mistrust of civilians towards their 
governments, which has become the major driver of conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. 
Inclusive and principled peace mechanisms in the resolution of disputes: There is need for a 
revisit of each peace agreement to check the inclusivity of the process and fulfillment of the 
needs of various stakeholders involved. This helps in addressing the enmity and distrust that is 
build amongst ethnic diversities involved in the peace processes. There is need for more national 
peace approaches to quell the various polarities that exist in the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan. 
Thus, integrated approaches provide an inclusive and legitimization platform that puts the 
differences into perspective. There is need for peace networks in which communities engage in 
what they need and desire for a peaceful society. It is important to note that most actors in peace 
processes are distant from the needs of their hosts when it comes to peace. The UN and AU need 
to engage the regional bodies in establishing effective and binding structures in monitoring the 
peace agreement processes that are often undermined.   
Conclusion 
This research provides a comprehensive analysis of the various weakness and loopholes in the 
peace mechanisms that have been engaged in African peacebuilding. It argues for hybrid peace 
mechanisms that are driven by integrative approaches in order to bridge the gaps that exists 
across the international, national and local level peacebuilding policies and practices. Thus, it 
critically challenges the functionality of liberal peace frameworks as paternalist and monolithic 
hence the constant undermining of the local ownership in the African peace processes. The case 
studies explored in this research provides the institutional and social challenges rarely considered 
in the peacebuilding process and yet are crucial for the sustainability of peace. The use of 
vertical integration peacebuilding as a theoretical approach serves to clarify that every 
stakeholder in peacebuilding no matter how small has a role to play. Thus in intractable and 
protracted social conflicts which encompasses most African conflict counties there is much need 
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